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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides an overview of the Sri Lankan internal conflict with a 
view to identifying some of the factors that contributed to the dispute between the Sri 
Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The conflict has been 
variously explained as an ethnic, political or complex conflict involving a number of 
factors, such as colonialism, ethnicity, religion, economy, politics and globalisation. 
While appreciating the varied nature of approaches to the issues and the presence of 
the number of sociological models that are competing in their appeal, this thesis uses 
the four-dimensional model of social power offered by Michael Mann to understand 
the causal relationships to explain the conflict in Sri Lanka. It argues that Mann’s 
theoretical framework helps to highlight some of the interconnected elements that 
contributed to the conflict. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on a multi-causal explanation of the Sri Lankan conflict. 
Following Michael Mann and his theory of social power, the research analyses the 
effect that the four sources of power—ideological, economic, military and political—
had in contributing to the conflict.  Mann’s methodology looked at the role played by 
each of the four dimensions, while he asserted that each varied in size and reach at 
different times in history (1986, p.17 & 523).  This is particularly useful given the 
length of the Sri Lankan conflict.  Given the ‘messiness’ of human societies and “the 
myriad of human goals” (1986, p.28 & 30), this thesis proposes to reach a 
‘proximate’ understanding of what led to the social change and the conflict in Sri 
Lanka. 
This chapter outlines a brief background of the conflict (section 1.1), the 
context of the research (section 1.2), and its purposes (section 1.3). Section 1.4 
describes the significance and scope of this research.  Finally, section 1.5 includes an 
outline of the remaining chapters in this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Military fighting between the Tamil rebels and the government forces started in 
the 1970s with escalated attacks by the 1980s.  The full-scale guerrilla war 
commenced in July 1983 with the killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers by the LTTE in 
Jaffna.  Since then, continuous attacks have been seen with the occasional periods of 
ceasefires.  The LTTE with its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, led the campaign to 
overthrow the government and to establish a separate state for the Tamil people in 
northern and eastern Sri Lanka. 
The end of the conflict in May 2009 forms the backdrop for the present 
research undertaking.  Although the conflict continued to be popularly categorised as 
an ethnic conflict between the numerically powerful Sinhala majority and the Tamil 
minority, the need to better understand the roots of the conflict became apparent to 
ensure a lasting peace.  While the contribution of religious and ethnic ideologues are 
not denied, this research will reveal that the conflict is much more and that it is a 
complex web with a multitude of interconnecting dynamics at play. 
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Based on Mann’s model, it is argued that the Sri Lankan conflict is, first and 
foremost, a class struggle that was popularly manifested as an ethnic dispute. 
1.2 Context 
The focus of the study is to better understand the Sri Lankan conflict. This is 
done through the use of Mann’s theory on social power so as to develop a multi-
causal explanation of the conflict. 
My engagement with this research was driven by a number of factors.  As a Sri 
Lankan myself, I grew up in Colombo as part of the Sinhala majority and the conflict 
was simply a part of life.  However, for the past ten years I have been living abroad.  
The distance from my homeland has allowed me to think about my country and the 
conflict with a fresh perspective.  This was fuelled by many conversations with non-
Sri Lankans who were interested in my view, but who, at the same time, were able to 
discuss my country’s problems without pre-conceived notions.  Further, the 
complexity of the issues surrounding the dispute has resulted in the promotion of 
wrong facts and assumptions, and meant that many people did not (and continue not 
to) understand its origins.  This led me to want to engage with this subject, not only 
to understand the issues better myself, but also, as a representative of my country 
living abroad, to contribute to the learning of a significant chapter in my country’s 
recent history. 
As argued by Mann (1986, p.28 & 30), the myriad of human goals and the 
inherent disarray of human societies mean that any theory adduced would only be a 
‘proximate’ one that would “encompass some of their broadest contours” (p.30).  
Further, I am mindful that these four sources mentioned by Mann are ideal types and, 
in reality, each will be fused with one or more other sources, again highlighting the 
difficulty in establishing an ultimate cause/factor. 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to offer a broader understanding of the multitude 
of events that led to the ultimate clash between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE.  
In order to accomplish this, Michael Mann’s model on social power is offered as a 
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good structure to look at some of the ‘myriad of human goals’ and the resulting 
networks of power that were embedded in the crystallisation of the Sri Lankan state. 
Broadly, the main objective of this research is to understand the manner in 
which each of these social powers contributed to the Sri Lankan conflict.  The 
objective can be broken into the following subsidiary ones, which have been 
addressed in each of the five main chapters (Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 inclusive). The 
subsidiary objectives are: 
(a) To explore the effects that ideological power had in polarising the social 
groups in Sri Lanka and to understand the extent to which this power 
influenced the direction of the conflict. 
(b) To understand the extent to which economic power contributed to the 
formation of classes in Sri Lanka and to identify the consequences of the 
resulting social stratification. 
(c) To determine whether military power played a role in the conflict, other than as 
a means of defence. 
(d) To study the manner in which political power was used in Sri Lanka and to 
determine how it contributed to the conflict. 
(e) To examine the interconnections of Mann’s four dimensions of social power 
and to reveal the combined effect of those interconnections in the Sri Lankan 
state and society. 
1.4 Significance and Scope 
This study is a novel way of analysing the conflict in Sri Lanka, as there has 
been no published material that analyses it in a similar manner.  The existing 
literature does not consider the influence of the different sources of powers and the 
effect that their interconnections have had on the conflict.  The purpose of the 
research is to address this identified gap in the existing research, to analyse, and 
evaluate the effect of the sources of social power, both individually and their 
interconnections, in order to better understand the genesis of the conflict.  The aim is 
to offer a broader, holistic understanding of the dispute. 
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This research has utilised an historical-sociological analysis method.  It has 
involved the investigation of historical material such as material remnants, as well as 
written and/or otherwise recorded sources (primary or secondary).  Primary source 
materials examined include archival data from the Department of National Archives 
in Colombo.  The secondary sources include academic books, research journals and 
publicly available materials, together with government and NGO publications. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis contains nine chapters.  This chapter provides an introduction to the 
thesis, outlining the intention, background and purpose of the research.  It further 
provides the significance of this research. The remainder of the thesis has been 
divided into the following chapters. 
Chapter 2 briefly reviews some of the key literature amongst the vast quantity 
of literature about the Sri Lankan conflict and identifies the common themes that 
were presented by the literature.  The chapter will highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the arguments presented in these scholarly publications.  Based on the 
findings, this chapter will clarify the direction of the research and this thesis. 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical foundations that this thesis is based upon, 
especially that of Michael Mann.  Mann’s theoretical framework and his four 
networks of social power will be discussed, looking at the three major, sociological 
theorists and their influences on his thinking.  The chapter also contains an outline of 
the historical sociological methods used for this research. 
Each of the four networks of social power (ideological, economical, military 
and political) have been discussed in detail in the four subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4 outlines the ideological influences in the Sri Lankan conflict.  This 
chapter discusses Mann’s form of ideological power and also includes a brief 
understanding of the term, based on some other theorists’ views.  In understanding 
the importance of ideology in Sri Lanka, this thesis uses Mann’s analysis of 
ideological power to explain the social change in Sri Lanka.  The key issues are the 
transformation of Buddhism as a transcendent form of ideology and the wide use of 
ideology as an immanent morale to gain solidarity within the different groups.  In 
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understanding the power of ideology used in creating this seemingly ethnic division 
in Sri Lanka, it is argued that the development of the ethnic factions was not the 
result of the ideological power network alone. 
Chapter 5 explores Mann’s economic power to assess whether his assertions as 
to the economy, state and the formation of classes could give us a better understating 
of the conflict.  It is argued that the economic policies, since 1815 to date, increased 
the growing regional and social wealth disparity in Sri Lanka.  Extensive changes to 
the social stratification were seen and there was growing dissatisfaction to the 
centralised control of the state.  Mann’s observations on class struggles is particularly 
important, as he identifies the failure of class-based struggles to materialise due to 
the prevalence of some form of ‘extensive’ struggle.  This offers another potential 
point of view to explain how the conflict took shape in Sri Lanka. 
Chapter 6 looks at military power, as characterised by Mann, and its 
application in order to understand the militarisation by the Sri Lankan state and 
various groups, especially the LTTE and the JVP.  Mann’s classification of four 
levels of domestic repressions is used to understand the form of repression used by 
these military organisations.  Analysis shows the wide use of military repression in 
Sri Lanka.  Emphases will be on the aspirations of the military elite in engaging in 
domestic repression and the underlying interests that are carried out through 
geopolitical militarism.  It is argued that the state failed to detach military repressions 
from class struggles and protected the interests of the state’s old regime through 
geopolitical militarism. 
Chapter 7 continues with the theme and looks at political power to see whether 
the centralisation of this power in Sri Lanka (since the unification of the island by the 
British in 1815) contributed in some way to the conflict.  Mann’s theory on state 
formation and his “polymorphous crystallization model” (Mann, 1993, p.44) are 
explored, in order to trace the key forms of ‘crystallisations’ that shaped the 
development of the Sri Lankan state.  This chapter argues that the transcendent 
nature of other forms of power, especially that of ideology, allowed the state and its 
elite to penetrate social life through the (arguably excessive) use of ideological 
power.  The effect this had was the creation of division within social groups based on 
ethnicity, ultimately shaping the nation and the nature of the conflict. 
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Chapter 8 looks at Mann’s IEMP model as a whole, while discussing the 
findings of the previous four chapters (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7 inclusive).  As Mann 
describes, the interrelation of the four social powers are analysed to understand social 
development in Sri Lanka.  The ultimate goal being to better understand the reasons 
that led to the conflict.  A closer look will be taken on the power source/s that took a 
dominant role at various times in the history in Sri Lanka to help draw a map of the 
events that can explain the conflict between the state and the LTTE. 
This thesis concludes with Chapter 9, which discusses the utility of Mann’s 
model in analysing social change and, importantly, the Sri Lankan state formation 
and the conflict.  Discussion is based on whether this model offers a fertile method 
by which to analyse the Sri Lankan conflict and whether it has managed to fill the 
lacuna that the other literature failed to satisfy.  Further, Mann’s theory and model is 
tested for its adequacy as a method to analyse and explain social change in 
explaining conflicts and state formation in a non-European setting.  While this thesis 
highlights the overall usefulness of this model, it will also suggest aspects that will 
improve the model and help to extend the research to include additional dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the recent past, Sri Lanka was home to “one of the world’s most intractable 
wars and the longest running conflicts in Asia” (Bandarage, 2009, p.1).  The conflict 
became a vicious, territorial struggle between the Sri Lankan government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also known as the Tamil Tigers, who were 
fighting for the northern and eastern regions of the island. 
Over the years, there has been an overabundance of literature, both primary and 
secondary, about the Sri Lankan conflict.  The majority of this literature, however, 
leads to a mono-causal explanation of the conflict.  Broadly, three common themes in 
explaining the Sri Lankan conflict are presented.  These main themes describe the 
conflict as being either an ethnic one, as having risen from an ethno-political one, or 
as one based on economic factors.  The aim of this chapter is to analyse these three 
prevalent themes and to briefly guide the direction that this thesis embarks on in 
analysing the conflict. 
This chapter has been divided into three sections.  The first will give a brief 
overview of the conflict.  The second section will analyse the three main themes in 
the literature regarding the conflict.  The final section will propose a better method of 
analysing the conflict based on suggestions by some authors/analysts of the conflict. 
2.1 The Conflict in Brief 
Sri Lanka has been the focus of a vibrant, intellectual controversy in recent 
decades, largely concentrating around the dispute between its two major component 
communities of the society: the Sinhalese, who form the numerical majority, and the 
Sri Lankan Tamils.  The dispute, which ran through a good part of the last century, in 
changing modes, entered the last three decades resulting in the breakout of an all out 
war in its full fury between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka. 
Political exponents on each side, as well as other commentators, have variously 
described the dispute.  De Silva (1986) observes that, over the years, it has become 
evident that the conflict was not a simple, straightforward confrontation between an 
oppressed minority and a callous majority. 
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The armed Sri Lankan Tamil groups, which began to make their appearance 
from about the mid 1970s, claimed that they had taken recourse to military action as 
the means to achieving self-determination for (Sri Lankan) Tamils. In short, this 
meant total independence and separatism from the State.  Their action has taken on 
the appearance of a liberation struggle, which is what they claimed it to be.  This 
view of a ‘liberation struggle’ is claimed to have had general acceptance, even 
among some non-combatant Tamils (Myilvaganan, 2009). 
To give credibility to the Tamil claim for an identity of their own that 
warranted ‘liberation’ (i.e. independence and separatism) from the political situation 
in which they were caught up, it has been claimed that the Tamils and the Sinhalese 
existed as two distinct populaces occupying individual areas until the British yoked 
them together.  The Tamils sought to re-assert their political and legal sovereignty. 
For example, the FACT claims that the Tamils and the Sinhalese had existed 
previously as two separate nations in two separate territories until 1833 (i.e. political 
sovereignty), when British colonialism joined them together for ‘supervisory 
convenience’ by the Colebrook Commission.1  They also allege that the Tamils had 
never surrendered their legal sovereignty and remained inviolate in the British Crown 
through their rejection of the 1972 Republican Constitution.2   
In contrast, de Silva (1981) pointed out that, because the idea of a struggle or 
use of arms as part of a war of liberation generally has a greater attraction and even 
support at international level, the Sri Lankan Tamil claim took the form that there 
existed ‘two nations’, the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils, before British 
occupation.  Essential features used to build the ‘two nation’ theory were the 
possession of separate identities, such as the diverse languages spoken by each 
group, distinct territories and historical evidence of the existence of two separate 
political entities (in the latter part of the history of the country).  These were adduced 
                                                
 
1 The same claim was made in the Vadukkodai Resolution.  The Colebrook-Cameron Reforms (1832-
1833), led to the division of the island into five administrative provinces: North, South, East, West and 
Central. 
2 The 1972 Republican Constitution is claimed to have elevated Buddhism to a foremost place within 
the state.  The Tamils claimed that this was a symbolic and real alienation of the Tamil minority from 
the benefits of economics and political power (Wijeyeratne, 2007). 
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to support the claim with the Vadukkodai Resolution3 forming the official landmark 
when that claim was acknowledged as official.  However, analysis of this claim 
reveals that even the British, despite purposefully creating divisions within the 
society, still maintained the long-standing, territorial integrity of the island nation4 
(de Silva, 1981).  Later, the Indo-Sri Lanka accord5 of 1987 also refuted such claims, 
only referring to “areas of historical habitation of the Sri Lankan Tamil speaking 
peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other 
ethnic groups” (Bandarage, 2009, p.133). 
Some commentators, however, view the dispute in Sri Lanka as an armed 
struggle by the Tamil minority for their own land and self-determination.  However, 
describing the conflict as simply a military struggle for self-determination seems to 
be conceptually limiting. 
A recent analyst, Bandarage (2009), sees the conflict as also being a terrorist 
problem between an extremist secessionist group and the Sri Lankan state.  Quoting 
Gunasekera (1996) and Uphoff (2000), she points out that the problem seems to be a 
law and order issue involving a “blatant attempt by a minority to seize political 
power and territory” (Uphoff, 2000 cited in Bandarage, 2009, p.120).  Terrorism is 
defined as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the 
threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” (Wilkinson in Samaranayake, 
2007, p.1).  Although the actions of the LTTE have taken the form of a terrorist 
organisation, analysis of the conflict in terms of a terrorist problem alone is again 
conceptually limiting. 
                                                
 
3 Soon after the promulgation of the 1972 Constitution, several Tamil political groups resolved to 
close ranks to form the TUF (later renamed TULF).  Its first convention in 1976, under the 
chairmanship of Chelvanayakam, was the Vaddukoddai Resolution.  The resolution accused the 
United Front Government of callously ignoring the “last attempt … to win constitutional recognition 
of the Tamil nation without jeopardizing the unity of the country” and called on the Tamil nation and 
the Tamil youth to “throw themselves fully in the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the 
goal of a sovereign socialist state of Tamil Eelam is reached” (Wilson, 1994, p.128). 
4 The Kandyan Convention of 1815 between the British and the Sinhalese chieftains was the 
instrument which led the entire ‘Sinhale’ conceded to the British crown to become Ceylon. This ended 
the continuous Sinhalese rule of the island for over 2,300 years (de Silva, 1986). 
5 The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987 between Rajiv Gandhi 
(the then Indian Prime Minister), and J.R. Jayewardene (Sri Lankan President).  The aim of the 
Accord was to help resolve the fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government forces.  
According to the agreement, the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to a devolution of power and, the 
withdrawal of government forces from the north, in exchange of the disarmament of the Tamil rebels. 
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2.2 Examination of the Main Themes 
2.2.1 An ethnic dispute 
The most popularly favoured explanation of the dispute has been to project the 
conflict as an ethnic issue between the majority Sinhalese and the Tamil minority.  
This analysis deserves attention. 
Bandarage (2009) observes many Sinhala and Tamil nationalists portraying the 
conflict as a primordial conflict based on mutual distrust and violence spanning over 
more than two millennia.  De Silva (1986), on the other hand, describes the ethnic 
conflict as a manifestation of an age-old rivalry between the Sinhalese and Tamils.  
Emphasis is laid on the pre-colonial roots of the conflict, even before the Portuguese 
captured the island in 1505, the times when the Tamil and Sinhalese kingdoms were 
fighting to expand their boundaries in ancient Sri Lanka (Imtiyas & Stavis, 2008). 
De Silva (1997) explains that, although the Sinhalese are the majority within 
Sri Lanka, they “regard themselves as a[n] historically beleaguered minority facing 
an ancient antagonist whose main stronghold lies across the seas in Tamil Nadu in 
south India” (p.403).  Further, according to de Silva (1981), the Sinhalese consider 
themselves as the protectors of Theradava Buddhism.6 
Some, such as Shastri (1999), blame Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the 
starting point of the ethnic conflicts, alleging that it ultimately led to the Tamils 
becoming gripped by the same kind of “narrow and parochial chauvinism” 
(Seneviratne cited in Little, 1994, p.101).  Little (1994) explains that the ethnic 
conflict is not about religion alone, although religious belief is said to have 
“functioned in an important way as a warrant for intolerance” (p.101).  Roberts 
(2009) is more reserved in attributing the blame on Buddhist nationalism advocated 
by Anagarika Dharmapala.7  What is observed, however, is that in the early 20th 
                                                
 
6 Theravada Buddhism was obliterated in southern India under a Hindu revivalist tide and, therefore, 
Sinhalese perceive Tamils as the traditional national enemy against whom their ancestors fought at 
various times in the past (de Silva, 1996). 
7 Anagarika Dharmapala (17 September 1864 to 29 April 1933) was a model for the Buddhist activists 
of post-independence Sri Lanka.  He was almost the mirror image of Protestant Christianity in its 
organisational apparatus, never more so than in its propaganda techniques and the mores it upheld as 
an integral part of the current Buddhist culture (de Silva, 2005). 
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century, revivalist leaders from both communities used early literature for their own 
social and political purposes8 (Otis, 1988, p.10). 
An examination of pre-colonial times reveals that it was caste, not language 
and religion, that was the basis of social stratification at the time.  The concept of 
‘caste’ existed both among the Tamils and the Sinhalese, but not in such a virulent 
form among the latter as to prevent temple worship, use of wells, and dress by the 
lower caste Tamils (de Silva, 1981).  There was no visible conflict even as late as 
1912 between the Sinhalese and Tamil elites in the council.9  Otis (1988, p.12) states 
that the conflict during this period was, instead, based more on the different cultural 
reaction to colonialism, especially the level of Christian proscriptions.10 
The colonial history theorists, however, argue that the present pattern of ethnic 
relations in Sri Lanka was primarily created by its colonial history when borders 
were created and ethnic groups were defined (Imtiyas & Stavis, 2008).  More 
particularly, problems started to arise when the colonial rulers favoured and ‘allied 
with a particular group, often a minority, to help in colonial administration’ (Robert 
& Wolpe, 1970, cited in Imtiyas & Stavis, 2008).  This was especially evident in Sri 
Lanka.11  This priority extended also to land alienation and opening of settlements in 
former abandoned ‘tank country’ (a term used to denote ancient reservoirs) as seen 
from records of British administrators.12 
Following independence in 1948, the British colonial practice of classifying 
groups (for censuses and the issue of birth certificates) according to distinct cultural 
traits, using factors of race, language, and historical origin, was continued 
                                                
 
8 See further, Obeysekere, G. (1979). The Vicissitudes of the Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity Through 
Time and Change. In M. Roberts (ed.), Collective Identities: Nationalisms and Protest in Modern Sri 
Lanka (pp.279-313). Colombo: Marga Institute. 
9 Ramanathan Ponnambalam (a Jaffna Vellala Tamil) was elected to ‘vathe’ council by the Sinhalese 
electorate which was confined to educated/property owning Sri Lankans (Ceylonese) (De Silva, 
2005). 
10 See further, Wriggins, H. (1960). Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
11 Rozat & Bantra (1980) have referred to the Huntington doctrine followed by colonial powers, first 
advocated in Ireland of substituting local populations with imported alien populations.  De Silva, 
D.G.B., (2002) has taken this idea to explain the reasons for importing south Indian labour to Sri 
Lanka in the 19th century and the colonial administration’s plans to encourage the importation of 
south Indians and Jaffna people to settle in lands in the ‘tank’ country (under ancient irrigation 
works). 
12 See Administration reports of Trincomalee Kachcheri, and the records of Governor McCallum’s 
Durbar with Tamil Chieftains held in Jaffna in 1911 (Department of National Archives). 
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(Wickramasinghe, 2006; Little, 1994; Ram, 1989).  This was seen by these 
commentators principally as each group (Sinhala13, Tamil14 and others15) viewing the 
potential by identifying themselves as one ethnicity or another.  In making 
assessment, it should be noted that Sri Lankan Tamils wanted to keep their distinct 
identity separate from those of ‘Indian Tamils’.  They saw the majority of Indian 
Tamils as the descendants of indentured labour brought from south India to work in 
European-owned plantations with whom they did not wish to be identified socially.  
Therefore, Sri Lankan Tamils saw no advantage of associating them with their own 
political aspirations. 
The political party system introduced with the first parliamentary elections held 
in 1947, with independence in view, saw a profound change in the former electoral 
system, in which caste, creed, and sometimes ethnicity formed the determining 
factors.16  It is this party system, which has since continued to constitute the 
determining factor over old considerations of caste, creed, and ethnicity.  The LTTE 
was also seen as having made a conscious attempt, and succeeding in identifying 
themselves within this socio-cultural framework, thereby establishing a strong Sri 
Lankan Tamil identity17 even amongst the Tamil diasporas who had lost their identity 
in terms of language and culture (Nithyiyanandam, 2001). 
It is argued that the record of historical animosities against south Indian 
invaders has been manipulated as having played a significant role in influencing the 
current stage of the conflict.  Such efforts are seen as having hindered the process of 
nation building by introducing the idea of invaders (or enemies; the Tamils) and 
defenders (the Sinhalese).  Little doubt exists that group identity became a prominent 
                                                
 
13 The majority of whom are Buddhists, consider themselves to be descendents of the fair-skinned 
Aryan people of North India, pointing out that the Sinhala language is related to the refined and 
widely used Indo-European group of languages (Manogaran, 1987). 
14 The darker skinned, largely Hindu people of south India speaking the Dravidian language, Tamil 
(Manogaran, 1987).  Citing Matthews (n.d.), Manogaran (1987) argues that Tamil identity does not 
have a specific religious or Hindu dimension. 
15 Muslims, Malays and Burghers. 
16 However, during independence there was no indication that the ethnic differentiation could leave to 
a possible ethnic conflict as the elites of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) comprising of Sinhalese, Tamil, 
Muslim and Burghers were all united (Wilson, 1974). 
17 The LTTE allowed persons to rise above caste and creeds.  Velupillai Prabhakran, the LTTE leader, 
rose from the non-Vellala caste of Karaiyar, equivalent to ’Karawa’ caste among the Sinhalese.  In 
contrast to the Karawas in the Sinhalese society who rose to economic, social and political 
prominence among the Sinhalese in the 19th and 20th centuries.  The Karaiyars and other castes were 
not allowed to rise in the ‘Vellala–dominated’ Sri Lankan Tamil society (Roberts, 1982). 
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factor during colonial times, exacerbated by colonial policies of favouritism as 
shown towards minorities at the expense of the numerical majority.  This trend has 
continued post-colonial times.18  However, the attempt to explain the conflict in 
ethnic terms alone has its serious limitations. 
2.2.2 Rise of an Ethno-political Conflict 
A review of most accessed literature suggests that the problem has, at least in 
part, arisen as a result of the pursuit of political interests by the leadership of the 
numerical majority, as well as that of the Tamil minority, rather than being framed 
simply as an ethnic manifestation.  Otis (1988) describes this as the result of the 
breakdown of democratic institutions.19 
Moving on to more contemporary times, Shastri (2009) states that the root 
cause of the conflict has been the ‘flawed political settlement’ introduced at the time 
of independence by way of a centralised majoritarian parliamentary structure.  The 
1948 constitution is seen to provide for this democratic representation that is based 
on a majoritarian basis.20  However, there is strong evidence that, even prior to 
independence, plans for constitutional reforms by colonial authorities led to the 
emergence of communal rivalries to some degree (de Silva, 2005).  The introduction 
of communal-based representation for the non-official seats in the Legislative 
Council commenced from its inception in 1833, when the governor appointed them, 
based on a fixed ratio selected on a communal basis.  Not only was ethnicity 
introduced as the key to selection, the governor selected the Sinhalese and Tamil 
representatives based on caste.  The Sinhalese seat went to an upper class Goyigama 
(Cultivator) caste while the Tamil seat went to a high-class Vellala (Cultivator) caste 
and the practice hardened almost to a convention.  The divisive feature of the caste 
was so manipulated by the colonial authorities that, when the first elected 
representation was conceded, the Goyigama element in the educated Sinhalese 
                                                
 
18 See further, de Silva, K.M. (1976). Discrimination in Sri Lanka. In W. Veenhoven (ed.), Case 
Studies in Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
19 See also the following authors who have taken this similar view: Tambiah, S.J. (1986). Ethnic 
Fracticide and the Dismantling of Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Wriggins, H. 
(1960). Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Commaraswamy, 
R. (1984). Sri Lanka: the Crisis of the Anglo-American Constitutional Traditions in a Developing 
Society. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 
20 See Wilson, 1974; de Silva, 1977a. 
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electorate saw a preference for a Vellala Tamil rather than electing a man from the 
prosperous Sinhalese Karawa caste, who were highly distinguished by their 
education (de Silva, 2005). 
Prior to independence, under British rule, the island was unified and 
administration was centralised following the Colebrooke-Cameron recommendations 
of 1833.  However, Ram (1989) states that, for the purposes of administration, the 
British divided the people of Ceylon along ethnic lines and also those of religion.  
This was seen as the beginning of the ethno-political conflict that led to the growth of 
political parties inside ethnic and religious divisions (Perera, 1997; Ram, 1989).  
These views need to be subjected to close scrutiny. 
The establishment of five administrative provinces (for judicial purposes) on 
the recommendation of the Colebrooke Commission cut across ethnic boundaries.  
These provincial divisions broke up the old Kandyan provinces and annexed them to 
the Northern Province, the Eastern Province, and the Southern Province.  This could 
be seen more as a strategy to break up the power and influence of Kandyan chieftains 
after the experience of the 1818 Kandyan Rebellion.  It resulted in the negative step 
of breaking up the Kandyan political identity, which Governor Manning (1918-1925) 
later tried to restore.  Rather, it was the introduction of the communal-based 
appointments of members to the Legislative Council from 1833 that established the 
idea of communal-based representation.  Religion did not come into the picture, even 
in these appointments to the Legislative Council, but it was caste that figured in the 
selection.  Ponnambalam Arunachalam, who was appointed to represent the Tamils 
first, was a devout Hindu. 
De Silva (2005) shows that, at this stage in the island’s development, ethnicity 
was not a divisive factor.  He quotes the ‘Ceylon Standard’ of 8 June 1889, which 
commented: 
among the different races to be found in Ceylon, the existing relations are 
perhaps far more cordial than … in any other British dependency in the East,’ 
the divisive forces were religion and caste, especially, the latter and these 
caused divisions among the Sinhalese themselves rather than dividing the 
Sinhalese from other ethnic and religious groups … (p.369) 
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This means to say that the colonial government’s practice of selecting 
unofficial representatives to the Legislative Council from 1833 could not have had a 
determining influence from that early date.  Later, Governor Manning even 
manipulated ethnic divisions to such an extent that he was seen encouraging the 
Kandyans to assert their separate, political identity.  The intention was for the 
Kandyans to be used as a bulwark against low country Sinhalese agitation for a more 
representative government.  Manning’s strategy resulted in the addition of a 
‘Kandyan Sinhalese’ nomination to the legislature instead of increasing the Sinhalese 
representation, which was the demand of the (low-country) ‘constitutionalists’ (de 
Silva, 2005, p.484-491). 
Spencer’s (2008) argument that the Sri Lankan conflict is “first and foremost 
the outcome of a specific history of electoral politics …” which from the 1930s 
onwards was structured along “ethnic lines” (p.611), seems to be closer to reality, but 
the dividing line of 1930s he selected could arguably be shifted to an earlier date as 
discussed above. 
On similar lines, Dunham and Jayasuriya (2001) refer to the promotion of the 
patron-client relations by those in government and conclude that the: 
Sri Lankan setting has been moulded by a long history of patronage, and by a 
strong religious-ethnic and class divide as organising principles. We view the 
policy package as having been the outcome of conscious political (rather than 
purely economic) choices geared to strengthening patronage networks and 
buttressing political support. (p.18) 
Here, again, the conclusions seem to be too bold to be real. 
Manogram (1987) observes that, following independence, the leaders at the 
time were accused of using their power in the government to improve only their 
community’s economic and political positions.  The demand for preferential 
treatment by the Sinhalese-educated, rural people and Buddhist clergy further 
exasperated “a political culture that unified the different ethnic groups” (Gamage, 
2009, p.3).  Identification within ethnic groups is said to have prevailed over 
nationalism (Abeyratne, 2004, cited by Gamage, 2009). 
A more balanced view is presented by Wickremasinghe (1995) who says that 
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it is significant that even at the time of independence the three self-defined 
political groups (i.e. the majority, the minority and the British government) all 
found it to their advantage to preserve this ethnic structure and strategic 
ethnicity was practised by groups trying to secure a greater degree of power and 
reactive ethnicity by the threatened groups. (p.xxi) 
These ethnic politics also suited the political elite21 of the day, as it helped 
achieve their personal aspirations, which included gaining elite status (both Sinhala 
and Tamil) (de Silva, 1997).  This led many political leaders to speak of and blow up 
the grievances ‘in the guise of communal justice, and patriotic and religious fervour, 
alleging that the woes of one ethnic group were the outcome of the selfishness of 
another’ (Swan, 1997; Wickremasinghe, 1995). 
Significantly, the post-independence, intra-Sinhala power struggles, in 
particular between the UNP and the SLFP, is said to have included ‘scape-goating’ 
and “marginalisation of minority Tamils, which, in turn, aggravated ethnic discord 
and led to the political violence in 1956 and 1958” (de Silva, 1997, p.60).  It is 
alleged that the communal riots in 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, and 1983 were designed 
by the Sinhalese elites22 (Tambiah, 1992; Wilson, 1988).  The escalation of 
communal violence is blamed on the following three events: 
(a) the introduction of a bill23 to make Sinhala the country’s only official language; 
(b) the re-writing of the constitution24 giving unique primacy to Buddhism; and 
(c) the TULF25 calling for a constitutional change to create a Tamil homeland in 
1976 (Winslow & Woost, 2004). 
Imtiyaz and Stavis (2008) see Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956) 
as laying the foundation for ‘the ethnicisation of politics’.  This started in the 1950s 
with the introduction of the ‘Sinhala only’ language policy, which “sharply 
                                                
 
21 The political elites comprised of the upper caste Sinhala and Tamils comprising of the Govigama, 
Radala and Vellala’s.  These elite is said to move in the same high society circles and clubs of 
Colombo (de Silva, 1997). 
22 A recent view has been expressed that the 1983 riots were not subjected to a close study in the light 
of what came to be known as the Indian intelligence services (RAWs) hand in Sri Lankan politics of 
the 1980s. 
23 Official Language Act No.33 of 1956. 
24 The 1972 first republican constitution. 
25 The major Tamil opposition party. 
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discriminated against Tamil speakers” (Imtiyaz & Stavis, 2008, p.8).  Other policies, 
such as the educational standardisation policy introduced in 1972, is said to have 
allowed Sinhalese students (from disadvantaged areas) to enter university to study 
even science and medicine although they held lower scores compared to Tamil 
students (from elite schools), and further, the special status conferred on Buddhism 
by the 1972 constitution is said to have created an air of mistrust by the Tamils 
which resulted in the minority losing faith in the Sri Lankan state (Dharmadasa cited 
in Imtiyaz & Stavis, 2008). 
Tamil nationalism is, thus, often defended as a direct response to Sinhala 
expressions of chauvinism (Rotberg, 1999).  Tamil nationalism grew during this 
period towards the end of the 1970s.  The LTTE was formed as a violent Tamil 
movement demanding to secure a separate state called Eelam (Imtiyaz & Stavis, 
2008).  This is, however, an extreme view that could be subjected to a two-way 
argument and rejected by others. 
Against this ‘Tamil response’ theory, the Sinhalese assertion of the 1950s is 
projected as the result of Tamil dominance, which, in turn, was inherited as a result 
of favouritism shown to Tamils under British colonial policy.  At the time of British 
rule, the Sinhala-educated majority was, in fact, sidelined and Tamils were highly 
over-represented in most spheres of life and society (de Silva, 1981).  This priority, 
given to Sri Lankan Tamils, was also reflected in land and settlement policies 
followed by the colonial government. 
The politicisation of the ethnic distinctions escalated and became a legitimate 
reason when the LTTE attacked Sinhalese villages and blew up Buddhist temples 
(Imtiyaz & Stavis, 2008).  This gave the Sinhalese politicians ammunition to 
continue military action against the LTTE and to draw focus to the suffering of the 
Sinhalese at the hands of the LTTE.  This led to the strengthening and the formation 
of Sinhala nationalist parties, such as the JHU and other mushroom groups, and 
changing the political orientation of the former JVP. 
The JVP, before entering into democratic politics, carried out two 
(unsuccessful) rebellions against the Sri Lankan government in 1971 and 1987, 
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during which it is alleged that 60,000 people were killed.26  The group then entered 
mainline politics, strongly supported by the poor Sinhalese in the deep southern and 
urban western provinces in 200027 (Spencer, 1990).  The popularity of the party has 
grown over the years and the JVP systematically politicised the ethnic emotions. 
The formation of the JVP highlighted that, “when a group claiming to represent 
the marginalised violently targets the masses of the dominant polity, it is highly 
likely that ethnic politicians of the dominant polity will exploit such violence to 
politicize the system with ethnic emotions” (Imtiyaz & Stavis, 2008, p.15).  In the 
2005 presidential elections, the United People Freedom Alliance nominated Mahinda 
Rajapakshe,28 who was portrayed as a Sinhala nationalist. Rajapakshe emotionalised 
“his campaign with his ‘anti-Tamil and anti-devolution’ crusade and portrayed 
himself as a hero of the Sinhalese” (Imtiyaz & Stavis, 2008, p.15-16).  He also allied 
with the JVP and the JHU during the election. 
Immediately following the elections, the newly elected President Rajapakshe is 
said to have commenced politicising of state institutions.  The appointment of several 
Sinhalese nationalists in high-ranking state positions became important.  This 
commenced with the appointment of the premier, Ratnasiri Wickramanayake, who 
was renowned as a Sinhalese nationalist with pro-war sentiments.  Next was the 
appointment of member of JHU, H.M.B.G Kotakadeniya, as a public safety adviser 
in the defence ministry.29  Further, Rajapakshe is accused of having replaced the state 
media institutions with anti-peace journalists.  This type of state actions by those in 
power is said to have encouraged the increasing Tamil nationalist elements and led to 
the rising distrust by the Tamils of the state and the political system (Imtiyaz & 
Stavis, 2008). 
Imptiaz & Stavis (2008) highlight some of the reasons, which led to the rise of 
Sinhalese extremism and the violence by the LTTE.  They argue that the electoral 
                                                
 
26 The number alleged to have been killed during JVP insurrections is quite high compared to the 
established death toll in the three decade old Tamil insurrection. 
27 The JVP secured 10 parliamentary seats in the 2000 elections, 16 seats in 2001 and 38 seats in the 
2004 elections. 
28 President Rajapakshe secured little over 50% of the votes at the Presidential elections against the 
leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickramasinghe, who gained 48.43%.  However, the minorities in the North 
East, Central, and part of the Western Provinces voted for Wickremasinghe. 
29 Kotakadeniya faded into insignificance shortly afterwards. 
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politics that ensued resulted in politicians to divide the societies to gain electoral 
votes.  This ultimately led to the marginalisation and violence between groups. 
The above discussion highlights the conflict as being the result of failed 
democratic institutions or as having been based on the rise of ethno-political systems.  
However, it is argued that the basis of political decisions made by the political elite 
needs to be understood in order to correctly explain the conflict.  Therefore, 
describing the situation in Sri Lanka as being the rise of an ethno-political conflict 
alone is, again, an incomplete, narrow explanation of the conflict. 
2.2.3 Rooted in Economic Factors 
Some literature describes the conflict as one that was based on economic 
factors.30  Bandarage31 (2009) is one author who broadened the discourse from 
predominantly ethnic or political to include economic factors.  She highlights that 
conflicts are seen to emerge in the context of changes to economic and political 
structures and the unequal distribution of wealth and power between groups at the 
local, regional, and international levels.  She seeks to develop a broader analysis of 
the Sri Lankan conflict by examining multiple ethnic and religious groups and by 
focusing on intra-ethnic, social class, caste, regions, and other divisions.  The 
ethnically-based approaches that are dominant in explaining the Sri Lankan conflict 
do so as purely a domestic conflict.  Meanwhile, Bandarage (2009) says that it is “a 
complex political-economic conflict perpetuated by the confluence of factors in an 
increasingly globalized world” (p.7).  She goes further to state that the sluggish 
economy could not meet the rising expectations of educated rural youth. 
Similarly, Gamage (2009) argues that the Tamil militancy has been the result 
of the frustrations felt by them following the changes in politics and the neo-liberal 
economic reforms, which resulted in uneven distribution of economic and social 
benefits. 
                                                
 
30 See also, Fernando, T. (1982). Political or Economic Development in Sri Lanka. Current History, 
81(475), 211-214; Jayewardene, K.V. (1983). Aspects of Class and Ethnic Consciousness in Sri 
Lanka. Development and Change, 14(1), 1-18. 
31 Bandarage’s work “Colonialism in Sri Lanka: The political economy of the Kandyan Highlands, 
1833-1866”, is considered one of the foremost books on the subject. See Bandarage, A. (1983). 
Colonialism in Sri Lanka: The Political Economy of the Kandyan Highlands, 1833-1886. New York: 
Mouton Publishers. 
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Samaranayake (1997) argues that the violence waged by the JVP and the LTTE 
both stem from “social expansion and the lack of economic and political 
development in Sri Lanka since the beginning of the 1960s” (p.118).  He uses 
Huntington’s theory of modernisation, which states that there is a linear relationship 
between the degree of democratisation and the likelihood of political violence.  
Accordingly, the higher the level of education of the unemployed, the more extreme 
the destabilising behaviours that will result.  Although Sri Lanka had a high rate of 
literacy due to the free education system, it lagged behind other Asian countries in 
economic growth during 1960 to 1977. 
The introduction of the centralised governance structure in 1815, and again in 
1977, has been highlighted as having significantly reduced human liberties and rights 
in Sri Lanka.  Gamage (2009) states that there existed “well-designed programmes 
intended more to ensure political and economic supremacy to a powerful segment of 
the country, while alienating and excluding significant segments of the Sinhalese as 
well as Tamil and Muslim populations” (p.6). 
Gamage (2009) leaves the identification of the ‘powerful segment’ open.  One 
has to go to Bandarage (2009) to understand it.  She summarises the post-1977 
economic liberalisation programmes as leading to: 
(a) a newly rich element in Sri Lanka, widening income distribution and the 
emergence of a new class; 
(b) economic growth being centred in the Western Province and the Colombo 
metropolitan region; 
(c) liberalisation of imports resulting in local producers being unable to compete 
with cheap foreign goods; 
(d) an open economy favouring the English-educated graduates from prestigious 
Colombo schools in state and public sector employment; and 
(e) rising unemployment, especially amongst educated youth (Bandarage 2009). 
The post-1977 economic and social policies highlighted above need closer 
scrutiny.  Jayasuriya (in 2000, cited by Gamage, 2009) commenting on the economic 
liberalisation policies says, 
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the profound social and political impact of these new conservative policies 
which entailed a rejection of welfare ideology … has, regrettably, been poorly 
examined in understanding the complex social dynamics of the ethnic conflict. 
(p.4) 
While explaining the conflict as having roots in economic factors is seen to 
have a better basis than those purely explaining it in terms of ethnicity or politics, it 
is argued that conflict does not necessarily manifest itself through feelings of 
economic deprivation (Otis, 1988, p.22) alone.  Therefore, the argument based on 
economic factors of conflict needs to be further analysed. 
2.3 Conclusion: In Fact, a Complex Conflict 
There have been a large number of authors explaining the conflict by 
highlighting a particular facet of the conflict.  The majority of these authors focused 
on language and religion.32  Further, recent literature draws attention to the escalation 
of violence and the polarisation of communities.33  The variety of literature available 
suggests that it has adequately succeeded in describing and analysing the factors that 
contributed to the Sri Lankan conflict.  However, none has used a satisfactory 
method to explain the conflict utilising all of the various competing factors that 
presented in Sri Lankan society at the time. 
The conflict in Sri Lanka is far more complex than a confrontation between a 
once well-entrenched minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils, and a now more powerful 
group, by reason of being the numerically preponderant yet still insecure majority 
(especially in economic and social terms), the Sinhalese. 
Spencer’s (1990) assessment that the single most obvious factor in the slide of 
Sri Lanka into political crisis has been the “failure of successive governments to 
                                                
 
32 See Kearney, R.N. (1967). Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon. New York: Duke 
University Press, where he highlights the role of language in economic and political deprivation; also 
Wilson, A.J. (1974). Politics in Sri Lanka: 1947-1973. London: MacMillan; Obeysekera, G. (1979). 
The Vicissitutudes of the Sinhalese-Buddhist Identity Through Time and Change. In M. Roberts (ed.), 
Collective Identities: Nationalisms and Protest in Modern Sri Lanka. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
on religion and the Sinhalese-Buddhist identity. 
33 See, for example, Thornton, E.M. & Niththyananthan, R. (1984). Sri Lanka: Island of Terror, an 
Indictment. Middlesex: Eelam Research Organization; Committee for Rational Development. (1984). 
Sri Lanka: the Ethnic Conflict, Myths, Realities and Perspectives. New Delhi: Navrang Press. 
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settle the grievances of the minority Tamil population, in a way that is acceptable to 
the majority population” (p.1), could be seen as providing only a partial explanation 
of the issue. 
Equally, the idea that the attempts to gain and remain in political power 
through measures of that can be described as less than democratic needs closer 
examination.  More significantly, as de Silva (1997) put it, not only did the Sinhalese 
politicians fail the Tamil people, but the Tamil elites also failed to look after the 
interests of the average Tamils.  Consequently, to explain the conflict in Sri Lanka as 
either an ethnic or political problem is to conceptually limit the study. 
A few commentators have identified the need for a broader view and a 
preference to examine the conflict as the result of multiple factors arising from 
social, economic, religious, and political forces.  Bandarage (2009) quite rightly 
highlight that: 
the Sri Lankan separatist conflict has to be placed within the historical context 
of global political-economic domination and the historical divide-and-conquer 
strategies, dating back to British colonialism and perpetuated by ethnic elites 
after independence, including promotion of conflict among local ethnic and 
religious groups”.  And on understanding the conflict, she states that; “it is 
necessary to examine the complex intersection of cultural and political-
economic forces, such as the local and regional ethno-class segments and 
international hegemonic interests which have aided terrorism and the ethnic and 
separatist conflict in Sri Lanka. (p.28) 
As Bandarage (2009) identifies, understanding the conflict requires 
examination of a number of inter-related, complex forces.  She identifies culture, 
politics, economic and ethnic forces and adds that these must be viewed with 
reference to the historical context in which these forces were utilised.  She highlights 
that this includes the role played by colonialism and international hegemonic 
interests.  The forces identified by Bandarage (2009) are different means by which 
persons or groups within society exercise power.  However, their use cannot be 
viewed in isolation, or without reference to the interaction between these forces.  It is 
in this regard that this thesis develops the learning in this area.   
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In particular, there is little literature that analyses the conflict taking into 
consideration the contribution of the multiple factors.  This thesis hopes to address 
this lacuna. 
 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
24  Chapter 3 Theory and Methodology 
CHAPTER 3 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
Little doubt exists that the conflict in Sri Lanka has complex roots.  However, 
based on Chapter 2 above, it is apparent that many commentators rely on mono-
causal explanations to explain its origins.  The point of departure in this thesis is the 
use of Michael Mann’s theoretical work on social power.34  In particular, Mann’s 
theory is used as a model to analyse and understand the Sri Lankan conflict by 
reference to multi-causal factors.  Mann advocates that it is only by reference to 
multi-causal factors that situations of social change can be understood.  His method 
allows the incorporation of several different theoretical aspects that he has drawn 
from the three key sociological thinkers, namely, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.35 
This chapter will study Michael Mann’s theory on social power that has been 
applied in this thesis to analyse the Sri Lankan conflict and state formation.  This 
chapter is split into four sections.  The first section addresses Mann’s theory, whilst 
the second explores Mann’s IEMP model.  The third section discusses the 
sociological foundations, and theorists, which influenced his theories, and the final 
section reviews the historical sociological method that the thesis utilises. 
3.1 Mann and Sri Lanka 
Michael Mann is a contemporary British/American sociologist who proposes 
that the object of sociology should be social power, and the aim of sociology should 
                                                
 
34 See section 3.1 on Mann and his definition of power. Hindess (1996, in Clegg, 2000) identifies 
Mann’s conception of power as a “simple capacity of concept of power as a capacity to act” as against 
the idea of “a capacity to act that is grounded in the legitimate right to do so” (p.143), which he says is 
shared by modern theorists such as Parsons.  The first is the simplest, wherein ‘power is defined in 
terms of the capacity of an agent to secure something or other’ (Hindess, 1982).  Hindess (1982) 
distinguishes the two concepts by stating that the first is the power of an actor to intervene in a series 
of events so as to alter their course, while the second concept deals with the “capability to secure 
outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends on the agency of others” (p.499).  Hindess 
(1996, in Clegg, 2000, p.143) states that the tendency of most theorists has been to reduce all cases of 
power to the former. 
35 See section 3.3 for detailed discussion of Mann’s theoretical influences.  Forsberg (1996) argues 
that territorial disputes could be better explained through normative reasons, rather than power 
politics.  He states that, if it were based on power relations, then it would be more in terms of strategic 
positions or economic benefits, leading to territories with high economic benefits to be contested.  
However, Mann’s analysis is does not limit the research to finding simply normative reasons.  Mann 
incorporates both normative and power politics.  This is particularly useful in the analysis of the Sri 
Lankan conflict. 
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be to chart the growth and transformation of power through time and space.36  Social 
power is derived from four main sources: ideological (the ‘meaning systems’), 
economic (the ‘material resources’), military (the ‘physical violence’), and political 
(the ‘administrative infrastructure’), with each being centred on a different means of 
organisation and social control37 (Mann, 1986, p.3).  He says that these four sources 
are “overlapping networks of social interactions” and that they are also 
“organizational, institutional means of attaining human goals” (Mann, 1986, p.2).  
According to Mann, in order to understand social change, one needs to understand 
the motives of individuals.  The four sources of social power (also referred to as the 
IEMP model of organised power) offer an alternative approach to understanding the 
means by which human beings attain their goals. 
In Volume I, Mann (1986) describes human beings as “restless, purposive, and 
rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good things of life and capable of 
choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so” (p.4).  He highlights these 
human characteristics as being the ‘original’ source of power or original motivations, 
thus, an individual’s capacity to achieve determines the nature of a society.  
However, Mann’s theory is not focused on the individual’s capacity to achieve his or 
her motivations (Mann, 1986, p.6).  Rather, he concentrates on what he calls 
“emergent organizational power sources” (p.6), which is the expression that Mann 
uses to describe social power. 
This thesis addresses how Mann’s four-dimensional identification of social 
power (ideological, economic, military, and political) can be applied to understand 
the conflict in Sri Lanka.  This thesis also seeks to use Mann’s theory to comprehend 
the interconnection of these four dimensions of social power and the relative 
importance of each across time. 
                                                
 
36 Mann (1986, p.4) says that societies are much messier than our theories of them and he aims to 
achieve a proximate methodology with his theory.  See Gorski, P. S. (2006). Ideological Power and 
the Rise of the West: Reappraisal and Reconstruction. In J. R. Hall & R. Schroeder (Eds.), An 
Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann (pp.101-133). Cambridge: Cambridge. 
37 Haugaard (2003) divides the creation of power into two broad camps; theorists that viewed power 
coercively (that is, where individuals get others to do things which they would not otherwise do, other 
than through the use of threat or physical sanctions) and other theorists that view power as an outcome 
of the creation of social order that goes beyond coercion.  He sees Mann as a theorist who views 
power coercively and highlights Mann’s military and political power as examples of this physical 
coercion (Haugaard, 2003, p.88 & 109). 
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In particular, the following research objectives will be explored: 
(a) The effects that ideological power had in polarising social groups in Sri Lanka 
and understanding the extent to which this process influenced the direction of 
the conflict. 
(b) The extent to which economic power contributed to the formation of classes in 
Sri Lanka and to identify the consequences of the resulting social stratification. 
(c) How far military power played a role in the conflict and from what point in 
time. 
(d) The manner in which political power was used in Sri Lanka and to determine 
how it contributed to the conflict. 
(e) To examine the applicability of the interconnections of the four-dimensions of 
social power described by Mann and to see if the combined effect of such 
interconnections played a contributory role to the Sri Lankan dispute. 
Adopting Mann’s approach, this thesis will also incorporate both empirical 
work and theory.  In describing his research style, Mann (2006) said that “I am an 
empiricist and I work to results through historical examples” (p.78).  He considers 
that sociology needs to be based on a “wide-ranging and fully critical macro-history” 
(p.78), which, in turn, must be informed by historically grounded ‘sociological 
theorising’.38  Due to the multiple differences between societies, which are made of 
even larger numbers of differing variables (that exist by virtue of the individuals that 
make up each society), Mann (1986) states, “No laws are possible in sociology” 
(p.341).  He rejects the sole use of comparative sociology39 and, instead, highlights 
the need to compare broad eras and territories (Mann, 1986, p.173).  He is explicitly 
                                                
 
38  Bryant (2006, p.78) expresses concern with Mann’s method of switching between theoretical 
conceptualisation and empirical engagement, especially with respect to the analysis of political power.  
He says, “a chained series of specifications will be required to do justice to the diverse and dynamic 
phenomena under investigation” (Bryant, 2006, p.79).  However, this research will follow a similar 
methodology as was used by Mann because the author of this thesis agrees with Mann’s methodology 
in using theory to give meaning to historical facts and the usefulness of empirical research in the 
analysis. 
39 “Comparative sociology”, Mann (1986) declares, “must be restrained by an appreciation of world-
historical time” (p.173).  “Comparative sociology now peters out not for any logical or 
epistemological reason but for a more compelling reason- lack of empirical cases” (Mann, 1986, 
p.189).  Mann does not think one should be limited solely to comparative sociology because of the 
lack of empirical cases.  Instead, he suggests that one should also look at historical development. 
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committed to empirical research.  Mann (1986) gives three reasons why any 
empirical test must be historical: 
(a) His theory of social power is primarily concerned with processes of social 
change. 
(b) His theory is based on the approach that “societies are constituted of multiple 
overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (Mann, 1986, 
p.1).  Thus, his rejection of the concept of society being unitary makes it 
difficult to adopt a comparative sociological method. 
(c) His methodology is to trace the development of power, which, in turn, makes it 
essential to trace the sources of that power throughout history.40 
Mann uses theory as a guide to understanding the empirical data.  Data that is 
analysed is in the form of historical material, from written and otherwise recorded 
sources.  This includes the large number of secondary sources relied upon by this 
thesis, such as academic books, research journals, and publicly available materials, 
together with government and NGO publications.  In relation to the reliability of 
facts and the questions surrounding the incompatible interpretations of these 
secondary sources, Mann (1994) points out that historical sociologists critically 
‘rethink’ the arguments and the evidence provided by historians.  He says that they 
do so in the light of “theories based on broader knowledge about how societies 
operate” (p.41) and that they have also been known to take the step of analysing 
primary historical data directly.  “Theory leads us to ask questions of the data which 
historians have not asked” (p.43).  Historical-comparative sociologists can, at times, 
produce nuanced revisions or entirely novel insights “finding patterns in the data to 
which historians had not been sensitive and finding inconsistencies or 
implausibilities in their account” (p.43).41 
                                                
 
40 However, Mann is not interested in narrating of how events happened in history, rather he is said to 
be more concerned with understanding the ‘social interaction that explains why things happened’ 
(Snyder, 1995, p.168). 
41 Bryan (2006, p.84) credits Mann as having set an exemplary standard through his examination of 
primary sources and says that, through the use of an integrative sociological theory, Mann was able to 
better understand historical facts. 
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3.2 Mann’s Theory Explained 
3.2.1 Central issue and theory 
Michael Mann (2004) classifies himself as “a comparative sociologist who 
works with historical materials”.  His aim through his two-volume ‘Sources of Social 
Power’, was two-fold.  First, to present a “distinctive, general way of looking at 
societies” (Mann, 1986, p.1).  Mann achieves this by arriving at “a proximate 
methodology … for the issue of ultimate primacy” in social change (Mann, 1986, 
p.1-4).  Second, he provides a “sociological theory which can also discipline 
historians in their selection of facts” (Mann, 1986, p.vii).  Overall, he hopes to offer a 
“better general theory of social stratification and social change” (Mann, 198, p.viii). 
Mann (1986) starts by using ‘power’ as his primary problem.  Power, for him, 
is “the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s environment” 
(p.6).  He concentrates on explaining the physiology of power (Mann, 1986, p.4-5).42  
This includes the methods in which humans acquired resources, exercised control 
over others, forged close relationships, and engaged in communication.  Further, 
although Mann reminds us of the large forces at work in the modern world through 
his emphasis on power, he omits what he refers as ‘intimate’ (1986, p.34) aspects of 
life and/or gender relations out of his theory.  Mann (1986) admits that his concepts 
will have “no relevance to 99 percent of humanity’s life span to date” (p.34) and 
concentrates only on ‘the era of civilisation’ or specifically the Western experience 
from Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and so on, to Europe from 800 A.D. onwards 
(1986, p.34-37). 
Mann asserts that, to understand the science of society, large-scale historical 
change must be studied and that historical comparison enables identification of the 
most significant problems of the present.  His identification of four sources of power 
(‘IEMP’), each centred on a different means of organisation and social control,43 
could be seen as a development of the “Weberian tripartite split of class, status, and 
                                                
 
42 One of the main criticisms that Mann had to face was that he failed to offer a philosophical 
discussion of his primary concept (Shklar, 1987, p.331). 
43 Gellner (1988, p.207) argues that power is a mechanism an imperialist notion which can be easily 
absorbed into anything and therefore the subdivision of power into four is a kind of re-definition 
which simply gives new labels for the same data. 
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party” (Jacoby, 2004, p.2).  These power sources, Mann claims, are overlapping 
networks of social interactions and they are ‘institutional means’ of attaining human 
goals.  His theory centres on the following questions.  What are the relationships 
between four important aspects of social structure - economic, political, military, and 
religious structures?  In particular, what is their relationship to each other?  Does on 
or more of them become principal in organising society?  Why do some become 
more important at times than others?44 
In explaining the creation of society, Mann rejects a single factor being given 
priority (1986, p.30).  He is also against an evolutionary theory that explains social 
forms as being inscribed in some sociogenetic code within earlier forms (Mann, 
1986, p.39).45  For Mann (1986), societies are “constituted of multiple, overlapping 
and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (p.1).  He summaries his theory by 
stating, “civilization was an abnormal phenomenon” (Mann, 1986, p.126).  
Therefore, he rejects evolutionary theories that attempt to argue that there existed a 
natural progression from prehistoric societies to civilisation. 
Opting for a multi-factor explanation, Mann uses what is essentially an 
ecological explanation46 and pointed to three sets of different sociospatial, 
overlapping, intersecting networks.  Firstly, alluvial agriculture, secondly, a ‘caged’ 
core living47 on that agriculture, and thirdly, a differentiated periphery falling only 
incompletely under the core’s control and featuring “overlapping power networks”48 
(Mann, 1986, p.124).  What these empires had in common, according to Mann, is 
‘power’.  This power primarily included, and is highlighted by, the ability to extract 
agricultural surpluses, the ability to defend against enemies and the exercise of local 
authority over its population.  Mann (1986; 1988) speaks of the ‘multiple acephalous 
                                                
 
44 Some of these questions have been identified by Jacoby (2004) and Tarrow (1994). 
45 However, Gellner (1988) show that Mann is not entirely removed from an evolutionist theory, with 
his need to look at the chronological order of events and his preoccupation with collective and 
bounded power (see also, Mann, 1986, p.534). 
46 Mann admits to being influenced by Jean-Jacques Rouseau and to the concept that people originally 
lived in undifferentiated, small, peaceful villages, but eventually became “caged” by being territorially 
fixed and internally stratified (Shklar, 1987, p.331). 
47 The metaphor of the cage, familiar to readers of Max Weber, recurs throughout Mann’s analysis.  
His organising idea runs roughly as follows: when relations among multiple power holders constrain a 
population that cannot flee, the strength of existing organisations multiplies (Tilly, 1987, p.631). 
48 Which he says promoted the creation of a state, stratification, cities, ceremonial centres, writing, 
private property, and the other appurtenances of civilisation (Mann, 1986, p.124) (See also Tilly, 
1987, p.631 on the ecological explanation). 
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federation’ of economic, military, and ideological power networks in the Europe of 
the high middle-ages.  This, according to him, paved the way for a later capitalist 
transition. 
The forms of power that he refers to are mostly ‘entwined’49 and at times some 
forms take prominence over others (Mann, 1986, p.6).  For example, he states that, in 
the 18th century, the military and economic forces took prominence, while in the 
19th century, political and economic forces were more important to state and classes 
(Mann, 1986, p.8). 
According to Mann, history of society is synonymous with the development of 
power.  Shklar (1987, p.331) identifies Mann’s object to be two-fold.  The first, is to 
show that the selective and combined use of the theories of Karl Marx, Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber will give a better account of the development of power 
and states.50  Second, Mann wants to get away from a reductionist, single-factor 
analysis, and show that classes, ideologies, and, above all, military necessities and 
responses all played their part in the development of states.51 
These sources of powers are used by Mann to present somewhat broad views 
on the development of nation-states and the rise of classes in modern times.52  Mann 
(1986) further discusses what he calls a “polymorphous crystallization”53 (p.76) 
where the specific combination of power sources yields different states with differing 
classes and nations.54 
                                                
 
49 Therefore, the forms of power are not ‘pure’ and, therefore, not ranged against one another in a 
permanent game of primacy for the benefit of social theorists’ (Tarrow, 1994, p.1031). 
50 The theories selected by Mann of Marx, Durkheim and Weber has been discussed in the proceeding 
pages. 
51 Mann has been credited for having a ‘good eye’ for logical connections and Tilly (1987, p.630) 
highlights Mann’s most valuable contribution to be his insights into the ways in which power-holders, 
within different kinds of wide ranging networks, acquired and used the resources with which they 
were disposed. 
52 However, this potentially opens up to Mann presenting essentially a politically reductionist 
argument (Snyder, 1995, p.168; Mulhall, 1995, p.362), which is an argument that explains everything 
in terms of the state.  Mann’s trajectories of five major states, the ‘leading edge’ of power, is evidence 
of such an argument.  The chief characteristic of these states in this period is the rise of classes and 
nations as dominant collective actors. 
53 State crystallisation has been discussed in Chapter 7 on Political Power. 
54 However, much criticism has been levelled against him that the theory is essentially Eurocentric in 
nature (Mulhall, 1995, p.36; Shklar, 1987, p.331) with the narrative being about the determination of 
class and nation in Europe and the development of the state. 
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3.2.2 Four sources of social power in brief 
Mann observed that a broad division of functions between ideological, 
economic, military, and political organisations was ubiquitous, ‘popping up’ again 
and again through the interstices of more merged power organisations.  Mann went 
on to elaborate on these four sources of social power.  He saw the need to ‘hang on’ 
to this as a simplifying tool of analysis in terms of either of the interrelations of a 
number of autonomous dimensional functions/organisations, or of the ultimate 
primacy of one of them (1986, p.17-18).  This formed the basis of his theory and was 
his final trump card to show that both Marx and Weberian orthodoxies taken on their 
own would be misleading. 
(a) Ideological power 
According to Mann, ideological power55 derives from three interrelated 
arguments56 in the sociological tradition.  The first is understanding sense 
perception, an idea modified from Weberian thoughts of the knowledge and 
meaning57 necessary for social life.  The second is ‘norms’,58 a shared 
understanding of how people should act morally in relations with each other, 
necessary for social cooperation.  The ability to influence norms, or even to 
have a monopoly of it, is the route to power (Mann, 1986, p.22).59 
                                                
 
55 Gorski (2006, p.105) identifies theoretical and analytical gaps in Mann’s work on the analysis of 
ideological power.  He names the following as being the theoretical gaps: the absence of the 
phenomenological school, which defines and analyses religion, not as a system of beliefs or rituals, 
but as a type of experience; the absence of the psychoanalytically-informed version of Marxism; and 
the lack of attention Mann gives to post-modern and post-structural brands of social theory (for 
example, those represented by Barthes and Foucault).  He identifies the analytical silences, both 
theoretical and empirical, as the lack of attention to certain forms of ideological power, which is 
contained in, or implied by, Mann’s overall theory.  That is, while Mann distinguishes between 
transcendent power, which is collective and extensive, and immanent power, which is distributive and 
intensive, Mann doesn’t explore the two other permutations of ideological power, which can be 
derived from these oppositions: intensive and collective, and diffuse and distributive. 
56 Mann (1993) maintains that “ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate 
meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices” (p.7).  
Goski (2006) highlights the close connection of Mann’s ideological power with the concepts of  
Durkheim and Weber.  He also show the infiltration of Marxian and Marxian-Althusserian in Mann’s 
concepts.  Goski (2006) argues that Mann’s analysis therefore puts emphasis “not on the symbolic or 
phenomenological content of religion, but, rather, on its social, organisational and political 
dimensions” (p.132). 
57 Collective and distributive power can be wielded by those who monopolise a claim to meaning 
(Mann, 1986, p.22). 
58 According to Mann (1986, p.22), to monopolise norms is the route to power. 
59 Durkeim’s influence is seen in this construction.  However, this shared understanding or belief is a 
mere acceptance of values and does not imply the truth (Carlton, 1984).  This is significant as the 
truth-value of the ideology will be dependent on the acceptability and in so far as it achieves social 
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The third source of ideological power is aesthetic/ritual practices,60 
which, according to Mann, cannot be reduced to rational science, and for which 
he quotes Bloch (1974).  Bloch said the power of religious myth is a ‘song’ and 
“you cannot argue with a song” (Bloch quoted in Mann, 1986, p.23).  Mann 
saw religious61 movements providing the most obvious examples of ideological 
power, but saw in Mesopotamian and classical Greek cultures more secular 
examples. 
Mann (2006) describes the ‘ideological network of power’ as comprised 
of: 
networks of persons bearing ideologies which cannot be proved true or 
false, couched at a sufficient level of generality to be able to give 
‘meaning’ to a range of human actions in the world – as religion, 
socialism, or nationalism all do, for example.  They also contain norms, 
rules of interpersonal conduct which are ‘sacred’, strengthening 
conceptions of collective interest and cooperation, reinforced, as 
Durkheim said, by rituals, binding together in repeated affirmations of 
their commonality.  So those offering plausible ideologies can mobilize 
social movements, and wield a general power in human societies 
analogous to powers yielded by control over economic, military, and 
political power resources. (p.346) 
Therefore, for Mann, religion, socialism, and nationalism are all 
instances of ideology that play a key role in shaping modern social formations. 
Delving into definitions further, Mann (1986) observed that knowledge 
by an ideological power movement necessarily ‘surpasses experience’ (as 
Parsons put it).  It cannot be totally tested by experience and therein lies its 
                                                                                                                                     
 
expression.  Carlton (1984) highlights that belief contributes to the construction and maintenance of 
subjective social reality, and that it can also define and legitimise moral and intellectual structures at 
the macro-social level. 
60 A distinctive power is conveyed through song, dance, visual art forms and rituals (Mann, 1986, 
p.23).  Sassoon (1984) states that, although modern societies tends to de-ritualise, social movements 
emphasise the importance of rituals, leading to organised symbolic actions providing groups with an 
essential support.  This source of ideological power becomes a powerful tool used by leaders or rulers 
of the group to ensure group cohesion. 
61 For Mann, religion is the ultimate example of a private case of an ideological network of power 
(1986).  Religion, therefore, is ‘located in the socio-political field and disregards other approaches to 
religion, such as the phenomenal and psychological approaches’ (Gorski, 2006, p.105). 
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distinctive power to persuade and dominate.62  He argued that ideological 
organisation comes in two main types.  The first is the more autonomous form 
of ideological power, referred to as sociospatially ‘transcendent’.  This is 
power that “transcends the existing institutions of ideological, economic, 
military and political power and generates a sacred form of authority (in 
Durkheim’s sense), set apart from and above more secular authority structures” 
(p.23).  The second type of ideological power is immanent morale.  Immanent 
morale refers to the solidarity, the cohesion, or morale of a specific social 
group.  Immanent ideology, according to Mann, is not as automomous and is 
largely concerned with strengthening whatever is there. 
(b) Economic power 
Mann equated the social group or ‘class’63 as forming around the tasks of 
satisfying needs through the “social organisation of the extraction, 
transformation, distribution, and consumption of the object of nature” (1986, 
p.24).  This is taken as a pure economic concept.  These class formations 
normally combine a high level of intensive and extensive power, and have been 
a large part of social development.  Those who were able to monopolise control 
over production, distribution, exchange, and consumption became a dominant 
class, and able to obtain general collective and distributive power in societies.  
Mann avoided entering into a debate concerning the historical role of economic 
power, but, instead, concentrated only on the context of actual historical 
problems commencing with the class struggle in ancient Greece.  He 
distinguished four phases in the development of class relations and class 
struggle: latent, extensive, symmetrical, and political class structures.  His final 
conclusion was that, although classes were important, they were not ‘the motor 
of history’, as Marx believed.64 
                                                
 
62 Similar to the Marxist thought which associates ideologies as being concerned with gain and 
preservation of advantage. That is where ideology is seen as a “guise or a weapon in the unending 
historical struggle for advantage between those who have power and those who seek it” (Carlton, 
1984). However, Mann does not limit his definition of ideological power to a narrow economic and 
class explanation. 
63 Mann’s definition of class is similar to that of Karl Marx. 
64 While Maxists are more interested in the exploitation and class related discussions of power, Mann 
states that power should be examined to also study ‘in terms of the mode of organisation itself, 
particularly in the mode of organisation of people’s working lives, which differ both in the kind and 
the amount of domination and independence’ (Therborn, 1976). 
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Coming to economic organisation, Mann (1986, p.24) observed that it 
comprised circuits of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption; its 
main sociospatial peculiarity being that, although those circuits are extensive, 
they also involve intensive practical, everyday labour—what Marx called the 
praxis—of the mass of population.  Economic organisation thus offered a 
distinctively stable, sociospatial blend of extensive and intensive power, and of 
diffused and authoritative power.  For economic organisation, he gave the term 
‘circuits proxy’, a term he admitted to be rather ‘pompous’, as the idea was to 
build upon Marx’s insights.  In this configuration, he saw at the one end of a 
reasonably developed mode of production, a mass of workers labouring and 
expressing themselves through the conquest of nature.  At the other end, of the 
‘mode’, complex, extensive circuits of exchange into which millions may be 
locked by impersonal, seemingly ‘natural forces’.  The contrast, however, he 
observed, was extreme in the case of capitalism, but, nonetheless, present in all 
types of economic power organisation.  The degree to which they are 
‘extensive’,  ‘symmetrical’, and ‘political’ across the whole circuit of praxis of 
a mode of production will determine the organising power of class and class 
struggle; and this will turn on the tightness of linkages between intensive local 
production and extensive circuits of exchange (Mann, 1986, p.24-25). 
(c) Military power 
The most distinctive part of Mann’s model is his conceptualisation of 
militarism as a separate social power to political power.65  While most writers 
include military power under the umbrella of political/party, Mann (1986) 
argues that they should be considered as distinct, based on his arguments that: 
1. “Political powers are those of centralized, institutionalized, 
territorial regulation”, whereas “military powers are of organized 
physical force wherever they are organized”; 
                                                
 
65 Most theorists, especially Marx and Weber do not distinguish between the two, because they 
generally view the state as “the repository of physical force in society” (Mann, 1986, p.11). Mann 
justifies his claim by stating organized gangs challenge states with the transport of illegal arms  and 
shows that Weber’s claim that the states monopolizes military power is not true (Mann, 2004). See 
also Hyslop (2009) who uses Mann’s theory in the analysis of South Africa. Hyslop (2009) agrees 
with Mann and states that “it is sociologically useful to analyse military power as a form of power that 
is significant in itself” (p.237).  
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2. Conquest is undertaken by military groups that may be 
independent of their home states;66 
3. Internally, military organization is usually institutionally separate 
from other state agencies even when under state control; and 
4. If international relations between states are peaceful but stratified, 
we will wish to talk of a ‘political power structuring’ of the wider 
international society that is not determined by military power67 
(p.11). 
Mann (2006) adds “politics is about rules, routinization and the relative 
dominance of infrastructural over despotic power, whereas military power is 
rule-light, arbitrary and essentially despotic” (p.357).  For him, military power 
is concentrated, legal violence and he sees the state as having a monopoly over 
this institutionalised violence.68 
Military power, according to Mann, is, therefore, ‘derived from the 
necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression’.  The 
military elite that has a monopoly on this power is also able to obtain collective 
and/or distributive power.  He (also) highlights that military organisation is 
essentially concentrated-coercive and mobilises violence.  Mann (1986, p.26) 
calls it the ‘most concentrated, if bluntest, instrument of human power, which 
may endure beyond the battlefield and the campaign’.  He shows that the 
‘militaristic forms of social control’ when attempted in peacetime are highly 
concentrated, and likens them to using coerced labour to build ‘city 
fortifications, monumental buildings, or main communication road channels in 
mines, plantations, and in the households of the powerful’.  Militarism has, 
therefore, according to Mann, proved useful where concentrated, intensive, 
authoritative power has yielded disproportionate results.69 
                                                
 
66 Mann highlights the cases of Japan and West Germany where both were demilitarized but still 
remained to be powerful states (1986, p.11). 
67 Vaughan (1987) argues that the capital dynamism that was buttressed by the states as a regulator of 
economic relationships within its boundaries is seen to strengthen the military and geopolitical role of 
the national state in its relations with other states, which were ultimately settled by military force. 
68 See also Harries-Jenkis, G., & Moskos, C. C. (1981). Armed Forces and Society. Current 
Sociology, 29, 1-170, who is in line with Mann’s argument. 
69 Hyslop (2009) uses Mann’s perspective to successfully show the importance of military power in 
shaping the South African state. 
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Mann further points to military power as having more extensive reach of 
a negative, terroristic form (Jacoby, 2004).  He quotes Lattimore70 to show that, 
throughout most of history, military striking range was greater than the range 
of either state control or economic production relations, but Mann says that this 
is minimal control.  This discussion led him (Mann, 1986) to think of military 
power of being sociopatially dual: “a concentrated core in which positive, 
coerced controls can be exercised, surrounded by an extensive penumbra in 
which terrorized populations will not normally step beyond certain niceties of 
compliance but whose behaviour cannot be positively controlled” (p.26).  
Thus, the greater the outer ‘penumbra’, the greater the level of control that was 
exercised by military power.  In summary, according to Mann, there are two 
historical functions of military power networks, these are: firstly, the 
geopolitical competition, and secondly, the internal repression. 
(d) Political power 
According to Mann (1986), political power71 is derived “from the 
usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many 
aspects of social relations” (p.26).  Mann has devised his own theory of the 
state, based on all of the principal state theories.  Largely influenced by 
Weber,72 Mann (1984) defines the state as: 
a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in 
the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a 
territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of 
authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical 
force. (p.112) 
Mann (1984) specifies four particularities shared by the political 
institutions of all states: 
(i) ‘state institutions are differentiated, undertaking different functions for 
different interest groups located within its territories; 
                                                
 
70 As in Owen Lattimore’s theory, the most extensive radius of social integration is military action, 
and the second and lesser one is state administration.  However, Lattimore does not treat economic 
integration as a separate factor or as negligible in that historical period (Vaughan, 1987). 
71 “Political power means state power” (Mann, 1993, p.9). 
72 Weber (1968) speaks of states as being political entities that are internally specialised with regards 
to function and have a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence. 
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(ii) it contains two dualities73: domestic and international; 
(iii) it is territorially centralised; and 
(iv) they also exhibit a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, 
backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence’ (p.112). 
With the state becoming a nation-state, wherein a citizen’s internal sense 
of community is emphasised, Mann identifies the process of implementation of 
the state’s objectives.  He notes this process as being ‘collective restraint’ upon 
both the state’s infrastructural and despotic organisational authority.  He 
divides political power into two types: despotic and infrastructural74 (Mann, 
1993, p.9). 
For Mann (1993, p.9), political power is essentially state power and he 
comes up with his own theory with regard to state formation, which is 
discussed in Chapter 7 on ‘Political Power’. 
3.3 Mann’s Work: A Synthesis of Marx, Weber and Durkheim 
Popularly known as a contemporary Weberian, Mann’s work has also been 
described as classical in the sense that it connects with what is seen as mainstream 
macro-sociology.  However, one of Mann’s objectives seems to be to promote a 
selective and combined use of all three of the main classical sociological theorists.  
Detailed analysis of his theory suggests that he is more heavily reliant on some of 
Marx and Weber’s theoretical foundations.75 
                                                
 
73 For Mann (1986, p.27), “Political organization is also sociospatially dual, though in a different 
sense … Domestically, the state is territorially centralized and territorially-bound … But states’ 
territorial boundaries … also give rise to an area of regulated interstate relations.  Geopolitical 
diplomacy is a second important form of political-power organization, essential to social life, but often 
ignored by sociological theory”. 
74 See Lucas (1998, p.90) where he interprets Mann’s despotic power as “referring to the repressive 
capacities of a state while infrastructural power refers t its ability to penetrate society and actually 
implement its decisions”.  See Chapter 7 on Political Power where the two types of state powers are 
discussed. 
75 Collins (2006) says that “Mann sets forth that which we have learnt from Marx and Weber that is 
worth preserving, and displays the state of our knowledge on Marxian and Weberian themes” (p.19-
20).  He also credits Mann with having found a common ground between Marx and Weber through 
the use of his four-dimension model in order to understand patterns of social change (Collins, 2006, 
p.20). 
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3.3.1 Mann and Marx 
According to Marx,76 society is a system of competing groups struggling to 
obtain resources for basic needs.  Marx (1959) stated that, whatever stage of 
historical development a society was in, it rested on economic foundations.77  He 
viewed social change as a necessity to reassert social order (Marx, 1867).  Conflict 
and change were inseparable.  Marx examined the distortion of the person through 
industrialisation and capitalism, seeing social change as a struggle between different 
classes in society.  He described capitalism as paving the way for the exploitation of 
labour by the bourgeoisie.  Capitalism78 for him was the fuel that built the fire for the 
competition of natural resources (Marx, 1867).  Marx saw the emergence of the 
modern state as stemming from the struggle by the bourgeoisie against the remnants 
of feudalism, and that it was stimulated by the demands of capitalist economy.79  
Marx, therefore, explained the conflict theory as a ‘single cause theory’ determined 
by economics,80 explaining the evolution of society by the tracing of the history of 
economic development (Marx, 1867).  He argued that social conflict better explained 
the evolution of social change and highlighted external forces, such as war or the 
state of the economy, as being the force behind this social change (Marx, 1867).  In 
regard to religion, Marx regarded it as merely an epiphenomena and highlighted 
class81 and material sources as the predominant variables responsible for changes in 
society (Marx, 1867). 
                                                
 
76 Karl Marx is popularly known as a conflict theorist.  Conflict theory assumes that social behaviour 
can best be understood in terms of tension and conflict between groups and individuals (Turner, 2002, 
p.56). 
77 He called this the ‘mode of production’ of commodities and went on to divide history into five 
major stages: (1) tribal ownership, which is a type of primitive communism, (2) ancient communal 
and state ownership accompanied by slavery, (3) feudalism, (4) capitalism, and (5) communism 
(Marx, 1848).  See Giddens (1971) who analyses Marx’s historical materialism in detail and states 
that “for Marx, history is a process of the continuous creation, satisfaction and re-creation of human 
needs” (p.22). 
78 He says that in the period of capitalism “social wealth becomes to an ever-increasing degree the 
property of those who are in a position to appropriate continually and ever afresh the unpaid labour of 
others” (Marx, 1867, p.841). 
79 Marx (1970) says, “To this modern private property corresponds the modern state, which, 
purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their 
hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial 
credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extent to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of state 
funds on the stock exchange” (p.113).  See Giddens (1971) for further discussion on this. 
80 Marx’s theories focused on economic factors.  One such economic factor was war, which Marx 
considered could create social conflict.  A key assumption adopted by Marx was that the value of a 
person’s wealth defined one type of social structure.  On this basis, he believed that a change in social 
structure would be achieved by changing the value placed on material wealth (Marx, 1867). 
81 By way of comment on Marx, Giddens (1971, p.37) states that Marx considered classes to be 
constituted by the relationship of groupings of individuals based on the ownership of private property 
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The full extent of Mann’s views on motivational theories may have to wait for 
Volume 382 of his book, which is to contain a greater discussion. However, he 
concludes that “societies are much messier than our theories of them” (1986, p.4).  
Therefore, according to Mann, the Marxist claim that social change is driven by 
economic production and the human drive for material subsistence cannot be 
supported.  Whilst these factors are important, they are not relevant to the issue of 
ultimate primacy given that the need for external relations and cooperation outweighs 
an individual’s motivational drives, needs, and goals (Mann, 1986:5).  Thus, the 
argument that Mann presents is that human motivations alone cannot explain social 
changes, as human relations and interactions are equally important. 
However, Mann (1986) accepts that “social stratification is the overall creation 
and distribution of power in society” (p.11).  In so doing, he suggests four types of 
power organisations as being predominant instead of the three suggested by 
Marxists; class (economic), status (ideological83), and party (political) (Marx, 1867).  
The primary difference between Mann and Marx is the ‘political/party’ type.  Mann 
considers that this, in fact, forms two separate forms of power; political and military 
power (1986, p.11).  Mann’s justification for the separation of the two has been 
discussed earlier. 
While Mann’s four-dimensional model follows the Marxist definition of 
classes in relation to capitalism and economic power, compared to the Marxian 
approach, Mann avoids a ‘single-factor’ approach.  The Marxist approach justifies 
economic primacy, based on the need of human beings to pursue economic 
subsistence, while political and ideological power is described as the means in which 
surplus labour is extracted from the direct producer (Marx, 1867, p.209 & 226).  In 
                                                                                                                                     
 
in the means of production.  For Marx (Marx quoted in Giddens, 1971), “classes form the main 
linkage between the relations of production and the rest of society, or social ‘superstructure’ 
(Uberbau)” (p.37).  These class relations were, therefore, the central point in which political power 
was distributed, and upon which political organisation depended.  Therefore, in Marx’s theory, 
economic and political power were closely linked.  See Giddens (1971) for a detailed analysis of 
Marx’s relations of production and class structure. 
82 Volume 3 was published in November 2012. However, there was insufficient time to review and 
incorporate Mann’s work in Volume 3 as at 16 November 2012 (the date of handing in this thesis for 
examination). 
83 Giddens (1971, p.42) highlights two ideas presented by Marx.  The first is that ideology is 
dependent on the social circumstances of the individual, which, in turn, will determine their view of 
the world.  The second is that the diffusion and creation of ideas is influenced by the ideas of the 
ruling class. 
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this respect, Mann (1986) aligns himself with the Weberian view that “they are all 
means of power” (p.12).  He adds that, while “Marxists … neglect that states are 
economic actors as well as political ones.  They are functionally promiscuous” 
(Mann, 1986, p.17).  In reality, there is no unique function of each form and each 
“weave across each other in the historical process” (Mann, 1986, p.18). 
In Mann’s analysis of the class struggle in ancient Greece,84 he acknowledges 
the importance of classes.  However, Mann (1986) doesn’t see class in the same light 
as Marx, as “the motor of history” (p.24).  Although Mann accepts the Marxian 
terminology as appropriate in the discussion of classical Greece, Mann points out 
that Marx indirectly stressed the importance of militarism and political regulation in 
‘Grundrisse’ (Marx, 1973, p.245).  In that writing, Marx referred to the two 
alternative conceptions of appropriation by slavery and appropriation through 
citizenship, which he called the “ancient mode of production” (Marx, 1973, p.245). 
However, Mann (1986, p.308), in his account of the rise of Christianity, refutes 
the Marxian claim that the rise was attributed to economic crisis and political 
repression.  Instead, Mann (1986) says that the rise of Christianity followed a crisis 
of social identity emanating from the question, “What society do I belong to?” 
(p.309). 
On the whole, Mann feels that he has supplied the missing background to 
Marxist accounts of how the world arrived and the transition of societies.  While he 
argues that the Marxist theory of the origins of the state is both unitary and inward 
looking (Mann, 1986, p.59), Mann (1986, p.409 & 376) believes that his four-
dimensional model encompasses both an economic and non-economic explanation.85  
Mann rejects theories giving mono-causal explanations and maintains that each 
power source influences social change, albeit in varying degrees and at different 
times in history. 
                                                
 
84 See Mann (1986, Volume 1, Chapter 7), where he distinguishes four phases in the development of 
class relations and class struggle; latent, extensive, symmetrical, and political class structures. 
85 For Mann, economic forces and relations of production are held to exercise a preponderant 
influence on shaping social life more generally, and in generating and sustaining corresponding forms 
of political, military, and ideological power more specifically (Bryant, 2006, p.76). Also see 
Schroeder, R. (2006). Introduction: the IEMP model and its critics. In J. R. Hall & R. Schroeder 
(Eds.), An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann (pp.1-16). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, for similar observations. 
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It is Mann’s contention that this transition was caused through infrastructural 
power (that is, ‘power through’) rather than despotic power (that is, ‘power over’).  
Thereby, he rejects the Marxist theory that the ruling elite forced social change from 
above.  Mann (1993) states that “Marx was wrong to suggest that the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism revolutionized distributive power in the sense of bringing 
extensive and political class conflict between feudal lords and capitalist bourgeoisie” 
(p.219).  Instead, Mann (1993, p.250) asserts that ‘commercial’ and ‘industrial’ 
capitalism consist of diffused power rather than authoritative power. 
Although Mann does share certain Marxist views, the main point of difference 
between the two is that Mann’s ‘organisational materialism’ is not materialistic 
enough.  That is, Mann does not solely base his analysis on economical terms. 
3.3.2 Mann and Durkheim 
Durkheim is credited for his organic approach of describing sociology.  He 
views society as an organism.  His theories display an interest in explaining social 
norms and their impact on society, rather than giving psychological explanations.  
According to him, society is based on social facts.  These include belief systems, 
customs, and institutions.  They are chosen by individuals and cannot be changed 
thereafter at will.  Everything is explained as being a function of society (Durkheim, 
1907/1982). 
Durkheim used social cohesion to analyse the evolution of society and 
proposed two concepts on the evolution (Durkheim, 1893/1964).  First, that society 
evolved from a mechanical state to an organic state.86  Second, he introduced the 
concept of social norms.87 
Mann is not in disagreement with Durkheim’s theories.  However, he 
demonstrates the need to extend Durkheim through exploring psychological impacts.  
For example, the impact of the Christian doctrines to boost capitalism, rather than 
                                                
 
86 The mechanical state is the simplest form where individuals behaved identically, thought alike and 
performed the same work duties and exhibited group-oriented goals.  The organic state is a complex 
one with social bonds becoming impersonal, releasing individual bonds.   
87 He argued that the breakdown in social norms and the replacement of these norms was the process 
where individuals moved from the mechanical state to an organic state.  Individuals moved into this 
organic state by joining a social group (Durkheim, 1893/1964). 
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limiting the analysis solely to normative pacification that Durkheim uses (1986, 
p.377 & 398-399). 
With respect to Durkheim’s views on religion, Mann (1986) states, “I have 
extended, not rejected Durkheim” (p.370).  For Durkheim, religion arises out of the 
usefulness of normative integration (and of meaning, aesthetics, and rituals).  It is 
‘sacred’ and set apart from secular power relations.  However, it does not merely 
integrate and reflect an already established ‘society’.  Indeed, it may actually create a 
society-like network, a religious, or cultural community, out of emergent, interstitial, 
social needs and relations88 (Mann, 1986, p.23, 309, & 369).  Religion as being 
society, that is “stretched ideally to the stars” (Durkheim quoted in Mann, 1986:47).  
As society became caged, so did religion (Mann, 1986:47).  Mann (1986:369), by 
way of examples of Islam and Hinduism, argues instead that religion is not merely a 
reflection of society but that it is also actually capable of creating the normative, 
ritual community that actually is society.  Through his analysis of a number of world 
religions,89 Mann concludes that the Christian ecumene, the Islamic umma and the 
Hindu caste systems were all societies.  He states that it is evident that religion is 
capable of creating a social order in instances when the traditional regulators of 
society90 were faltering (Mann, 1986, p.370).91 
Once again, Mann seems to accept much of Durkheim’s theories although he 
doesn’t wish to confine himself.  He reiterates on several occasions that concepts 
need to be extended to include further concepts to get an overall understanding of 
society and social changes. 
3.3.3 Mann and Weber 
For Weber (1947), sociology is a “science, which attempts the interpretive 
understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its 
cause and effects” (p.88).  Weber’s view is that one should look at the meanings of 
                                                
 
88 Mann (1986) uses this model to discuss the first extensive civilisations (Chapters 3 and 4) and the 
world-salvation religions (Chapters 10 and 11). 
89 See Mann (1986) Chapter 11, Volume I. 
90 Here, he means the economic, ideological, political and military power relations. 
91 See similar explanations in Vaughan (1987, p.425). 
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human actions, the ‘verstehen’92 and the role of changes of ideas to understand 
society and social change (Weber, 1864-1920 & 1994).93  He discussed four types of 
actions; traditionally oriented social action (habits), effectually oriented social action 
(behaviour), rational orientation toward an absolute value (defined by a set of 
norms), and rational orientation toward a system of individual ends (Weber, 1905/ 
1958, p.234-235).  With respect to society, Weber offered a more complex 
explanation of society than Marx.  He viewed the economic evolution as solely an 
autonomous factor that enabled to affect a country’s political structure (Weber, 
1905/1958).  He argues that other non-economic factors were also involved and that 
social totality is determined by a complex interplay of dimensions. 
Mann (1986:12) is in agreement with the Weberian multifactor theory.  
However, Mann (1986) says, “it is not my intention,(sic) to paraphrase Weber, to 
replace a one-sided materialism with an equally one-sided military/political theory” 
(p.223).  He argues that military and political forms also have economic 
preconditions that warrant the need for a comprehensive study of each dimension’s 
interactions and the need to develop concepts that take each dimension equally 
seriously.  Mann (1986, p.223) highlights his analysis of Greece as a perfect 
example, where military and economic powers were conjoined. 
With respect to religion, Mann is generally in agreement with Weber’s 
philosophies.94  Weber portrayed religion as having a more important role in social 
evolution.  In his examination of religion, Weber found that it has a central role in 
the development of a society.  He also argued that religion played a major role in the 
rise of capitalism in the West (Weber, 1905/1958).  Mann (1986, p.465) is in general 
agreement with Weber’s argument that a mutually reinforcing affinity existed 
between Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism.  However, he highlights that 
                                                
 
92 Verstehen means understanding.  Weber adopted this idea that understanding of meaning is 
essential to the explication of human action (Weber, 1864-1920 & 1994, p.ix). 
93 Both of Weber’s works, Protestant ethic and the bureaucratic model, related to social cohesion.  
Social action under the influence of the Protestant ethic and the bureaucratic model both had 
characteristics associated with a class of individuals.  Weber correlated his interpretive methods of 
social meaning of motivation in a capitalist society with the Protestant ethic and capitalism (Weber, 
1904-1905 & 1958).  Here, he examined the importance of motives to social action, values and social 
behaviour. 
94 Mann’s acceptance of Weber’s definition of ideological power being the social organisation of 
ultimate knowledge and meaning necessary to social life (Mann, 1986, p.22) and his theory regarding 
the emergence of transcendent religion (Mann, 1986, p.301-302). 
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one needs to consider further the power organisations that have been neglected by 
Weber (Mann, 1986, p.456).  Mann (1986, p.377 & 397-398) argues that it was not 
only the psychological impact of the Christian doctrines (which he states is the 
Weberian approach), but also the normative pacification (in the Durkheimian sense) 
that boosted capitalism.  Here, again, he makes reference to Volume 3 (which is yet 
to be published) where more theoretical discussions will be undertaken (Mann, 1986, 
p.398). 
As identified earlier, Mann (1986) says that “Societies are much messier than 
our theories of them” (p.4), but adds that, in order to cope with this ‘messiness,’ he 
will utilise Weber’s methodology of ‘ideal types’95 to devise a method in which to 
emerge with a proximate answer in his search towards the ultimate primacy.  In 
reality these ideal types do no exist in the real world, instead it act as a yardstick to 
enable one to measure the similarities or differences in cases.  However, these ideal 
types do not exist anywhere in the real world.  Weber (1947) argues that, through the 
use of ideal types, a researcher is able to use an objective measure to deduce 
knowledge about humans in society. 
Although referred to as a contemporary Weberian, Mann remains critical of 
Weber’s use of the comparative method, especially in his comparative studies of 
Europe (Mann, 1986, p.501-503).  With regard to development in Europe, Weber 
contrasted the East and the West arguing that massive social development occurred 
in Europe due to the contractual, decentralised feudalism that fostered a relatively 
rational spirit of acquisition and an activist orientation to the conquest of nature.  
Mann highlights that every case is unique and develops temporally.  Therefore, for 
                                                
 
95 According to Weber (1904/1949, p.90) the ideal type is formed “by the one-sided accentuation of 
one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-
sided emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.  In its conceptual purity, this mental 
construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.  It is a Utopia.  Historical research faces 
the task of determining, in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates 
to or diverges from reality … what is the significance of such ideal-typical constructs for an empirical 
science, as we wish to constitute it?  Before going any further, we should emphasize that the idea of 
an ethical imperative, of a ‘model’ of what ‘ought’ to exist, is to be carefully distinguished from the 
analytical construct, which is ‘ideal’ in the strictly logical sense of the term … An ‘ideal type’ in our 
sense, to repeat once more, has no connection at all with value-judgements, and it has nothing to do 
with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one”(p.110).  See also Eliaeson, S. (2002). Max 
Weber’s Methodologies: Interpretation and Critique. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.47, who discusses 
this concept further.
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Mann (1986, p.173-174) comparative analysis should also be historical.  He states 
that, through Weber’s lack of interest in the historical development, “his use of ideal 
types was at times static” (Mann, 1986, p.172).  Thus, Mann departs from a purely 
Weberian approach and instead highlights the importance of an historical analysis to 
comparative studies.  Seen in this light, this comparative historical approach is a 
further development upon Weber’s methodology.  It becomes apparent that Mann 
does not reject Weber’s ideas, but wishes to extend them further. 
Further similarities and differences between Weber and Mann may become 
more apparent following publication of Volume 396 of Mann’s book on ‘The Sources 
of Social Power’ in which he intends to discuss Weber’s ideas and theories in further 
detail (Mann, 1986, p.301-302).  At least for now, overall, Mann is closer to Weber 
than the rest of the sociological theorists.97  However, it is apparent that he attempts 
to combine other theories and extend the application of each in his analysis. 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
Mann is heavily reliant on the theoretical foundations of Marx and Weber.  
However, he differentiates his theory by adopting a multifactor explanation with 
regard to the structuring of Western society rather than just adopting a material or 
political generalisation.  Tilly (1987, p.630) comments that Mann is less interested in 
revising Weber or Marx and is more concerned to construct an alternative, sequential 
account of world history.  He prefers a view of history as a continuous flow of 
diverse interacting forces (Kiernan, 1987, p.648). 
Mann has drawn and considered theoretical aspects from all three key 
sociological thinkers.  Bryan (2006, p.94-95) credits the IEMP model as having 
provided an original and substantive insight over vast ranges of social time and 
                                                
 
96 Volume 3 was published in November 2012. However, there was insufficient time to review and 
incorporate Mann’s work in Volume 3 as at 16 November 2012 (the date of handing in this thesis for 
examination). 
97 Hall (2006) identifies three aspects where Mann differs to Weber by stating that he does so through 
“his insistence on the autonomy of military power; in his view of ideology; and in his attempt to 
replace Weber’s view that there is no pattern to the interaction of power source with a systematic 
account of why particular sources gain salience at particular points of the historical record” (p.34).  
However, Mann (1986) acknowledges an ‘enormous’ debt to Weber, “not so much in terms of 
adopting his specific theories, but rather, in adhering to his general vision of the relationship between 
society, history, and social action” (p.32). 
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terrain.  In particular, Mann’s methodology provides an explanation of the role 
played by each of four dimensions—ideological, economic, military, and political.  
Mann’s model is a deep, historical sociology and he repeatedly demonstrates that 
present social arrangements are the legacies of preceding collective actions, often 
dating from pasts long distant. 
3.4 Research Methodology Used: Historical Sociology 
The aims of this research are twofold.  Firstly, the principal aim of this thesis is 
to better understand the Sri Lankan conflict and the events that led to the dispute.  It 
has been proposed above that the best theoretical framework for analysing this issue 
is this model presented by Michael Mann.  Therefore, the second goal will be to 
utilise Mann’s IEMP model to analyse what he highlights as the four important 
aspects of social structure individually and also their relationship with each other in 
explaining the conflict using a multi-causal explanation.  Finally, while being 
conscious that the forms of power are not pure, but rather entwined, this research will 
explore why some forms become more important at times than others. 
In this section of the chapter, the aim is to provide a summary of the 
methodology used in this research. 
3.4.1 Historical-sociological analysis 
This study will utilise an historical-sociological analysis method. 
This methodology is appropriate for several reasons.  Firstly, an historical-
sociological analysis does not just describe historical events, but also utilises theory 
to better understand those events.  Secondly, looking at events that have transpired 
throughout time allows those events to be seen in their historical context.  This is 
important because it allows an analysis of a society at different stages in its 
development.  Thirdly, this methodology enables the use of comparative research by 
drawing upon examples from other societies that have experienced internal conflict.  
Fourthly, Mann’s research proves that historical sociology need not be limited to 
macro-level outcomes.  Like Mann, this research will utilise micro foundations as 
well as macro foundations in explaining societal change. 
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Historical sociology focuses on how societies develop throughout history.  A 
good example was given by Anderson (2007).  He points to the rise and fall of 
empires, or the biographical detail of an individual life, as examples of the particular 
phenomena and events that historians seek to describe and explain.  The historical 
sociology method looks at social structures, as these structures are believed to shape 
institutions and organisations, which, in turn, affect the society.  The social structures 
analysed in this research are the four identified by Mann—ideology, economic, 
military, and political structures. 
Mann (1989), describing his research style, said “I am an empiricist and I work 
to results through historical examples” (p.70).  He adds that sociology needs to be 
based on a “wide-ranging and fully critical macro-history” (Mann, 1989, p.70), 
which, in turn, must be informed by historically grounded ‘sociological theorising’ 
(Mann, 1989, p.70, Bryant, 2006, p.78).  This method is credited for having a deep 
concern for theory and Mann (1994, p.41) argues that historical sociologists critically 
rethink the arguments and evidence provided by historians in the light of theories. 
Griffin (1993) also endorses this method and highlights that most sociological 
theories do not consider time in the explanation of events.  He states that events can 
be better understood through the incorporation of time by way of narration.  
Accordingly, narratives further permit for “deep theoretical knowledge about the 
mutually constitutive interplay of agency and social structure” (Griffin, 1993, 
p.1094).  This he says is because the examination and the narration of events are 
done in their historical context.98 
Lawson (2006) describes Mann as a comparative macro-sociologist.  Mann 
(quoted in Lawson, 2006), himself, considers that the key advantage of comparative 
sociology is that it does “not take our own country as the limits of our vision” 
                                                
 
98 Griffin (2005) ‘does warn that narratives often blend both descriptions and interpretations, and that 
it is often easy to obscure causality of the events described within them.’  He argues that one should 
consider counterfacts or ‘what if’ questions, therefore, requiring that the researcher using this type of 
analysis to ponder what did not happen, thereby contextualising what did, however, this should be 
done within an historical and factual framework of objective possibilities.  Causal interpretations can 
be arrived at by asking a series of questions based on facts and counterfacts about historical 
sequences’. 
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(p.482).99  Great lessons can be learned from others who have gone before us.  In that 
regard, Mann widely uses comparative sociology in his latest work and is a keen 
exponent of its utility (Kreisler, 2004).  Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997) argue 
“that comparative historical research has a distinct and critical advantage in macro-
sociology because it focuses on historical sequence and because it allows one to take 
account of varied historical contexts” (p.55).100 
Most historical sociologists study macro-level outcomes.  Mann, however, 
according to Kiser (2006, p.57), is explicit and detailed in specifying micro-
foundations, and makes important progress toward specifying the conditions in 
which different motivations will be operative.  So, while Lawson describes Mann as 
a comparative macro-sociologist, others argue that he is more aptly described as 
explicit in mirco-foundations.  Mann (quoted by Kiser, 2006) argues that “these 
human characteristics [his assumptions about motivations and action] are the source 
of everything” (p.62).  Using Mann’s IEMP model and Mann’s research 
methodology, this thesis attempts to uncover similar motivations through the analysis 
of macro conditions. 
Overall, Lawson (2005) sums up Mann’s work as being rooted in the classical 
sociological tradition.  He says that this tradition emphasises the “importance of 
carrying out empirically grounded, comparative and historical research into the 
macro-processes that drive world-historical development” (Lawson, 2005, p.477).  
Perhaps one of Mann’s greatest advocates, Lawson says that Mann strikes an 
appropriate balance between theory and practice, and effectively deploys a variety of 
disciplines, ranging from international relations to history, to sociology.  In this 
regard Lawson (2005) provides an accurate summary of Mann.  
                                                
 
99 Case methods include techniques for identifying intervening mechanisms and testing multiple, 
observable implications of theories.  Cross-case methods include a host of approaches for assessing 
hypotheses about necessary and sufficient causes.  See Mahoney (2007) for more detailed analysis of 
this. 
100 Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997) state this in response to John Goldthorpe’s (1991) claim that 
comparative historical research is plagued with similar problems as those he identifies in macro-
sociology.  These problems being due to the small number of cases, the lack of full independence of 
the cases, and problems that arise when we move from association to causal explanation.  Although 
Rueschemeyer and Stephens agree with Goldthorpe’s claim in respect to the methodological problems 
of macrosociology, they refute that similar problems are present in comparative historical research. 
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3.4.2 Application of research methodology 
Using the IEMP model as the historical sociology methodology, this research 
analyses each power source over time and its possible contribution to the conflict in 
Sri Lanka.  Each power source will be discussed individually in Chapter 4, Chapter 
5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.  In analysing these power sources Mann’s classifications 
will be applied to understand these social powers and, where applicable, events will 
be divided into significant eras for a better understanding. 
Ideological power in Sri Lanka will be examined twofold.  Firstly, based on 
Mann’s two types of ideological organisation, the transcendent nature of Buddhism 
will be explored, and then the extent of the use of culture as an immanent morale will 
be examined.  Thereafter, ideologies track-laying achievements as described by 
Mann will be examined to see whether the same could be observed in the ideology, 
which was prevalent in Sri Lanka from 1815 to 2009.  Analysis by way of division of 
periods cannot be applied here as it is difficult to isolate a date or year when a 
particular ideology took form or precedence. 
Economic power in Sri Lanka is (arguably) held by a small fraction of the 
population.  Analysis of the conflict indicates that it was partially caused by the 
increased economic disparity between the upper and lower classes.  Therefore, the 
analysis of economic power can be broadly divided into the following periods, based 
on the different economic policies undertaken.  They are: 
(a) 1815-1945: British colonialism and the introduction of the centralised 
governance structure; 
(b) 1945-1977: Independence and Import Substitution Industrialisation; and 
(c) 1997-2009: Introduction of economic liberalisation programmes. 
Military power in Sri Lanka will be analysed by reference to five significant 
military groups that have held such power at different times throughout Sri Lanka’s 
history.  Those five groups are the British Colonials, the Sri Lankan Government, the 
JVP, the Tamil paramilitary groups (in particular the LTTE), and the IPKF.  These 
groups have been selected because they each exercised a form of military power to 
gain the collective and distributive power of civilians.  Significantly, each deployed 
their military power at different times and for different reasons.  This makes it 
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difficult to select time periods for analysis.  Thus, rather than analysing military 
power throughout significant time periods, this research considers the military power 
deployed by these groups, and the various times that each group exercised its 
military power.  Further, Mann’s classification of domestic and geopolitical 
militarism will be considered in the context of Sri Lanka. 
The analysis of political power has been conducted by first considering the 
power organisation based on Mann’s domestic, political organisation and 
geopolitical diplomacy.  Thereafter, Sri Lankan state power is analysed by the 
methods in which the state acquired such power (either infrastructural or despotic).  
The overall state formation has been considered briefly, looking at the different 
forms of crystallisations. 
Keeping in mind that each power source and its influence can not be separated 
into watertight compartments, Chapter 8 discusses the interconnections of the four 
sources and their respective contributions to the Sri Lankan conflict and state 
formation over time. 
This research examines the ‘footprint’ that the past has left behind, which 
serves in understanding the reasons for the conflict in Sri Lanka.  It has involved the 
investigation of historical material, both primary and secondary.  Primary source 
materials examined include archival data from the Department of National Archives 
in Colombo.  Secondary sources include academic books, research journals, and 
publicly available materials, together with government and Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGO) publications. 
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CHAPTER 4 IDEOLOGICAL POWER 
This chapter will look at the ideological basis of the Sri Lankan conflict.  These 
discussions highlight the historical development of ethnic relations and show how 
they deteriorated over time.  The chapter is divided into three subsections.  The first 
section will focus on the term ‘ideology’ and Mann’s historiographic model of 
ideological power.  Second, will be Mann’s two types of ideological organisation: 
immanent morale and transcendent power, in relation to Sri Lanka.  Third, will be the 
application of Mann’s seven track-laying achievements of ideological power in the 
Sri Lankan context.  The extent to which ideological power is useful in 
understanding the ethnic divisions and the conflict in Sri Lanka will be considered 
through this chapter. 
4.1 Theoretical Considerations 
4.1.1 Ideology defined 
The term ‘ideology’ was first introduced by French theorists, called the 
‘Idéologues’, regarded this as a ‘science of ideas’ (Mullins, 1972, p.499).  Marx and 
Engels (1939) significantly changed the meaning of ideology into an instrument of 
social reproduction.  They argued ideology to be a ‘systematic aggregate of distorted 
representations’ that bear enough reference to ‘reality’ to appear true (1939, p.79-
90).  They were referring to ideology originating from deceitfulness, rather than from 
a false consciousness (Rogers, 1981, p.151).  Mannheim (1936, p.125 & 277)101 
insists that even Marxism is an ideology and explains ideology as “the whole outlook 
of a social group” (Mannheim, 1936, p.59).  This ‘total Weltanschauung’102 is 
sociologically developed by factors such as the political orientation and the group’s 
location on an ongoing historical process (Rogers, 1981, p.500).  Mannheim (1936, 
p.192-193) distinguishes between two types of ideologies; ‘ideologies’, which are the 
norms that are used to preserve the past, and ‘utopia’, which is the state of mind 
                                                
 
101 Mannheim (1936, p.192-193) argues that the Marxist notion is a simplistic one and that one should 
not be focusing on the ‘particularistic’ aspects of class ideology, but, instead, on the total aspects.  See 
further Mannheim, K. (1936). Ideology and Utopia (L. Wirth & E. Shils Trans.). London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
102 See Mannheim, (1936, p.57).  
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based on transcendent elements.103  Garstin (1954) and Walsby (1947) also support 
the use of ideology to contain an all-inclusive term.  Garstin (1954) argues that “all 
societies are characterized by weltanschauungs of one kind or another” (p.27) and 
says that the terms ‘Weltanschauung’, ‘ideology’, ‘myth’, ‘creed’, and ‘conceptual 
scheme’ are commonly used interchangeably.  Walsby (1947) goes further by stating 
that the term ideology refers also to “basic ideas (or rather, the assumptions) 
underlying any system of ideas” (p.142).  These basic ideas, he says, can be 
interpreted and then consist of an extended definition based on other fields, such as 
“political, economic, religious, philosophical, scientific or otherwise” (Walsby, 1947, 
p.142). 
There have been many definitions of ideology and it is not the purpose of this 
study to compile them.104  In this study, the term ideology will be used in a manner 
similar to Mannheim and will include an all-encompassing definition of the term.  
Thus, the use of the term ideology by other sociologists requires discussion. 
However, before doing so, the starting point in understanding the elements of the 
term is Minar’s work (1961, p.317-331) in which he identifies six different ideas of 
the word “ideology”. 
 
Table 1: Minar's ideas on Ideology 
(Source: Minar, 1961, p.317) 
Minar’s first idea views ideology as a collection of ideas that embody an 
orientation to normative and prescriptive issues.  Normative is ideology interpreted 
as a commitment or as a belief in something and prescriptive is viewed as a set of 
                                                
 
103 See Wagner, H. R. (1952). Mannheim’s Historicism. Social Research, 19 (Spring, 1952), 320-321, 
on the difficulty of distinction between ideology and utopia. 
104 See Loewenstein, K. (1952). The Role of Ideologies in Political Change. International Social 
Science Bulletin, V, 51-57, on the problem of the definition of ideology. 
01 As a collection of certain ideas with certain kinds of content;  
02 As the form or internal logical structure that ideas have within a set; 
03 By the role in which ideas play in human-social interaction; 
04 By the role that ideas play in the structure of an organisation; 
05 As meaning, whose purpose is persuasion; and  
06 As the locus of social interaction. 
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beliefs that include “statements of instrumental values and interpretations of fact 
related to some ultimate value position” (Minar, 1961, p.321).  Second, ideology is 
also to be treated as a psychological system and, therefore, is more than a passing 
opinion or idea.  Third, ideology comprises ideas that are consciously or 
subconsciously developed and acts to rationalise human interactions.  Fourth, 
ideology includes a set of ideas that govern or unite an organisation or group of 
people.  Fifth, ideology is also often utilised for the purpose of persuasion.  These 
ideas are expressed as verbal symbols in social relations.  Sixth, ideology also 
includes a shared set of ideas or shared values representing ethnic groups, classes, 
nations, associations, or groups of people105 (Minar, 1961, p.321-326). 
Broadly, ideologies consist of ideas that are essentially different understanding 
of the same “world” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p.123-124).  These different 
interpretations mean that ideologies can compete with one another (Roger, 1981, 
p.161) and the fifth idea of Minar, for the purpose of persuasion, becomes relevant.  
Roger (1981, p.147) argues that the concept of ideology is closely connected with 
‘interest’, with interest possibly leading to persuasion and competition.  With this in 
mind, the description of ideology by Cherne (1979) is interesting where he suggests 
that if “power grows out of the barrel of a gun then that ideology is the force that 
triggers that gun” (p.47). 
The question of ideology is a question of power.  Power does not come merely 
from the ability of discourse to define and so determine social reality.  Mann’s 
ideology and ideological power excludes two elements: a tool employed to maintain 
power by deceiving subscribers, and a legitimating rationale for other forms of 
power.  Mann points out that 
knowledge purveyed by an ideological power movement necessarily ‘surpasses 
experience’ (as Parsons put it).  It cannot be totally tested by experience, and 
therein lies its distinctive power to persuade and dominate.  But it need not be 
false; if it is, it is less likely to spread. … And though ideologies always do 
contain legitimations of private interests and material domination, they are 
unlikely to attain a hold over people if they are merely this” (1986, p.23) 
                                                
 
105 Similar to Parsons who treats ideology as a belief system held in common by ‘a collectivity’ (see 
further Minar (1961, p.325) and Walsby, H. (1947). The Domain of Ideologies. London: William 
Maclellan). 
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Therefore, in order for ideological organisation to be able to gain power in a 
society, it becomes essential that the subscribers genuinely believe in its tenets or, at 
the least, they behave as if they believe.  The organisation of this form of power 
comes in two forms, transcendent and morale.  Although Mann argues that 
ideological power was on the decline during the 19th century, its importance is 
argued, in this chapter, to be paramount in understanding the background to the 
hostilities in the Sri Lankan conflict. 
4.1.2 Mann’s ideological power 
In this section, Mann’s form of ideological power is considered further.106 
Mann’s (1993) ‘ideological power’ is derived from “the human need to find ultimate 
meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual 
practices” (p.7).  The organisation of Mann’s ideological power comes in two forms, 
transcendent and morale (1986, p.23).  Transcendent is the ability of ideology to 
transcend the boundaries that are set by other organisations of social power and 
which, therefore, exist in a relative autonomy.  This means that if one of the other 
power organisations was to collapse, although it would impact the transcendent 
ideological system, it would not necessarily result in its own collapse, and may not 
even provoke any response at all.  Mann argues that this organisational structure is 
strengthened by ‘universal infrastructures’ which are formed by other organisations 
of power and that are dependent upon diffused power techniques.  The second 
organisation of ideological power, immanent morale, serves to intensify the power.  
This is because it is primarily a tool of a social group to solidify and codify its 
position within a society.  Ideological power can, therefore, be collective and 
distributive, and may be powerfully intensive and extensive when a specific group 
controls the orthodoxy. 
Mann’s ideological power has seven general reorganising achievements that he 
refers to as ‘track-layers’ of history (1986, p.363-371, Jacoby, 2004, p.60). 
                                                
 
106 At the outset, it is worth noting that Mann does not define ideology.  Rather Mann uses the concept 
of ideological power as the key plank in his methodology.  Thus Mann’s approach is to define 
ideological power and then identify its source. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of Mann’s 
ideological power. 
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Table 2: Track-laying achievements of ideological power 
01 The resolution of the contradictions of imperial rule 
02 The control of literacy 
03 The extension of social identity 
04 The narrowing of the state-subject divide 
05 The capacity to supersede existing structures 
06 The control of core social spheres 
07 The development of military morale 
(Source: Mann, 1986; Jacoby, 2004, p.61) 
Mann, in analysing the belief systems during the period 600 B.C. to 700 A.D., 
highlights the prominence that religion took at the time and its ability to enter 
historical records through its extensive and intensive mobilisation by the “translocal 
sense of personal and social identity” (1986, p.363).  The first ‘track-laying’ 
achievement follows from this ability to reorganise imperial rule in favour of 
universalism, egalitarianism, decentralisation, cosmopolitanism, and civilisation 
(Mann, 1986, p.363; Jacoby, 2004, p.60).  He says that this achievement is built upon 
two preconditions and causes.  First, it is “built on previous extensive achievements 
of economic, political and military power relations” and secondly, it “depended on 
communications and control systems”107 (Mann, 1986, p.363). 
The second achievement was the development of literacy in order to increase 
the decentralised and egalitarian ideological power network (Jacoby, 2004, p.61).  
This helped to keep the original form of the message intact and Mann introduces the 
two-step infrastructure of literacy (where written messages are carried by individuals 
and then passed on verbally) that were adopted by the Roman Empire to transmit 
orthodox belief systems (1986, p.364). 
Its third track-laying achievement was the ability of ideological power to 
transcend into existing social structures (Mann, 1986, p.364).  Through the simple 
                                                
 
107 Mann (1986) outlines “the trading networks of ancient modes of production, the communicated 
ideologies of dominant classes, military pacification structures, and state institutions” (p.363) as the 
control systems. 
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messages108 passed on, Mann (1986, p.364) says that consciousness of collective 
powers emerged, and personal and social identity became more extensive and 
diffused.  Flowing on from this is the fourth achievement of narrowing the state and 
subject divide.  The belief systems, their transcendent exchanges of messages and the 
ability to mobilise the masses meant that this brought the masses closer to the state as 
the “masses and the centers of power were ideologically connectible” (Mann, 1986, 
p.365).  The beliefs of the masses ultimately becoming more important in the 
exercise of power meant that ideological power was able to facilitate support and 
establish new social structures (Jacoby, 2004, p.61).  This is the fifth track-laying 
achievement of ideological power identified by Mann. 
Although the sixth track-laying achievement suggests that ideological power, 
having monopoly of control over the  ‘core social spheres’, Mann (1986, p.368; 
Jacoby, 2004, p.61) points out that its autonomy is restricted by its dependence on 
alternative power networks for territorial extensiveness.109  In his last track-laying 
achievement, Mann (1986, p.368) shows how ideological power is able to influence 
the interpersonal ethic and thereby develop a military morale.  As Mann (1986) 
argues, “religions did not so much transcend existing power organisations as parallel 
them” (p.367), further highlighting that ideological power is not autonomous. 
Although Mann argues that ideological power was on the decline during the 
19th century, incorporating ideology into our understanding of the Sri Lankan 
conflict shows its importance in the Sri Lankan society and especially its 
transcendent nature.  This study attempts to examine if the theoretical framework on 
ideological power proposed by Mann can be used to understand the influences that 
affected the Sri Lankan society that led to the commencement of the discord between 
the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. 
                                                
 
108 Mann (1986, p.364) speaks of messages in relation to three main areas of experience that the 
philosophies and religions touched upon: the ‘fundamental questions of existence’ (the meaning of 
life, the creation and nature of the cosmos, the problems of birth and death), of interpersonal ethics 
(norms and morality), and of the associated spheres of the family and the life cycle (birth, marriage, 
three generational relations and death). 
109 As an example, here Mann points to Islam that was not only diffused by clerics, but also traders 
and soldiers (1986, p.368). 
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4.2 Ideological Power Organisation and Sri Lanka 
Mann (1986) summarises transcendent as power that “cut right across existing 
economic, military and political power networks, legitimating itself with divine 
authority but nonetheless answering real social needs” (p.301).  In immanent morale, 
he refers to the solidarity or morale of a specific social group (Mann, 1986, p.23).  
This could be described as the sense of identity or purpose that the members of a 
specific group have derived.  Unlike the other types of powers identified by Mann, 
these do not seem to stand in a zero sum relationship to one another110 (Goski, 2006, 
p.131).  Whether ideology acted on these lines in Sri Lanka will be examined below. 
4.2.1 Buddhism and its transformation as a transcendent power 
This section will argue that Buddhism acted as what Mann describes as a 
transcendent power within Sri Lanka during, and following, British occupation of the 
island.  A brief analysis will be conducted of the events that led to Buddhism 
becoming an important ideological force in the community and how it continued to 
retain a foremost position in the country. 
In the pre-colonial period, there was no evidence to show any serious political 
or other cleavage between any groups living in the island,111 although the literature 
highlights the importance of Buddhism on the island at the time (Malalasekera, 1928; 
Paranavitana, 1970).  It was not until the 19th century that ideology played a 
dominant role in Sri Lanka in mobilising groups according to ethnicities (Kearney, 
1967; Farmer, 1963).  The island was a typical colony with the Colonialist powers 
using the ‘divide-and-rule’ basis to ensure that power was kept out of the hands of 
                                                
 
110 Mann (1986) highlights Hinduism as a good example of a power network possessing both 
transcended and encompassed political and social divisions between kingdom and caste, even as it 
undergirded the morale of a particular group, the Brahmins. 
111 The introduction of Buddhism into the island resulted in the establishment of a polity based on 
Buddhist values and the formation of a society where people closely intermingled.  The large number 
of early Brahmi lithic inscriptions (dated between 3rd century B.C. and 2nd century A.D.) discovered 
point to all classes of people from the elite, such as the royalty, queens, and chiefs, joining the 
common folk, such as artisans and others, in making donations to the Sangha (Paranavitana, 1970).  
Further, there is epigraphic evidence that the Tamil invaders in the 6th century A.D., the Sad Dravidas 
of the chronicles, also patronised Buddhism.  See Wickremesinghe, D. M. D. Z. (ed.). (1912). 
Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Epigraphia Zeylanica Being Lithic and Other Inscriptions of 
Ceylon (Vol.1, Part IV). London: Oxford University Press, p.114). 
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the majority.  This was especially evident during the British colonial period.112  This 
resulted in what Kearney (1967, p.49) describes as a religious-ethnic revival 
movement following the oppression under the colonial situation and rising inter-
communal tensions (between the Sinhalese and the Tamils).113  Buddhism became an 
important form of ideological power in Sri Lanka during the time of colonial rule.  
Farmer (1963) says that these religious revivals “served to perpetuate differences 
between the Sinhalese and Tamil, between Buddhist and Hindu; and so far as 
Buddhism is concerned, identified Buddhism with the national revival” (p.52-53).114  
That was also said to have been a reaction to forces that had worked to undermine 
the place Buddhism had held earlier in the country.  Initially, Buddhism was a 
diffused form of power,115 where it seemed to have acted as a unifier116 (Paranavitana, 
1970).  Later, it is observed that Buddhism became an authoritative117 power upon the 
island gaining its independence from the British in 1948 and on Buddhism being 
given a special place under the constitutional change introduced in 1972. 
The period following the election in 1956 brought about religious and 
nationalistic sentiments by the Sinhalese Buddhist118 (Smith, 1966, p.458; Kearney, 
                                                
 
112 This mode of rule was evident also under the Dutch colonial periods in Sri Lanka.  See further 
Schrikker, 2007; de Silva, 2005; Arasaratnam, 1958. 
113 The earliest history of the island suggests that no differentiation existed between the two major 
communities in Sri Lanka (Paranavitana, 1970; Tambiah, 1986; Obeysekera, 1979).  One of the first 
things the British administration did in 1802 was to replace local Sinhalese chieftains with Tamil civil 
officers, the British managed to immediately exacerbate communal tensions.  The British used the 
“ethnic divisions in the island, crystallized in the pattern of the labour force, to diffuse any threat of 
serious struggle for independence” (Halliday, 1975, p.160). 
114 See also de Silva (2005) who observes that the Buddhist revival “proved a spur to the growth of 
national consciousness and the recovery of national pride” (p.411-412). 
115 Mann (1986) defines diffused power as when “ideology spreads in a more spontaneous, 
unconscious, decentered way throughout a population, resulting in similar social practices that 
embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded” (p.8). 
116 The introduction of Buddhism to the island resulted in the establishment of a polity based on 
Buddhist values and the formation of a society where people closely intermingled (Paranavitana, 
1970).  See also Nissan and Stirrat (1990), where they state that “pre-colonial and most of colonial 
history does not conform to the model of two opposed nations imposed upon it by present day 
rhetoricians … this is not to say that there were no differences between groups of people living in the 
island: the point is simply that differences of language, custom and religion were made into something 
new by the devices of the modern state …” (p.24). 
117 Mann (1986) explains authoritative power as being “actually willed by groups and institutions.  It 
comprises definite commands and conscious obedience” (p.8). 
118 Kearney (1967, p.80) says that, during mid 1950s, a wave of Sinhalese nationalism swept across 
Ceylon also aided by the 2500th anniversary of Buddha’s entry into Nirvana.  This led to the 
appointment of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) into office, 
following their support of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism and promise of making Buddhism the 
official religion and Sinhalese the official language.  See also Bond, G. D. (1988). The Buddhist 
Revival in Sri Lanka. University of South Carolina Press, 75-76, on the Buddhist Committee of 
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1967, p.80).  Three important steps were taken by the then newly elected Prime 
Minister, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, in the revival and establishment of Buddhism in 
the island (Bond, 1988).  First, the establishment of the Ministry of Cultural affairs, 
which was to be the official source for all religions, is said to have paid more 
attention towards Buddhism (Bond, 1988, p.92).  Second, was the granting of 
university status to two Buddhist training seminaries (these were the Vidyodhaya and 
Vidyalankara).119  These were empowered by the Vidyodaya University and 
Vidyalankara University Act, No.45 of 1958, with the provision “for the 
advancement and dissemination of knowledge and for the promotion of Sinhala and 
Buddhist culture” (Bond, 1988, p.92).  Third, was the appointment of a Buddha 
Sasana Commission in 1957 to look into the position of Buddhism in the country.  
This was the start of Buddhism cutting across into the other power networks.  This 
was justified as a means of achieving justice and an equal playing field with the 
dominant power of Christianity and cultures (which were previously given 
preferential treatment by the British colonials) (de Silva, 1965).  As Mann argues, the 
transcendent nature would not succeed if the ideological power did not appear to be 
legitimate or did not answer a real social need (1996, p.301). 
Here, it is seen how Buddhism, as a diffused form of power, was transformed 
into an authoritative one over time.  This was mainly a result of the divide-and-rule 
policies of the colonial rulers, which led to the religious-ethnic revival movement.  
Buddhism became a transcendent power following independence, as each succeeding 
government adhered to the strong religious and nationalistic sentiments.  This made 
Buddhism become what Mann describes as a ‘divine authority’ that cuts across the 
existing economic, military, and political power networks. 
4.2.2 Tamil-Sinhala cultural competitiveness and the use of immanent morale 
In this section, the cultural competition that was seen between the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils is shown to have created an immanent morale that went on to create 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Enquiry, the report entitled “Betrayal of Buddhism” and its importance to the politics of Sri Lanka at 
the time. 
119 For further on the two pirivenas and their importance in the revival of Buddhism, see 
Ven.Akuretiya Amarawansa Thero. (1958). The Role of the Pirivenas in the Revival of Buddhist 
Learning. The Buddhist, 29(May 1958), 75. 
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strong group cohesion.  Here, the wide use of symbols and the creation of immanent 
morale are explored. 
Following independence, in both ethnic groups (Sinhala and Tamil), leaders 
started to rally to protect their religious traditions and attempted to reassert their 
communal roots on the island (Wilson, 1966; Kearney, 1967).  This allowed the 
uniting of previously separated communities.120  Post-independence also saw the rise 
of symbols used as ethnic boundaries121 (Jensen, 1980).  These symbols included 
religion, ancestry, language, ritual, and other such elements of culture.  These 
become a mode of communication between members of both groups.  The Sinhalese 
and the Tamils, through the emphasis of some of these elements, created a strong 
group identity through the emphasis of group morale.  The symbols increased 
consciousness of the individual and the growing cohesiveness of the group.  The use 
of ideology as immanence and as morale seen during this period is similar to Mann’s 
description of ideology—as immanence and morale (1986, p.301). 
The Sinhalese used the threat of Indian invasion and the need to protect the true 
Buddhist culture as rallying points (Obeysekere, 1979; Nissan and Stirrat, 1990).122  
The ancient chronicles became the principal media for the spread of this ideology 
(Guruge, 1989, p.67).  Soon, events, whether real or unreal, quickly became ‘factual’ 
events and acquired powerful ideological roles (Roberts, 1984, p.199).  Historical 
material started to describe the Tamils and the Dravidians as the invaders and the 
destroyers of Dhamma (that is, Buddhist preaching) (Roberts, 1978, p.364).  This 
helped foster a Sinhalese group identity.  The revival of Buddhism led to the coming 
                                                
 
120 The Kandyan and low-country Sinhalese, and the Ceylon Tamils with the Indian Tamils. 
121 What is arguable is the strength, solidity and permanence of these boundaries.  Like any social 
construct, ethnicity is flexible.  The Kandyan Sinhalese were quite a separate, clearly–bounded, ethnic 
group in the 1920s, but fear of being overwhelmed by the Indian Tamils resulted in an alteration of 
boundaries (Jensen, 1980, p.74). 
122 Obeysekere (1979) writes that, prior to the 16th century, “there were historically two major 
opposed ethnic identities, Sinhalese and Tamil.  The historical conflicts between Sinhalese and South 
Indian invaders reinforced and stabilized the Sinhala-Buddhist identity … these people could be 
mobilized by their rulers to fight foreign invaders … the myths became, on occasion, rallying points 
for Sinhalese Buddhism” (p.282-283).  Arguably, this was a political ploy to move attention away 
from the real issues during the elections.  This was not the case.  See Nissan and Stirrat (1990) “pre-
colonial and most of colonial history does not conform to the model of two opposed nations imposed 
upon it by present day rhetoricians” (p.24).  Not only did Tamils and Sinhalese live together peaceably 
for most of two millennia, but there was considerable social, political, and economic commonality 
between them.  “This is not to say that there were no differences between groups of people living in 
the island: the point is simply that differences of language, custom and religion were made into 
something new by the devices of the modern state …” (Nissan and Stirrat, 1990, p.24). 
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together of a population frustrated and humiliated by a long period of colonial 
domination, during which they were isolated and powerless (Matthews, 1979, p.454).  
The reunion of the Kandyan Sinhalese and the low-country Sinhalese was important, 
as they were able to unite to become a larger, cohesive group gaining more power 
(Samaraweera, 1977). 
The Tamils felt that they had a “permanent right to be represented on an equal 
footing with the Sinhalese” (Wickramasinghe, 1997, p.33) and started to feel 
alienated by the continued assimilation of the Sinhalese community.123  Russell 
(1982) observed: 
“It is interesting that the note of righteousness vis-à-vis the Sinhalese frequently 
crept into Ceylon Tamil discussions comparing the preservation and state of 
their culture with that of the Sinhalese-Buddhists, and it became another 
recurrent characteristic of the nature of Ceylon Tamil revival”. (p.116) 
Kandiah (1975) notes that the Tamil leadership “have been able to enhance 
their position as leaders of the Tamil community by exploiting Tamil attitudes to 
Sinhala nationalism” (p.38).  Their leadership was successful in reflecting the fears 
of the Tamil masses (Kandiah, 1975).  Meanwhile, within the Tamil community 
language, religion and rituals were becoming increasingly important in creating a 
strong identity.  Kearney (1978) quotes a Tamil member of parliament: “language is 
the basis of our culture and our nationality” (p.528).  At first, the symbols that 
became important to the Tamils centred on language and, later, the concept of a 
guaranteed homeland was added to it. 
Establishing a homeland for the Sri Lankan Tamils became the driving force of 
the LTTE.  Hoffman (2009) states that “an integral element of the LTTE’s 
institutional ethos was the principle of individual self-sacrifice and martyrdom for 
the greater, future good of the Tamil people” (p.465).  This became part of the 
group’s ideology.  The LTTE engaged in extensive usage of symbolism by way of 
rituals, which included hero-worshipping rituals and ceremonies, to gain support for 
                                                
 
123 Nithiyanandan (1987) describes Tamil nationalism as a “defensive nationalism” (p.116), which 
was nothing more than a reaction to rising Sinhalese nationalism.  Tamils of all classes and 
communities felt threatened and, in May 1972, the Tamil Congress, the Federal Party, and the Ceylon 
Workers Congress joined together to form the Tamil United Front.  This was the first time that all 
Tamil groups, Indian and Ceylon Tamils, elites and peasants, joined together to form one united front. 
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its cause and to share the memory of fallen Tamils (Hoffman, 2009, p.465).  Some of 
the major rituals include: karum puli thinam (Black Tigers’ Day, commemorating the 
Tigers’ suicide squad), the karuppu joolai (‘Black July’ 1983), thamil eela mahalir 
thinam (Women’s Day of Tamil Ealam, commemorating women Tigers), and the 
Great Warriors’ Day (the great warriors week, from 21 to 27 November) 
(Rudhramoorthy, 2001).  Prabhakaran (1994) stated that “my ambition is to mould a 
new generation of youth who will be the architects of our country’s future.  This new 
generation will be scientific minded, patriotic, honest, decent, heroic and possess a 
sense of honour, self-respect and dignity” (p.3).  He tried to achieve this by the use of 
collective memory through extensive rituals that formed what Mann would describe 
as an immanent morale that allowed the ideology to gain the solidarity of the group. 
Both groups are seen to have used ideology to foster and strengthen group 
solidarity and cohesion.  The cultural competition following independence meant that 
each group resorted to the extensive use of symbols to disseminate its ideology, 
highlighting Mann’s ideological power organisation of the use of ideology as 
immanence and as morale. 
4.3 Sri Lankan Ideology and its Track-laying Achievements 
Mann’s seven reorganising achievements of ideological power are considered 
here, to determine whether ideological power had the same effect as shown by Mann 
in describing the history of the West. 
4.3.1 The resolution of the contradictions of imperial rule 
Mann’s first track-layer of history relates to the resolution of the contradictions 
of imperial rule.  The key attribute of this aspect of ideology is its reorganising 
power (Mann, 1986, p.363).  In particular, Mann proposes that ideology was utilised 
to move away from an imperial rule of a society in favour of universalism and 
equality, and one which was decentralised, cosmopolitan and civilised (Mann, 1986, 
p.363; Jacoby, 2004, p.60). 
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Prior to European colonialism in Sri Lanka, there existed no evidence of one 
united society, kingdom. or state124 (as referred to in the modern context).  Instead, 
the island consisted of three main kingdoms125 (Arasaratnam, 1964; Farmer, 1963).  
During the Portuguese and Dutch periods, the maritime areas were unified and 
brought under control.  Later, the British unified the entire island in 1815, after 
conquering the central highland areas126 (Farmer, 1963, p.35).  A more centralised 
judicial and administrative system was promoted under the British rule, which does 
not accord with Mann’s examples and also Jacoby’s application of Mann’s theory in 
understanding the Turkish state (Mann, 1986; Jacoby, 2004). 
Ideology, however, was seen as being instrumental in changing the 
stratification of society.  This was especially so during the colonial and post-colonial 
periods.  Importantly, in pre-colonial times (pre-1505) until medieval times, 
Buddhism acted as a unifier with the establishment of a polity based on Buddhist 
values and the formation of a society where people closely intermingled127 
(Paranavitana, 1970).  Meanwhile, during colonial rule, and in the period leading up 
to independence, a deep ideological and cultural change was emerging.  Especially 
during the British rule, the sense of identity and group became prevalent.  Halliday 
(1975)128 has argued that the British used the “ethnic divisions in the island, 
                                                
 
124 Before either Sinhalese or Tamils arrived in Sri Lanka, there existed an indigenous population of 
slash and burn agriculturalists, the Veddas.  According to the mythicised Sinhalese version, the 
Sinhalese arrived 2,500 years ago and became Buddhist a couple of hundred years later.  By about 
200 B.C., the Sinhalese civilisations spread throughout the island.  The capital and centre of Sinhalese 
civilisations moved constantly.  During the 13th century, a new civilisation arose, the Tamil Kingdom 
of Jaffna.  When the first European colonialist, the Portuguese, arrived early in the 16th century, the 
powerful kingdom of the Sinhalese was long gone and the Portuguese had no trouble taking control of 
Kotte and, after a few decades, Jaffna.  The Kingdom of Kandy remained autonomous, inaccessible in 
the mountains (de Silva, 2005). 
125 These were the Kandyan, Jaffna and Kotte kingdoms (de Silva, 2005). 
126 See Farmer (1963) who states that the Sinhalese “dynasty which persisted in something less than a 
straight line for 2,300 years was at an end” (p.35).  The island was now, for the first time in over five 
hundred years, a single political entity, and an entity with three separate major cultural groups 
(Tamils, low-country Sinhalese, and Kandyan Sinhalese) and a fourth on the way (Jensen, 1980, p.17). 
127 Nissan and Stirrat (1990), state that “precolonial and most of colonial history does not conform to 
the model of two opposed nations imposed upon it by present day rhetoricians … this is not to say that 
there were no differences between groups of people living in the island: the point is simply that 
differences of language, custom and religion were made into something new by the devices of the 
modern state” (p.24).  See further Spencer (1990, p.5). 
128 During the British colonial period, there was a movement to ‘inferiorise’ the Sinhalese as “less 
energetic and listless” and “innately proven to laziness” (Jayasinghe, 2002, p.9; Bandarage, 1983).  
This was primarily as the Sinhalese population did not support the British following the extensive 
exploitations by the British through the ‘Rajakariya’ system and the possession of their traditional 
lands (Bandarage, 1983; de Silva, 2005, p.55). 
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crystallised in the pattern of the labour force, to diffuse any threat of serious struggle 
for independence” (p.160).  This individual consciousness was ultimately influenced 
by ideology.129  The Indian Tamil immigrant labour that was confined to plantations 
became a group with a separate identity.130  The circumstances of their employment 
in estates, the control by Kanganis, and their abhorrence by Kandyans as disease 
carriers, helped to crystallise their separate identity more than any threat for 
independence. 
The post-independence period was marked by stages of ever-deepening, ethnic 
self-awareness and communal solidarity by the two major ethnic groups.  Stinger 
(1964) speaks of a group identity that exists “among individuals sharing a similarity 
of perception” (p.218) and finds that “social action occurs in response to stimuli 
which are perceived as relating to, or threatening, specific group identities” (p.213).  
Although there were also other factors that led to increase this ethnic consciousness, 
the competition between the two main groups was a salient one.  The period 
immediately following independence saw significant changes in the country with the 
use of ideology as a tool to further centralise rule and stratify society. 
Mann’s description of the resolution of the contradictions of imperial rule does 
not have similar application to the Sri Lankan context, as it did not promote the level 
of decentralisation and egalitarianism that Mann describes (1986, p.363).  The only 
exception was the uniting of the Kandyan and the low-country Sinhalese through 
ideology, in this case, Buddhism.  This, however, took place during a period when 
the majority Sinhalese population felt a heightened threat by the Tamil community 
(Samaraweera, 1977).  Nonetheless, ideology’s ability to reorganise power remains 
relevant, as reflected by changes in Sri Lankan society brought about by the 
ideological and cultural forces. 
                                                
 
129 Erikson (1974) argues that “identity is a process at the core of both the individual and his 
communal culture; the process establishes the identity of these identities” (p.23).  Singer (1964) 
speaks of a “group identity”, which he finds to exist “among individuals sharing a similarity of 
perception” (p.218).  He stresses the importance of communication and finds that “social action occurs 
in response to stimuli which are perceived as relating to, or threatening, specific group identities” 
(p.213). 
130 See further, Meegama (2012), who states that the immigrant labour with the manifold diseases they 
bought in, such as smallpox, cholera, and typhoid, made the ethnic divide even more separate. 
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4.3.2 The control of literacy 
The second track-laying achievement of ideology that Mann (1986, p.364) 
describes is the development of literacy and modes of communication.  According to 
him, this development and control of literacy was aimed at increasing the 
“decentralized and egalitarian ideological power network” (Jacoby, 2004, p.61). 
Mann’s identification of literacy aiding the dissemination of certain ideologies 
was certainly true in the Sri Lankan context.  In Sri Lanka, British arrival and the 
English language131 saw ideas of liberalism, nationalism, and equality follow 
(Roberts, 2009, p.55).  Roberts (2009) states that “the arguments of ‘representation,’ 
‘equality’ and ‘self-government’ were understood by the English-educated middle 
class as arguments for the interests of the people of Ceylon, that is, for the 
‘Ceylonese’ in its all-island, multi-ethnic sense” (p.56).  However, the English-
educated middle class comprised mainly members of the minority ethnic groups, in 
particular the Tamils132 (Denham, 1912, p.434).  On the other hand, the majority of 
the population (nearly 70%) spoke only the Sinhalese language (Gunasekera, 1996, 
p.38).  Language soon became important to improve one’s employment possibilities 
with opportunities in British government (Jayasuriya, 2006, p.12).  This meant that a 
large number of Tamils secured jobs in the elite Ceylon Civil Service: Tamils 
comprised 33% of the civil service and 40% of the judicial service (De Votta, 2001, 
p.121; de Silva, 1984, p.116).  The control of language during this period in Sri 
Lanka shows that it again resulted in the centralisation of power to a minority group 
and ended in marginalising the vernacular speakers. 
The swabhasha bilingual movement commenced in about the 1920s, when non-
English speaking Sinhalese and Tamils demanded the recognition of their vernacular 
languages (Bandarage, 2009, p.42).  However, it was not long before the pendulum 
                                                
 
131 English language was colloquially referred to as the ‘kaduwa’ (the sword) in Sinhala, meaning that 
it “divides the Westernized, culturally-elite class fluent in this language from everyone else in the 
country and cuts down anyone from the lower classes who aspires to economic and social 
advancement” (Jayasuirya, 2006, p.12).  Wickremesinghe (2001, p.9) argues that English education 
was favourable in the sense that it guaranteed social mobility for the low-caste Sinhalese. 
132 The introduction of English language education was primarily done by American missionaries in 
northern regions (Russell, 1982).  See Denham (1912), Ceylon at the census of 1911, p.434, where he 
notes that, in 1911, despite accounting for merely 12.8% of the country’s population, 4.9% of Tamils 
were considered literate in English compared to with 4.2% of the low country and Kandyan Sinhalese.  
See also Jayasuriya (2006) on language in Sri Lanka. 
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swung in the opposite direction.  In particular, the days leading to independence saw 
the preference for the development of Sinhala-only policies and the Sinhala language 
replaced English by early 1950133 (Bandarage, 2009, p.42).  This was despite Prime 
Minister Bandaranaike’s original support for a dual language policy.  He expressed 
fears that if the Tamil language was given the same status, due to the regionally 
dominant Tamil language it could lead to the annihilation of the Sinhala language134 
(Bandarage, 2009, p.42; Kearney, 1967, p.72).  During this period, the issue of 
language intermeshed with Buddhism, and Buddhist priests had also demanded that 
Sinhala be the only official language (Devotta, 2001, p.129).  Soon, usage of the 
ancient chronicles and the original stories were used to legitimise and dissimilate this 
ideology of a one language policy and the ideal Buddhist state (Guruge, 1989, p.67; 
Roberts, 1984, p.199).  The new constitution in 1972, which changed the name of the 
country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, further consolidated the status of the Sinhalese, 
the Sinhala language and Buddhism135 within the state (Jayasuriya, 2006). 
The control of literacy in Sri Lanka was arguably a means of decentralising 
power to the majority of the island, but resulted in centralising power to a small elite 
group.136  In summary, the control of literacy in Sri Lanka was a critical factor in 
determining the dissemination of power between the Sinhalese and Tamils, both 
during the British rule and thereafter.  In particular, during the British rule, the 
predominance of English and the preferential treatment of Tamils left many 
Sinhalese disenfranchised.  Following the end of British rule, the focus on Sinhala as 
the national language had the same effect on many Tamils.  The use of myth and 
religion in Sri Lanka acted as a further method of crystallising this ideology to the 
                                                
 
133 Through the Official Language Act of 1956.  This was further enshrined in the constitutions of 
1972 and 1978.  Ironically, the leaders who were responsible for language planning were actually 
educated in the universities of former colonials and English educated (Anderson, 1991).  For a 
comprehensive overview of the constitutional dimension of the conflict, see Connidis, A. A. (1988). 
Sri Lanka’s Constitutional Development and its contribution to Ethnic Conflict (unpublished paper). 
Ottawa: Ottawa University. 
134 Referring to the proximity to India.  Both domestic elites (movement and regime leaders) and 
international actors contribute to the development of a mature ethnic consciousness.  This is what 
Benedict Anderson has termed ‘long-distance nationalism’.  Manipulating the cohesiveness of identity 
is a non-tangible, yet very powerful influence that non-domestic actors can have.  See further, 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities. London: Verso. 
135 Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution states that “the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give Buddhism the 
foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha 
Sasana”.  See 1978 Constitution. 
136 The small, elite group in power remained to be the English-educated minority, which still 
comprised of Tamils and the Sinhalese elite. 
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groups in power.  Although the development of literacy was paramount in Sri Lanka, 
it did not achieve the results described by Mann, as it did not achieve the 
decentralisation of power as anticipated.  In particular, although the adoption of 
Sinhala as the majority language was supposed to result in the decentralisation of 
power, it did not make the country more egalitarian.  Power was still held by a small 
group of people - the elite. 
4.3.3 The extension of social identity 
Mann’s third track-layer of history relates to the extension of social identity.  
Mann (1986, p.365) states that, through simple messages, ideology is able to 
transcend existing structures and also act as an immanent ideology capable of 
boosting the morale and solidarity of an existing group.  Therefore, the third track-
laying achievement of ideology is capable of extending the social identity further to 
become more extensive and diffused (Mann, 1986, p.364).  The ability of ideology to 
transcend existing structures and to act as an immanent ideology was evident in Sri 
Lanka.  This was particularly evident during the British colonial period, which 
witnessed the brewing of inter-communal tensions and the rise of significant 
religious-ethnic revival movements (Kearney, 1967).  This led to two key 
developments; the uniting of up-country (Kandyan) and low-country Sinhalese, and 
the establishment of a strong Tamil identity.  Which of these preceded the other is 
subject to debate. 
The Sinhalese were previously divided culturally and geographically into two 
groups.137  When the British failed to uphold their promises under the Kandyan 
Convention, due to overriding European capitalist interests, the rebellions and 
religious revivals commenced (Bandarage, 1983, p.50).  Kearney (1967, p.42) is 
closer to reality when he points out that this was much more than a religious revival, 
and that it appealed “to an idealised Sinhalese past” and involved “a renewal of 
interest in religious, linguistic and historical studies”.  The Buddhist movement can 
                                                
 
137 With the Kandyas being roughly 40% and low-country Sinhalese 60%.  Differences between these 
two groups were based on historical fact that the Kandyan kingdom successfully resisted colonial rule 
until 1815, while the low-country Sinhalese, particularly those in the coastal areas, were exposed to 
various influences of the colonial powers from about 1500.  The Kandyan Sinhalese maintained their 
separateness through limited intermarriage with low-country Sinhalese and the maintenance of their 
distinctive, social organisation and legal system (Wilson, 1974, p.38-43). 
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be considered, at least in part, as the result of the improved economic and social 
status of major non-Goigama castes of the maritime districts (de Silva, 2005, p.433).  
Irrespective of the reasons behind the religious revival, the Sinhalese Buddhist 
identity grew strong and was able to transcend, as Mann (1986, p.365) argues, into 
other structures.  This ultimately resulted in the union of the Kandyan Sinhalese and 
the low-country Sinhalese.  Farmer (1963) says that the religious revival “serves to 
perpetuate differences between Sinhalese and Tamil, between Buddhist and Hindu; 
and so far as Buddhism is concerned, identified Buddhism with the national revival” 
(p.52-53). 
This resulted in the Tamils feeling alienated by the assimilation of the 
Sinhalese community.  They felt they had a “permanent right to be represented on an 
equal footing with the Sinhalese”138 (Wickramasinghe, 1997, p.33).  Tamils sought to 
obtain such representation by forming groups.  The group formation that took place 
within the Tamil community (Bush, 1994, p.70; Kearnery, 1967; Tambiah, 1986; 
Wilson, 2000) was what Pfaffenberger (1990) has termed as the political 
construction of defensive nationalism.  The Tamil emphasis on ideology arose more 
from a broad identification with ethnicity.  The question of Tamil identity soon arose, 
with emphases on language and a guaranteed homeland.139  Within a short period of 
time, the Tamil identity and especially the LTTE ideology, was able to transcend to 
existing structures.  This resulted in the creation of a strong Tamil identity. 
Both ethnic groups can be seen utilising ideology to extend support for their 
causes (Kearney, 1967; Bandarage, 1983).  They gained solidarity within their 
groups in the years to come.  The importance of identity, religion, language, and 
ideology was even more visible following independence, with the majoritarian party 
politics that ensued (Russell, 1982).  Mann’s contention holds true, as ideology was 
able to successfully transcend existing structures and was able to boost the Sinhalese 
                                                
 
138 Russell (1982) observed: “It is interesting that the note of righteousness vis-à-vis the Sinhalese 
frequently crept into Ceylon Tamil discussions comparing the preservation and state of their culture 
with that of the Sinhalese-Buddhists, and it became another recurrent characteristic of the nature of 
Ceylon Tamil revival” (p.116).  An important aspect of this argument is the issue of the air of 
supremacy that the Sri Lankan Tamils had assumed over the Sinhalese.  Russell (1982, p.187-188) 
thinks that this air of supremacy evinced by Ceylon Tamils was due partly to the fact that the 
Sinhalese and Tamil revivals on the island, simultaneously as they were, took a competitive hue. 
139 See section 4.2 above. 
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Buddhist ideology (Famer, 1963) and create a strong Tamil sense of identity 
(Pfaffenberger, 1990). 
4.3.4 The narrowing of the state-subject divide 
The fourth track-laying achievement of ideology flows from the third, and 
results in the narrowing of the state and the subject divide (Mann, 1986, p.365).  
According to Jacoby (2004), this enables the break-down of localised social 
structures and “the ‘cultural traditions’ of the millet … bring the masses closer to the 
state” (p.61). 
The important role of ideology is evident in Sri Lanka and became a significant 
factor in the relations between the state and the people.  Even the British colonials 
realised this when they agreed to govern the colony according to the customary laws 
and institutions of the Kandyan kingdom (Bandarage, 1983, p.49).  They agreed to 
preserve the “rights, privileges and powers” (Kandyan Convention, 1815/1923, p.59-
60) of the chiefs, the Buddhist religion, and the Sangha.140  The promises by the 
British were important to secure the support of the Sri Lankan people and ensure 
their uninterrupted rule in Sri Lanka. 
Following independence, ideology took on an even more important role.  It 
became the major point of allegiance and Prime Minister Bandaranaike (1956-1959) 
believed that nationalism,141 based on cultural revival among the Sinhalese-speaking 
Buddhists, was the only solution to the island’s apparent acquiescence of the imperial 
connection.  His party, the SLFP, asserted itself as the champion of the Buddhist 
religion and, upon winning the 1956 elections, they brought in the Sinhala-only act 
(the Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956)142 and established the Buddha Sasana 
                                                
 
140 See the Proclamation of 2 March 1815 or the Kandyan Convention (1815/1923). In A Revised 
Edition of the Legislative Enactments of Ceylon (vol. 1). Colombo: Government Printer, 1923, p.59-
60. 
141 It is necessary that one does not apply the same wide application of the term ‘nationalism’, as 
understood in the 18th century in the West, nor philosophic definitions, in understanding the situation 
in Sri Lanka.  See further, Gopal, S. (1980). The emergence of modern nationalism: some theoretical 
problems in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Sociological theories: race and colonialism. 
UNESCO. 
142 The act replaced English as the official language of then Ceylon.  Gunasingham (1999, p.20) 
comments that, initially, the English-educated Tamil elites and politicians did not take much interest 
in promoting the Tamil language as an official language until the Sinhalese suggested Sinhalese 
becoming the official language. 
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Commission143 in 1957 (de Silva, 2005, p.631).  Prime Minister Bandaranaike also 
established a Ministry of Cultural Affairs and a Department of Official Language 
Affairs (de Silva, 2005, p.632).  Moore (1985) argues that the “use of state power for 
the benefit of the ordinary Sinhalese has been, and remains, the primary legitimation, 
implicit or explicit, of all governments elected since 1956 at least, and arguably, 
since 1931” (p.29). 
In summary, the actions of political leaders fused the identity and interests of 
the Sinhalese with that of the state.  The various policies that were introduced by the 
succeeding governments in Sri Lanka highlight the importance of ideology and its 
ability to enmesh the interests of the people and the state, which is consistent with 
Mann’s fourth track-laying achievement of ideology.  In short, this demonstrates 
Mann’s theory on the ability of ideology to narrow the divide between the State and 
its citizens. 
4.3.5 The capacity to supersede existing structures 
Mann’s fifth track-layer of history relates to ideology’s ability to supersede 
existing social structures.  In that regard, according to Mann (1986, p.367), ideology 
is able to transcend and establish new structures.  This also means that it is able to 
immanently mobilise support for these structures (Jacoby, 2004, p.61).  This track-
laying achievement of ideology follows from the previous ones and is instrumental in 
making the beliefs of the masses an established commitment in a society (Mann, 
1986, p.367). 
The establishment of the Sinhala-only language policy in Sri Lanka is a good 
example of how ideology managed to gain support for the establishment of this new 
structure in the Sri Lankan society.  In addition, the use of myth in Sri Lankan 
society became important in facilitating this.  The early history of Sri Lanka is 
shrouded in myth.144  The chronicles became a principal medium for the spread of 
                                                
 
143 Bandaranike was under pressure by the sangha to declare Buddhism as the state religion and, 
although he was in favour of endorsing this demand, under heavy protests, he resisted this move (de 
Silva, 2005, p.626-680). 
144 There are three Sinhalese Buddhists texts—the Dipavamsa (4th century A.D.), the Mahavamsa 
(late 5th century) and the Thupavamsa (13th century)—that chronicle a history of kings, gods, myths, 
and magic (Smith, 1978; Kemper, 1991; Tambiah, 1992).  The chronicles were also originally 
compiled at a time when the leading monastery, Mahavihara, was under a serious threat of extinction 
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ideology and these texts were even recited on important occasions145 (Kemper, 
1991:111).  What was written in the chronicles146 soon became a national legend.  
Even events that were not found in the main chronicle of the island, but remained in 
oral tradition, found a place in the later Sinhalese work, Rajavaliya, compiled in the 
18th century147 (Gunasekera, 1900). 
The Sri Lankan Tamil chronicles148 of the 18th century are equally important in 
the creation of new ideologies and structures in the Sri Lankan society (Indrapala, 
1970).  These chronicles were instrumental in the rise of the Tamil identity on the 
island, which became more pronounced during and after the British colonial period. 
In summary, both the Sinhalese and Tamil chronicles managed to establish a 
strong following and strong sense of group identity within Sri Lanka.  This enabled 
the establishment of new structures.  The ideology that flowed through these 
chronicles united members of each group with a sense of shared history and identity, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
on account of the rise of the power of Mahayana and the ruler Mahasena (406-428) becoming a 
convert to Mahayanism.  Therefore, the prospect of the chronicles reflecting an ideology of the land as 
a ‘Dharmadipa’, that the precincts were sanctified by the presence of Buddhas, and Thera Mahinda in 
order to protect the monastic interests of Mahavihara from the intrusion of what the compilers thought 
was ‘heterodoxy’ (Vaitulya-vada) cannot be excluded altogether. 
145 Kemper (1991) states that, despite the mythological details and the lack of independent evidence, 
the story has not diminished in its “potential as a vehicle for moral feeling and ideological assertion” 
(p.111).  See further Geiger (1928, p.35), Culavamsa Translation, where he glosses over the “Dipetum 
Dipavamsam” in Ch. 38, v. 59, as ‘reading of Dipavamsa’ on festival occasions. 
146 The chronicles present a narration of the introduction of Buddhism to the island and state formation 
in the form of two original stories (Mahavamsa, Ch.VI, VII, VIII, IX and X and Ch.XIII). 
147 This includes, for example, the mythical story of Gajabahu (which is a memory of the Sinhalese 
being taken a captives to the Cola country during the rule of Gajabahu’s predecessor and how 
Gajabahu crossed the sea and brought the captives back along with an equal number of captives from 
the Cola country) (Gunasekera, A.M., 1900, p.40-41).  Interestingly, great political events (which 
have also been corroborated by foreign evidence), such as the success of King Vijayabahu I (11th 
century), and even the rule of King Parakramabahu I (12th century) have not been held in Sinhalese 
memory (Obeysekera, 1979).  King Vijayabahu I is said to have liberated the country from the Cola 
yoke in the 11th century (de Silva, K.M., 2005:31).  De Silva (2005) concludes “A successful 
resistance movement drove the Colas out of the country under the leadership of Vijayabbahu I” 
(pp.1055-1110).  King Parakramanahu I’s (12th century) war against Pandya and Cola country and 
Aramanna (Myanmar) has also been forgotten, although this was the first time a ruler of Sri Lanka 
engaged in such foreign wars on an extensive scale (Culavamsa Ch.76, vs.10-75 and 76-333; ch.77, 
vs.1-105). 
148 The Dutch official, Maccara, had requested the Jaffna Tamils to write their story (Britto, 1879; 
Rasanayagam, 1926), while the last Dutch official, Jacob Burnand, had been seen persuading the 
compilation of a local chronicle for the people of Batticaloa.  Indrapala (1970, p.134-135 & 139) 
describes this as something extracted from ‘loose floating tradition’ and confusing, as well as being 
replete with legendary material that did not point to authenticity or to early antiquity (not to speak of 
being able to be tested as archaeological evidence), see Indrapala, K. (1970). Origin of the Tamil 
Vanni Chieftaincies in Ceylon. Ceylon Journal of Humanities, I(2), July 1970.; Pathmanathan, S. 
(1972). Feudal Polity in Medieval Ceylon: An examination of the Chieftaincies of the Vanni. Ceylon 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science (N.S). July-Dec, 1972. 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
72  Chapter 4 Ideological Power 
thereby facilitating the establishment of new social structures.  This is consistent with 
Mann’s fifth track-laying achievement of ideology in which he considers that 
ideology supersedes existing social structures and results in the creation of new 
social structures. 
4.3.6 The control of core social spheres 
The sixth track-laying achievement of ideology is its near monopoly of control 
that it has over the core social spheres149 (Mann, 1986, p.368). 
Ideology, however, is not autonomous, as it relies on the other power networks 
for territorial extensiveness (Jacoby, 2004, p.61).  This is true of both the Sinhala and 
Tamil ideologies. 
As previously discussed, the Sinhala ideology is intrinsically linked with 
Buddhism.  Religion later formed an integral part of the national identity, with the 
monarch/ruler considered to be the protector of Buddhism from early days 
(Wickremasinghe, 2001; Bond, 1988).  The Buddhist establishment, closely with the 
monarch and thereby the state, reciprocated by creating institutions, practices, and 
myths to weave into religion (DeVotta, 2007, p.13).  The state and its rulers were 
consistently legitimised by religion, while the formal adoption of religion and its 
institutions by the state encouraged the people to adopt and accept the discipline and 
edicts of the religion and, as a consequence, the ruler, sanctioned by the religious 
establishment.  Further, Buddhism is a way of life, a philosophy.  The Buddhist way 
of life influences all aspects of an individual’s life.  This especially includes his/her 
personal life, thereby making it a powerful force if one were able to manipulate the 
ideology. 
Whereas for the Tamils, the language issue encouraged the growth of Tamil 
nationalism in Sri Lanka, ultimately leading to the struggle by Tamil paramilitaries to 
achieve a separate state for the Tamil people (Gunasingam, 1999, p.23-25).  
Although religion was equally important to the Tamil people, Tamil nationalism was 
based primarily on the issue of language and achieving Eelam.  The paramilitary 
                                                
 
149 The core social spheres to include cosmology, ethics, familial relationships, and life-cycles (Mann, 
1986, p.368). 
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groups, notably the LTTE used these two bases as the foundations to gain support for 
its cause.  It began to use various ceremonies, rituals, and symbols to increase its 
following, and ideology transcended into the individual’s core social spheres 
(Gunasingam, 1999). 
Both groups are seen to use ideology to gain support for their cause and the use 
of ideology is particularly powerful when members of both groups remain strongly 
committed to their beliefs that affect every aspect of their lives. 
4.3.7 The development of military morale 
The seventh and final track-laying achievement of ideology is its ability to 
encourage the development of a military morale (Mann, 1986, p.368). 
In Sri Lanka, the development of the military morale is again evident.  This, 
however, was not the view of all members of both groups.  In the development of the 
Sinhalese morale for military, one is confronted with the anti-federalism (or anti 
devolution of power) movement by some extremist monks, politicians and citizens 
arguing that this would divide the island and threaten the status enjoyed by Buddhist 
religion (DeVotta, 2007, p.23; Premasiri, 2006).  Therefore, an uncompromising 
attitude was formed among some Buddhist clergy (Premasiri, 2006, p.79).  When 
asked, in an interview, if fighting was justified, Venerable Dr. Walpola Rahula150 
replied “why not?  Take King Kosala a disciple of the Buddha.  He did fearlessly 
fight terrorism in his Empire.  The solution has to be the solution of the majority of 
the people” (DeVotta, 2007, p.23; Pieris, 1996). 
Following independence, especially around the 1965 period, the Sri Lankan 
government encountered several groups of militant political activists.  The most 
significant were movements by the LTTE and the JVP.151  Both the JVP and the 
                                                
 
150 He is a Buddhist monk who wrote the book “The Heritage of the Bukkhu”, tracing the history of 
the Sangha and fortune of Buddhism from its origins through to the colonial period.  He has stated that 
“from the beginning to the end of the history of the Sinhala nation, bhikkhus were the custodians of its 
freedom, culture and civilization, literature, arts and crafts”(Rahula, 1974, p.131). See Rahula, W. 
(1974). The Heritage of the Bikkhu (K Wijayasurendra, Trans.). New York:Grove Press.  Walpola 
Rahula was part of the Vidyalankara institution and became an important force in the politics of Sri 
Lanka in the decades before and after independence (Wickremesinghe, 2001, p.3). 
151 See Chapter 6 on Military Power for a detailed description of the LTTE and the JVP. 
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LTTE ideologies have justified and inspired armed insurrection against the Sri 
Lankan government, expressing different anti-state grievances.152 
The 1971 JVP insurgency was the first armed uprising against the state.  
According to De Silva (1998), “the JVP’s opposition to the state was nourished by a 
quasi Marxist ideology which traced individual frustrations to systemic inequalities” 
(p.168).  The group, who was vehemently against capitalism and imperialism, 
divided the Sri Lankan society into the “comprador bourgeoisie, land owning 
aristocracy, capitalist bureaucrats, national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, semi-
proletariat and proletariat categories” (Janatha Sangamaya, 1980, p.56).  The JVP, 
however, simply polarised society into Danapathy (bourgeoisie) and Nirdana 
(proletariat) classes (de Silva, 1998, p.169).  They claimed to represent the exploited 
and oppressed (Halliday, 1975, p.225153) and accused the state of using democracy as 
a means of holding the reins of state power.  The majority of its members recruited 
were between 18 and 25 years old in 1971, and consisted of non-bourgeoisie Sinhala 
strata (Fernando, 1976, p.407). 
Meanwhile, the LTTE accused the Sri Lankan state of discriminating against 
Tamils and of perpetrating genocide.  Espousing Tamil nationalism154 and a 
secessionist155 agenda, Sivathamby (1989) observes that “the core of the present 
group of Tamil militants come from this group of pre-University students of the early 
seventies” (p.253).  The LTTE mobilised its members mainly from Sri Lankan 
Tamils (who are mostly Saivite Hindus).  The development of military morale is 
                                                
 
152 See de Silva, N.A. (1998). Anti-State Militant Mobilization, Sri Lanka:1965-1991. Stony Brook: 
State University of New York further, as she states that  “The JVP and the LTTE rebels are drawn 
from a generation whose aspirations were elevated by free education, exposure to mass media and 
rash promises made by politicians.  However, in the face of slow economic growth and high rates of 
unemployment they faced difficulty in converting educational advancement into concrete gain” (p.50). 
153 See Halliday (1975) for Wijeweera’s dramatic speech before the Criminal Justice Commission 
where he declared “A representative of the exploited and oppressed proletariat is addressing the 
representatives of the exploiting and oppressing class.  We should not forget that the living reality 
which transpires here is a struggle for the fulfillment of class interests of two opposed social classes” 
(p.225). 
154 For further on the Sri Lankan Tamil separatist movement, see Bush, K. (1990). Ethnic Conflict in 
Sri Lanka. Conflict Quarterly, 10(Sprint 1990), 41-58; DeVotta, N. (2004). Blowback:Linguistic 
Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
155 The LTTE justifies Tamil Eelam for the following reasons.  It says the Tamils form a distinct and 
separate nation having their own language, history, and traditional homeland in Sri Lanka.  Some 
Tamil writers (Ponnambalam, 1983, p.28; Hellman-Rajanayagam, 1994, p.55-83) maintain that the 
original inhabitants of the island are Tamils, and that the Sinhalese are Dravidians who later became 
Buddhists. 
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further enhanced through the groups’ elaborate cult focusing on sacrificial death,156 
tiyakam (martyrdom) and commemoration (De Silva, 1998, p.65).  Further, the group 
maintains the undivided support of the public and its members and disseminates its 
‘sacrificial ideology’ and political stance through wide broadcast in the form of 
public speeches, slogans, songs, poems, and dramatic presentations (De Silva, 1998, 
p.66). 
The use of ideology to encourage and develop a military morale is evident in 
the Sri Lankan context.  The use of Mann’s final track-laying achievement of 
ideology -military morale- can be adopted to reveal the important role that ideology 
plays in Sri Lankan society and sheds some light on the roots of the establishment of 
forces against the Sri Lankan state. 
4.3.8 Track laying achievements of ideological power and Sri Lanka 
Applying Mann’s seven general reorganising powers of ideology, which he 
describes as ‘track-layers’, into the Sri Lankan context, three major observations can 
be made.  Firstly, ideological power did not have the similar application that Mann 
had encountered in the examination of Western history.  In Sri Lanka, ideology is 
seen to centralise power rather than decentralise it, and was used, instead, to ensure 
some form of preferential treatment in order to create an egalitarian society.  
Secondly, while the control of literacy arguably advanced the decentralising of 
power in Sri Lanka, it did not achieve the same decentralised and egalitarian society 
that Mann envisaged in his theory.  Thirdly, the track-laying achievements of 
extending social identity, the narrowing of the state-subject divide, the superseding 
of existing structures, the control of core social spheres, and the ability to develop 
military morale, all holds true of ideological power in Sri Lanka. 
                                                
 
156 According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, “an integral element of the LTTE’s institutional 
ethos was the principle of individual self-sacrifice and martyrdom for the greater, further good of the 
Tamil people”. See Hoffman, B. (2009). The First Non-state Use of a Chemical Weapon in Warfare: 
the Tamil Tigers’ Assault on East Kiran. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(3), 463-477. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
Mann offers a fertile base for analysing ideological power.  In his view, 
ideological power “derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to 
share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices” (Mann, 
1993, p.7).  He identifies seven general reorganising achievements of ideological 
power.  These help to understand both its transcendent quality and its dependency on 
other social powers to exist.  Ideology as a transcendent power is able to “cut across 
existing economic, military and political power networks” (Mann, 1986, p.301).  
Also, ideology gives members of a group a sense of solidarity or morale that Mann 
refers to as ‘immanent morale’ (1986, p.301). 
The popular explanation of Sri Lanka’s conflict has been that of an ethnic one, 
one of conflicting nationalism.  Many writers conclude that it was ultimately a matter 
of allegiances or identities, including irrational expression of myths and fears 
(Tambiah, 1992).  Upon examination of Sri Lanka and the power of ideology, it is 
easy to agree with the arguments of Kemper (1991) and Kearney (1978, p.521-534).  
Kemper stated that ideology fused Sinhalese religion (Buddhism), nationalism, and 
ethnic identity.  Kearney (1978, p.521-534) argued that the key to social and ethnic 
mobilisation in Sri Lanka was the identification of ethnic symbols (religion, ancestry, 
and language) and communication through these symbols.  Utilising Mann’s theories 
on ideological power, further highlights these arguments and helps to better 
understand the extent of control that ideology had on Sri Lankan society. 
Applying Mann’s understanding of ideological power, and its reorganising 
attributes into understanding ideology in Sri Lanka, three main observations help to 
understand the events leading to ideology becoming an important draw card in the 
Sri Lankan community.  Firstly, the divide-and-rule and oppressive British colonial 
rule saw Buddhism being transformed into a specific religious form and ideology.  
This is what Mann refers to as an ideology in the form of a transcendent power.  
Secondly, the cultural competition between the Sinhala and Tamil groups following 
independence led to each group utilising means to strengthen the cohesion and 
solidarity of the group.  This resulted in the use of ideology as an immanent morale 
similarly described by Mann.  Finally, although the majority of the track-laying 
achievements described by Mann hold true in the Sri Lankan context, unlike in the 
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West, it becomes evident that ideology in Sri Lanka was used to centralise power to a 
certain extent and not to achieve the same decentralised and egalitarian society as 
Mann describes. 
Ideology started to become a dominant force during Sri Lanka’s period under 
British rule.  Most writers explain this as a religious-ethnic revival movement as a 
result of the oppression under colonial rule (Kearney, 1967; Farmer, 1963).  The 
divide-and-rule policies used by the British resulted in the uniting of the low-country 
and Kandyan Sinhalese, with Buddhism becoming the important link between these 
two previously separate groups.  Utilising Mann’s form of ideology helps to explain 
the manner in which Buddhism was transformed into a specific religious form and an 
ideology that was spread spontaneously, unconsciously, and in a de-centred manner 
to a stricter, more centralised manner that Mann describes as ‘authoritative’.  
Buddhism, as an authoritative power, meant that it was able to intersect other power 
networks.  Mann defines this as ideological power becoming sociospatially 
transcendent.  Mann argues that, for such an ideological organisation to gain power 
in society, it becomes paramount that the subscribers genuinely believe in its tenets 
or, as he defines transcendent power, “answering real social needs” (Mann, 1986, 
p.301).  Studying the events that led to Buddhism gaining its foremost position on 
the island, it is evident that those leading the movement justified it based on 
arguments of achieving justice and having an equal playing field with the other 
religions and cultures that enjoyed preferential treatment under the British (de Silva, 
1965).  This inevitably led to the transcendent nature of Buddhism in Sri Lankan 
society, which continues to date. 
Independence in Sri Lanka saw a sense of cultural competitiveness between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils, each trying to justify the legitimate right to power 
following the departure of the British.  Communities that were not previously 
associated were now seen to join together, utilising ideology as a means of fostering 
and strengthening group solidarity and cohesion.  Mann terms this use of ideology as 
immanence and morale.  This is evident in both ethnic groups making use of 
extensive symbols to achieve this solidarity.  The Sinhalese mainly used Buddhism 
and the Sinhala language as symbols, while the Tamils used language, religion, and 
rituals as their main draw cards.  The LTTE was equally seen to exploit these 
symbols to gain support for its fight against the Sri Lankan government. 
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Analysing the Sri Lankan ideology by using Mann’s seven track-laying 
achievements of ideology, three major observations can be made.  First, while 
ideology’s reorganising ability remains true, ideology was used, instead, to gain 
support for centralised power in Sri Lanka.  This was contrary to Mann’s proposition 
that ideology was utilised as a resolution of the contradiction of imperial rule, and to 
promote universalism and equality by the decentralisation of power.  Ideology in Sri 
Lanka is seen to centralise power rather than decentralizes it, and was used, instead, 
to ensure some form of preferential treatment to create an egalitarian society.  
Secondly, the development and control of literacy as a means of increasing the 
‘decentralised and egalitarian ideological power network’ (as described by Mann) is 
debateable in the Sri Lankan context.  In the pretext of language being used to 
decentralise power, it was also used to further centralise power to a small, elite 
group.  The control of literacy in Sri Lanka was of paramount interest to all leaders, 
Sinhalese, Tamils, and especially the British.  Therefore, the control of literacy did 
not achieve the same decentralised and egalitarian society that Mann may have 
envisaged in his theory in the context of Sri Lanka.  Finally, the remaining 
reorganising achievements of ideology that Mann describes, which includes its 
ability to extend social identity, narrow the state-subject divide, supersede existing 
structures, control core social spheres, and develop military morale, all hold true of 
ideological power in Sri Lanka. 
In conclusion, Mann’s theories on ideological power, its organisation and its 
track-laying attributes, help to understand how ideological power influenced the 
development of the ethnic fractions within the Sri Lankan community.  Although 
other factors, such as the economic and political situation at the time of 
independence, were also reasons behind the uniting of the Kandyan and low-country 
Sinhalese, it is evident that ideology had a pivotal role in creating an ethnically 
divided society in Sri Lanka.  The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and 
the LTTE cannot, however, be explained simply as an ethnic issue, as there also exist 
internal social and economic influences.157  It is to these issues that the next chapter is 
addressed. 
                                                
 
157 Huntington (1993, p.22), argues that “the fundamental source of conflict in this ‘new world order’ 
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic”, and “the great divisions among humankind 
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and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural”.  See Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of 
Civilizations. Foreign Affairs, 72(3). 
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CHAPTER 5 ECONOMIC POWER 
This chapter will look at the extent to which economic power contributed to the 
formation of classes in Sri Lanka.  It also identifies the consequences of the resulting 
social stratification. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections.  The first section will attempt 
to define the term ‘economic power’ and understand Mann’s economic power 
concepts.  The second section will devote itself to a consideration of economic power 
in the Sri Lankan context utilising Mann’s fourfold typology of organisational reach.  
The third section will analyse class relations in Sri Lanka, paying particular attention 
to the class relations and struggles that took place from the time of colonisation to the 
present.  A brief socio-economic account of Sri Lanka and the traditional caste 
structure of the Sinhalese and Tamils will also be introduced, as this phenomenon 
has particular relevance to the study of socio-cultural issues among both the Tamils 
and the Sinhalese. 
5.1 Theoretical Considerations 
5.1.1 Economic power defined 
What is economic power?  There doesn’t seem to be an agreed definition as to 
what constitutes economic power.  Definitions vary from one authority to another.  
To quote a few examples, Rand (1946) defines it as “the power to produce and to 
trade what one has produced (p.1)”.  He described this type of power as being 
exercised through a positive mean158 (that is, by offering an incentive or reward by 
way of payment or value).  Frost (2009) broadly defines economic power as “the 
ability to control or influence the behaviour of others through the deliberate and 
politically motivated use of economic power” (p.9).  Here, economic power is 
depicted as a means of controlling others.  Fulda (1988) goes further and defines 
economic power as “the ability to influence a variety of social and economic 
conditions through the use of one’s wealth in a volitive, rather than a coercive 
                                                
 
158 See further Rand (1946), who contrasts economic power with political power and states that 
political power is said to have a negative connotation in that, it is achieved through the threat of 
punishment. 
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manner” (p.64).  The ability of influence becomes paramount and not the use of force 
or threat.  Fulda (1988) renames the notion of economic power as being economic 
freedom.  He speaks of the resentment that is felt through the unequal nature of 
influence when people are left free. 
In social science, when the concept of economic power and society is 
considered, Karl Marx’s ideas have played a significant role in social sciences.  For 
Karl Marx (1818-1883), the foundation of human life and history was based on 
economic relations. This resulted in the division of labour, the formation of social 
institutions and ultimately class159 struggle (Marx and Engels, 1848).  In an ideal 
world goods exchanged would have an equal value but Marx argued that capitalism 
and the profit-making motive interferes with this ideal.  Marx equated surplus labour 
as an example of exploitation of workers (Marx, 1894, Ch.47).  Within this state of 
capitalism, he relates the inevitable exploitation and alienation of workers as leading 
to the development of a sense of ‘economic class consciousness’160 on the part of the 
workers.  Giddens (1971) observes that “classes are constituted by the relationship of 
groupings of individuals to the ownership of private property in the means of 
production” (p.37).  These classes inevitably involve a conflict relation.  The two 
main classes Marx described were the ‘capitalists’ (also referred as the ‘bourgeoisie’) 
and the ‘workers’ (also known as the proletariat) (Marx, 1852, 1967 & 1894; Marx 
and Engels, 1848).  For Marx, these classes are the main link between the relations of 
production and the rest of the society that he refers to as the ‘superstructure’ 
(Uberbau) (Giddens, 1971, p.39).  According to Marx, there is a close relationship 
between economic and political power, as class relations act as a main axis to these 
powers (Giddens, 1971, p.39).  While having power means being in control, political 
power is designed to maintain control. 
Weber does not integrate economic and political power as much as Marx in 
discussing social development (Giddens, 1970, p.303).  Weber extends Marx’s 
analytical scheme through the introduction of a pluralistic notion.  While he agrees 
                                                
 
159 In ‘Capital 3’, although there is a draft chapter on social classes, there is no systematic discussion 
by Marx as to the definition of social classes.  Palermo (2007, p.557) states that economistic 
interpretation is when social groupings are categorised based on simply economic structures. 
160 According to Marx, it is the relationship between the forces of production and the means of 
production that create a class consciousness within society, rather than man’s philosophy or individual 
consciousness. 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
82  Chapter 5 Economic Power 
that the production process is important in the classification of men into groups, he 
highlights the importance of consumption patterns.  Economic power, for Weber, is 
the power to control resources in the production process, the ability to monopolise 
the accumulation of these resources, and to influence its consumption (Giddens, 
1970, p.297: Weber, 1968, p.63).  Swedberg (1998) states that, for Weber, 
“everything that happens in the economy is about opportunities: finding 
opportunities, excluding others from opportunities, and using opportunities for one’s 
own purpose” (p.386).  Equally, Weber agrees with Marx that, the present work is 
essentially a capitalist one where economic power has become a predominant figure.  
While he also agrees that economic power can directly or indirectly affect the 
exercise of political power, Weber stresses that “the emergence of economic power 
may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds”161 (Weber in Swedberg, 
1998, p.379). 
Weber’s definition of classes was similar to Marx.  He defined a class as the 
grouping of persons who 
have in common a specific causal component of their life chances in so far as 
this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the 
possession of goods and opportunities for income, and it is represented under 
the conditions of the commodity or labor market.
162




In traditional societies, Weber states that property owners were the ruling class, 
based on their means of wealth creation.164  However, in a capitalist society, those 
who have the greatest wealth or economic status are those holding seats of power.  
Therefore, these people do not necessarily own property, but would have access to 
power through other means.  Weber also differs from Marx insofar as he introduces 
an additional structural category that he refers to as ‘status groups’.  These status 
                                                
 
161 See further Swedberg, R. (1998). Max Weber’s manifesto in economic sociology. Archives 
Europeennes de Sociologie, 39(2), 379-98. 
162 This view is similar to Marx, as Marx discussed the implication of class in terms of the material 
conditions of existence and also the possession of property as being definitive. 
163 In short, the term ‘class’, according to Weber, refers to any group of people that is found in the 
same class situation.  See further Gerth & Mills (1958, p.181). 
164 Weber identifies two subdivisions among property owners, entrepreneurs, who create wealth 
through commercial ventures, and rentiers, who profit by interest on their property; through 
investments or rent of land. 
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groups are communities, which are united through common notions of ‘proper 
lifestyles’, ‘social esteem’, and ‘honour’ (Gerth & Mills, 1958, p.186-187).  For 
Weber, societies are therefore divided into such groups based on what he refers as 
‘status groups’ but also based on classes.  For Weber, the sectional interests are not 
limited to economic interests and should be extended to other areas of social life 
(Giddens, 1970, p.298). 
Borrowing from certain principal sociological theories, Mann (1993) agrees 
with “class theory’s insistence that modern states are capitalist and that politics are 
often dominated by class struggle” (p.88).  He aligns his theory closer to that of 
Weber (Mann, 1993, p.510 & 695) and distances himself from “Marxist or non-
Marxist one which believes in a definite path of development that class dynamics 
must follow” (Giddens, 1994, p.37165).  Mann’s (1993, p.723-730) view is that 
capitalism is a diffused form of economic power and that the division of classes can 
be uncertain and varied.166 
5.1.2 Mann’s economic power 
Mann’s concept of economic power revolves around the use and availability of 
natural resources and material goods to meet human needs (Mann, 1993, p.7).  Mann 
(1986) describes his notion of economic power and the use of the term of class in the 
following terms: 
Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the 
social organisation of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and 
consumption of the objects of nature.  A grouping formed around these tasks is 
                                                
 
165 Read further Mann, 1993, p.510-116. 
166 Mann (1993) gives four reasons why the distributive conflict was not as Marx expected: 
1. Because capitalism was predominantly a diffused power organization, its authoritative 
class organization emerged as essentially ambivalent. 
2. The outcomes of competition among these competing economic organizations were 
determined predominantly by the strategies or drifts of more authoritatively organized 
dominant classes and ruling regimes, which, after all, controlled existing authoritative 
states and armed forces. 
3. The strategies or drifts of dominant classes and regimes, and so therefore of workers 
themselves, were predominantly determined by the other three sources of social power. 
4. These interactions were not like billiard-ball collisions of separate objects. Classes, 
segments and sections all “entwined nondialectically” with authoritative political 
crystallizations, thus helping to shape one another” (1993, p.724-725). 
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called a class – which in this work, therefore, is purely an economic concept.  
Economic production, distribution, exchange, and consumption relations 
normally combine a high level of intensive and extensive power, and have been 
a large part of social development.  Thus classes form a large part of overall 
social-stratification relations.  Those able to monopolise control over 
production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, that is, a dominant class, 
can obtain general collective and distributive power in societies.
167
  (p.24) 
Mann (1986) offers a fourfold typology of organisational reach.  One of these 
dimensions is the typology between extensive and intensive power organisations.  
Extensive power refers to “the ability to organise large numbers of people over far-
flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation” (Mann, 1986, 
p.7).  On the other hand, intensive power is “the ability to organise tightly and 
command a high level of mobilisation or commitment from the participants, whether 
the area and numbers covered are great or small” (Mann, 1986, p.7).  Extensive 
powers are gained through distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods (Mann, 
1993, p.7).  Mann highlights its extensive powers during exchange, which, he says, 
opens up opportunities, and encounters influences beyond its capacity during the 
production process (Mann, 1986, p.25).  Intensive power is in the form of everyday 
labour cooperation.  This is the social cooperation needed to exploit nature (Mann, 
1986, p.25; Mann, 1993, p.7).  According to Mann (1986, p.7), the primary structure 
of society combines both extensive and intensive power.  This is aimed at assisting 
human beings in gaining cooperation to achieve their goals. 
The other aspect is between authoritative and diffused power.  Authoritative 
power is power that is actually “willed by groups and institutions” (Mann, 1986, p.8).  
By comparison, diffused power is that which “spreads in a more spontaneous, 
unconscious, decentered way throughout a population, resulting in similar social 
practices that embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded” (Mann, 
1986, p.8).  Authoritative power exists during production only and is diffused 
through exchange.  Mann (1986, p.25) describes economic power as being generally 
                                                
 
167 This terminology will be maintained in this work as well, in the few situations where class is 
relevant to the overall thesis. 
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diffused and incapable of being controlled from a core, resulting in a fragmented 
class168 structure. 
Mann goes beyond Karl Marx by arguing that organisational forms of 
economic power include not only social classes, but also social sections and 
segments169 (Mann, 1993, p.8; Baert & da Silva, 2010, p.175).  While classes relate to 
each other vertically, any given social class is composed of several sections (such as 
a skilled trade or a profession) (Mann, 1993, p.8).  A segment170 consists of members 
drawn from several classes (for example, the social segment ‘patron-client’ includes 
members of at least two different social classes) (Mann, 1993, p.8; Baert & da Silva, 
2010, p.175).  These segments compete with each other horizontally.  Ultimately, 
these classes, sections, and segments cut across each other and weaken one another 
in human societies (Mann, 1993, p.8). 
Mann outlines four stages of class relations and class struggles in the 
development of human societies: latent, extensive, symmetrical, and political (Mann, 
1986, p.24; Mann, 1993, p.8; Macauslan, 2010, p.17). 
(a) Latent: This is the struggle between groups in a hierarchical (‘vertical’) 
system.  It usually includes struggles between the different classes.  These are 
latent because they do not reach any pronounced organisational form due to 
other power organisations (the ‘horizontal’ economic organisations) that cross 
class boundaries.  These other organisations include familial, clan, tribe, client 
elist, and other relations.  These class struggles do not outwardly manifest as 
they are confined to an everyday, local level (Mann, 1986, p.216; Mann, 1993, 
p.8). 
                                                
 
168 Mann’s classification of ‘class’ denotes a purely economic power grouping (Mann, 1986, p.25).  
He argues that “class did not emerge as ‘pure’ features of modernity ... they were divided by other 
networks of social interaction, both from within the relations of production and through the influence 
of non-economic forces” (Jacoby, 2004:94).  The term ‘social stratification’ includes any type of 
distribution of power, and the term ‘ruling class’ denotes “an economic class that has successfully 
monopolized other power sources to dominate a state-centered society at large” (Mann, 1986, p.25). 
169 See further Baert & da Silva (2010, p.175), who argue that Mann’s analysis is more fine-grained 
than conventional social class analysis, dealing better with the multi-causal and multi-level character 
of most social phenomena. 
170 Mann (1993, p.8) states that he uses the word ‘segments’ as used by an anthropologist or by what 
Europeans term as a ‘class fraction’.  This is contrary to the term ‘segment’ used by the American 
class theorists to refer to a portion of a class. 
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(b) Extensive: Most extensive struggles are between segments.  This is where 
classes overcome other power organisations and organisers.  There are two 
types of extensive class organisation: unidimensional and multidimensional.  
Extensive class organisation can be considered unidimensional when there is 
one predominant mode of production, distribution, and exchange (Mann, 1986, 
p.217; Macauslan, 2010, p.18).  When there is more than one mode, the 
organisation is multidimensional. 
(c) Symmetrical: This is when extensive classes possess similar structures171 
(Mann, 1986, p.217). 
(d) Political172: The class organises itself for the purpose of political 
transformation or defence of the status quo.  Here too, political organisation 
can be symmetrical or asymmetrical.  Asymmetrical organisation occurs when 
only one class is politically organised (this usually being the ruling class) 
(Mann, 1986, p.217). 
Economic organisation, for Mann (1986), is a “distinctively stable, sociospatial 
blend of extensive and intensive power and of diffused and authoritative power” 
(p.25).  His term ‘circuit of praxis’173 embodies the extensive nature of the various 
paths (or circuits) of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, with the 
intensive nature of praxis (or “practical, everyday labor”) (Mann, 1986, p.25).  A 
group‘s relation to the circuit of praxis will dictate its position as a class.  Across the 
whole circuit of praxis, the extent to which they are ‘extensive’, ‘symmetrical’, and 
‘political’ in the mode of production will establish the organising power of class and 
class struggle.  A ‘ruling class’ in this framework is an economic class “that has 
successfully monopolized other power sources to dominate a state-centered society at 
large” (Mann, 1986, p.25). 
                                                
 
171 See Macauslan (2010, p.18), who gives the example of symmetrical classes as being when the 
organisation of producing classes resembles that of the merchant class or vice versa. 
172 See Mann (1986, p.216-228) where he states that Greece is the first known society that has moved 
completely to a political class organisation exhibiting a symmetrical, political class struggle. 
173 Mann, in Volume 1, termed these economic power organisations as ‘circuits of praxis’, which he 
abandoned by the time he reached Volume 2 and called it by the more conventional label ‘forms of 
economic cooperation and conflict’ (Mann, 1983, p.25; Mann 1993, p.7).  The term is maintained, 
however, in this thesis to explain the concept of economic power organisation in Mann’s words. 
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This study will examine whether Mann’s framework on economic power, 
discussed above, could be useful to understand the different classes, sections, and 
segments in Sri Lankan society and the possible influences they had on the conflict 
in Sri Lanka. 
5.2 Economic Power in Sri Lanka 
Mann’s economic power derives from the availability of resources and the 
social organisation around the “extraction, transformation, distribution and 
consumption” (1986, p.24) of such resources.  Economic power, for Mann, is 
particularly powerful because it combines intensive and extensive power, as well as 
authoritative and diffused power (Mann, 1993, p.7).174  He says that the “most 
effective organisation would encompass all four forms of reach” (Mann, 1986, p.8). 
This section will analyse Mann’s concept of economic power to understand the 
extent of economic power that existed in Sri Lanka in the three different phases.  The 
first phase is the period under British occupation (1815-1945), the second is the post-
independence period (1945-1977), and the third is the period which introduced 
economic liberalisation programmes (1997-2009).  The three phases have been 
divided, based on the key economic policies undertaken by ruling party. 
5.2.1 British colonialism and the introduction of the centralised governance 
structure (1815-1945) 
The British colonial rule in former Ceylon was primarily responsible for 
transforming the subsistent, agrarian economy of the land, which prevailed in the 
days of Sinhalese rulers of Kandy, into a commercial and competitive one.  The new 
economy was based on three primary plantation175 crops, namely, tea, coconut, and 
                                                
 
174 There are four examples of forms of organisation each that Mann (1986, p.9) gives which he says 
are generated through the combination of these four dimensions.  These include an army command 
structure (the combination of intensive and authoritative), militarist empire (the combination of 
extensive and authoritative), a general strike (the combination of intensive and diffused), and market 
exchange (the combination extensive and diffused). 
175 With the Sinhalese refusing to work as wage labourers in these plantations, the British resorted to 
the importation of labour from south India and “between 1843 and 1859 no fewer than 903,557 men, 
women and children came to work on the new plantations” (Farmer, 1963, p.41). 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
88  Chapter 5 Economic Power 
rubber (de Silva, 2005).  As for the peasant economy, the general picture was one of 
stagnation in agriculture, with neglected ancient irrigation works (de Silva, 2005, 
p.378).  The British used (and mostly misused) the ancient system of ‘rajakariya’176 
extensively for public works, especially in road construction and maintenance (de 
Silva, 2005, p.314).  By 1820, the beginning of a ‘market economy’ was clearly 
discernible (de Silva, 2005, p.316).  The Colebrook-Cameron Commission,177 
through its reforms178 in 1830, introduced a superstructure modelled by laissez-faire 
and free trade (de Silva, 2005, p.317).  This led to the rise of agency houses, almost 
wholly British owned,179 both as managerial functions and as credit institutions to the 
large estates (Wilson, 1980, p.75). 
The economic power during this period shows that the colonial users were 
successful in organising a large number of people in different territories to engage in 
the economy of Ceylon.  This is what Mann named as ‘extensive power’.  The 
colonial economy was dominated by the British, as well as by north and south Indian 
merchant capital180 (Roberts, 1974; Jayawardena, 1987).  The British introduced new 
sources of labour, which enabled members of more enterprising segments of the 
society to participate in the economy through their entrepreneurial talents 
(Bandarage, 1983, p.276; 2009, p.30).  Overall, Jayawardene (1984) describes the 
colonial bureaucracy and highlights that 
                                                
 
176 The rajakariya was a compulsory service in Sri Lanka which was established in the Anuradhapura 
period.  This system meant that the population was obliged to do certain services free for the king upto 
40 days each year. It was through this system of labour that the construction of water tanks, bridges, 
irrigation, roads and other public structures were completed.  Rajakariya was abolished by the British 
Governor Sir Robert Wilmot Horton on the 28 September 1932.  See further, de Silva (2005). 
177 In the view of this commission, the state’s role was to create an environment conducive to the 
growth of private enterprise.  It was intended to encourage the entry of foreign capital to invest in 
plantation agriculture, mainly cinnamon, and in the production of rice on commercial basis.  They saw 
the ‘rajakariya’ system as the greatest bug-bear that inhibited this process.  They objected to it more 
on humanitarian grounds—as an intolerable and oppressive relic of feudalism, as much as an obstacle 
on free movement of labour and the creation of a land market which were required for a laissez-faire 
state.  See further de Silva (2005); Bandarage (1983). 
178 Some of the reforms included the land policy of the colonial government, the reduction of salaries 
of the Civil Service, abolition of pensions, and the opening of plantation agriculture.  See further de 
Silva, 2005. 
179 Until the early 1970s, foreign interests largely owned most of the important economic sectors, 
including these tea estates. 
180 The weakness of native entrepreneurs in competition led to hostility towards ‘foreign’ domination.  
This was the root of hostilities between the Muslims, Tamils, Malayalees and Europeans (Roberts, 
1974; Jayawardena, 1987).  For example, there was competition between the Muslims and Sinhala 
shopkeepers and traders.  The former, who were migrants from the Coromandel and Malabar coasts of 
south India, had traditionally made a name for themselves in the internal and external trade of Sri 
Lanka. 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
Chapter 5 Economic Power 89 
Foreign trade was largely controlled by the British through British owned 
plantations, agency houses and banks.  Merchant capitalists from India 
dominated the export-import sector and the wholesale trade.  In retail trade, the 
smaller Sinhalese traders were seen to compete with the traditional trading 
communities like the Muslims and Chettiars (Tamils).  The wage employment 
was limited but was highly competitive with the Sinhalese white-collar workers, 
other skilled and wage workers competing with Indian migrant and workers 
from minority groups competing for the limited employment’. (p. 54-55) 
Irrespective of the merits or demerits of the British colonial economic system, 
the system managed to organise a large number of people in the economic process 
and to open up opportunities beyond those encountered in the production process.  
This is similar to what Mann describes as engaging ‘extensive’ organisational reach. 
The large export agriculture that was introduced facilitated the development of 
service industries, such as banking and transport, and helped to further open up 
opportunities in the economy.  This period saw a high level of infrastructural 
development in Ceylon with the building of roads and railways (Bandarage, 1983, 
p.276).  The use of the ‘rajakariya’ system allowed the British to access free labour 
and support from the local communities in the building of these infrastructures.  This 
can be described as the second type of organisation reach that Mann terms ‘intensive’ 
power, which encompasses the social commitment and social cooperation. 
The British used a unified administrative and political structure in the 
governance of Ceylon and its economy (Bandarage, 1983, p.276).  They used what 
Mann terms ‘authoritative’ power to implement their goals especially in the form of 
land and tax policies, which went to drastically change the previous economic 
structure in Ceylon (Bandarage, 2009, p.30, 1983, p.87-173).  For example, the use 
of instruments such as the Crown Lands Encroachment Ordinance of 1840 meant 
that the government was able to expropriate vast amounts of fertile land belonging to 
the royal and feudal villages and temples for the development of its plantation 
economy (Bandarage, 1983, p.171).  Further, the introduction of private property 
rights resulted in the erasing of communal village rights to high lands and the gradual 
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demise of the chena181 cultivations, which had provided sustenance to the villagers 
(Bandarage, 1983, p.171). 
The economic power during this period was also somewhat ‘diffused’.  This 
was because the British allowed certain lines of commerce to be de-centred and 
controlled by external parties.  For example, the merchants from India had a virtual 
monopoly over the importation and exportation of non-plantation produce 
(Jayawardena, 1984, p.54-5).  The economic power by the British in Ceylon shows 
that the colonials managed to encompass all four forms of reach described by Mann.  
Through the combination of both extensive and intensive powers, the rulers were 
able to gain greater cooperation to achieve their goals.  The use of both authoritative 
and diffused power further enabled the British rulers to, in Mann’s words, “exercise 
the most powerful and effective social organisation” (Mann, 1986:8). 
5.2.2 Independence and import substitution industrialisation (1945-1977) 
The post-independence government inherited from the British a highly 
undiversified export economy182 that was dependent on tea, rubber, and coconut, and 
in which an independent industrial sector was absent (de Silva, 2005, p.618; 
Rupesinghe, 2008, p.144).  With World War II, foreign income suffered badly and 
the cost of imports was on the rise.183  This was also a period highlighted by the 
rapidly increasing population, high human development indicators (such as literacy 
and life expectancy), a relatively stable macro economy, and the government 
continuing to be the largest landholder in the country (de Silva, 2005, p.618; 
Rupesinghe, 2008, p.142).  Bandaranaike’s economic reforms in favour of a more 
socialist-oriented economy, during the early 1970s, saw that government take a 
                                                
 
181 This is slash and burn agriculture known as ‘hen’ in Sinhala, and chena as anglicised by the British.  
This is a system involving the rotation of soil through relatively little exertion of labour, as the 
villagers would communally slash and burn a portion of the village forest, hoe the ground, and 
broadcast the seeds (Bandarage, 1983, p.26).  For further information, see Pieris, R. (1956). Sinhalese 
Social Organization. Colombo: Ceylon University Press Board. 
182 Ninety-five per cent of the total export earnings came from the plantation sector with tea 
accounting for nearly 60% of this.  See Snodgrass, D.R. (1966). Ceylon: An export economy in 
transition. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Ltd, for a further discussion of post-colonial Sri Lanka. 
183 At the time, Sri Lanka was highly dependent on imports of basic produce to feed the growing 
population, as the traditional agriculture was neglected during the British colonial period.  The largest 
percentage of total imports was food, accounting for over 50%.  See further de Silva (2005) and 
Rupesinghe (2008). 
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commanding role in the country’s economy184 (de Silva, 2005, p.639).  State control 
was initially introduced with the government nationalising the bus transport sector, 
certain plantations, and, finally, tea plantations.  The Business Undertakings and 
Acquisition Act of 1972 discouraged foreign investment and empowered the 
government to take over any industries employing over 100 employees (Wilson, 
1980, p.85). 
In an attempt to become less economically dependent on external factors, 
governments during this period encouraged various new policies.  The Prime 
Minister of Ceylon from 1947 to 1952, Don Stephen Senananyake, was passionate 
about the building up of traditional agriculture, but he did not make any far-reaching 
changes to the structure already inherited from the British (de Silva, 2005, p.619-
620).  The Bandaranaike governments (1956-1977) pursued a more active 
interventionist policy in the form of import substitution, or closed economy policies, 
aimed to stimulate domestic production (Rupesinghe, 2008, p.143).  The government 
committed to developing a strong industrial sector, started government-owned 
factories for “steel, tyres, hardware, sugar, salt, cotton, yarn, brick and tile, chlorine 
and limonite” (Athukoralage, 1981, p.123).  These new industries were also aimed at 
creating new employment and redistributing wealth (de Silva, 2005, p.639).  The 
government used what Mann terms as ‘intensive’ power to gain support of members 
of the public in its new policy direction. 
This period is also highlighted by the government’s wide use of ‘authoritative’ 
power (as described by Mann) to achieve its economic goals and to ensure the 
continued support of its citizens.  In the face of serious balance of payment 
difficulties, to execute its objectives, the government resorted to imposing import 
duties (to discourage import and to collect much needed revenue), protective tariffs 
(to encourage infant industries), and also lowering import duties (on certain capital 
equipment and industrial raw materials) (Rupesinghe, 2008, p.145, Snodgrass, 1966, 
p.216; Athukoralage, 1981, p.125).  Quotas, permits, and licenses were also 
introduced in the process of import control, which, by the end of 1964, was imposed 
                                                
 
184 See further de Silva (2005, p.639-651) on economic policies. 
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by state agencies on all imports other than those of food185 (Rupesinghe, 2008, 
p.146). 
This import substitution industrialisation meant that a highly state–regulated, 
economic system was required.  In turn, this meant that the state began to control the 
direction of the economy through various means, including “the establishment of a 
number of industrial and commercial operations, through the nationalisation of 
foreign industries and the expansion of the public sector” (Rupesinghe, 2008, p.165).  
During this period, economic power was predominantly intensive and authoritative.  
Mann describes this type of combination of forms as an “Army command structure” 
that is “concentrated, coercive and highly mobilised” (Mann, 1986, p.8-9).  
According to him, this is not the most effective organisation.  That also proved to be 
so by the failure of the policy in Sri Lanka. 
5.2.3 Introduction of economic liberalisation programmes (1977-2009) 
The new UNP government, which came into power in 1977, promised to steer 
economic management on a completely different path from socialism to a pro-private 
and market-oriented economy.186  It promised economic development and improved 
employment opportunities (Bandarage, 2009, p.77).  Foreign investment and local 
capitalists were encouraged, but the government took no immediate steps to reverse 
the process of control over large areas of the economy, especially with regard to the 
plantations.  According to de Silva (2005), there was no compelling need as the 
previous ‘Marxist’ minister in charge of the plantation industry had had the wisdom 
to maintain the plantations as viable units under efficient management.  The UNP 
government achieved a high GDP growth of eight percent during the first year of 
coming into power.  This was largely achieved through efficient management, rather 
than through development policies.  The economy bounced as a result of the sudden 
change of direction, as well as the strong donor support the country received.  The 
management miracle was largely the result of privatisation of burdensome state 
                                                
 
185 Rupesinghe (2008, p.165) highlights the issue of state patronage, which follows from the issue of 
these quotas, permits, and licenses.  He says that it is inevitable that patronage is exercised on the 
basis of political favouritism and not on a rational criterion in these circumstances. 
186 The Central Bank (1978) described the new policies as “a sweeping departure from a tightly 
controlled, inward-looking, welfare-oriented economic strategy to a more liberalized outward-looking 
and growth-oriented one” (p.2). 
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enterprises and the retrenchment of excess staff (de Silva, 2005, p.687).  The policies 
during this period drastically changed. The changes affected the economic, political 
and cultural character of the country187 (Bandarage, 2009, p.77).  This type of mixed 
economy was thereafter largely followed by succeeding governments. 
The changes that the UNP government made to the constitution and policies 
largely show an ‘authoritative’ use of power.  With the importance of foreign loans, 
grants, and investments in its open economic policy (Bandarage, 2009, p.77), the 
government’s number one priority was to show its potential investors that the 
country had the necessary political stability (Herring, 2003, p.145; Balasuriya, 1983, 
p.119).  The large public sector projects also required centralised control over major 
economic decisions (Balasuriya, 1987, p.150).  This led to the introduction of the 
new presidential system of government in September 1977 and the new constitution 
in 1978 (Bandarage, 2009, p.95).  The executive presidency was established making 
then President Jayawardene the head of the cabinet, Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, and minister in charge of several ministries (Bandarage, 2009, p.96).  
The powers of the government were concentrated in the new office of the president 
and were not dependent on, nor constrained by the parliament.  Ultimately, this 
meant that the parliament was weakened as an institution (Bandarage, 2009, p.96).  
Kelegama (2006) states that “by 1982 the government was increasingly authoritarian 
and the constitution which restructured on Gaullist lines with a strong executive 
presidency had led to increasing centralisation of power” (p.94). 
The economic growth that had centred in the Western Province and the 
Colombo metropolitan region, even during the colonial era, was intensified during 
this period (Bandarage, 1983:Ch. 8).  The new policies went on to intensify this 
“unequal and uneven pattern of regional development”188 (Bandarage, 2009, p.78).  
Although the opening up of the economy should have led to extensive power, the 
                                                
 
187 Bandarage (2009) summarises the “post-1977 economic liberalization and the policy mix popularly 
known as structural adjustment under terms set down by the IMF and the World Bank promoted 
export-oriented production, devaluation of the local currency, liberalization of imports, privatization 
of state-owned sectors, social service cutbacks, and removal of food subsidies and price controls on 
consumer goods.  Incentives for foreign investment were introduced, and the restriction on movement 
of capital, goods and services between the country and the outside world were removed” (p.77).  She 
also states that these policies realigned class, as well as ethnic relations in Sri Lanka, which will be 
discussed in section 5.3. 
188 See Lakshman (1997, p.196-197) who states that poverty was on the increase and social and 
political discontent was seen throughout the island, due to the economic resources being drained from 
the rural regions. 
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indiscriminate liberalisation of imports meant that many local entrepreneurs (small-
scale manufacturing, dairy, agricultural, handloom industry, and other ventures) 
could not compete with foreign goods (Bandarage, 1988, p.75; Lakshman, 1997, 
p.193).  This led to these businesses closing down and depriving thousands of 
employment (Bandarage, 2009, p.78).  This also resulted in losing the possibility of 
exerting intensive power.  The major changes by the UNP government cemented the 
economic power to be strongly held and controlled by the government despite the 
liberalisation policies.  Economic power during this period remained predominantly 
authoritative.  The government failed to involve the whole island in its economic 
programmes.  Therefore, as Mann highlights, the inability to utilise all four forms of 
organisational reach renders it an ineffective organisation. 
5.2.4 Economic power in Sri Lanka 
Analysis of economic power in Sri Lanka reveals that the economic policies 
implemented in each period did not necessarily create the most powerful and 
effective social organisation.  The British colonials used, what Mann (1986, p.8) 
defines as, the most effective combination leading to possibly a structure which 
would be the most powerful and effective social organisation, that is, utilising all 
four forms of reach, extensive, intensive, authoritative, and diffused.  However, the 
use of compulsory cooperation and the highly centralised structure and dependence 
on a highly undiversified export economy became some of the underlying flaws in 
British colonial policies.  The independent government, inheriting this undiversified 
export economy, faced economic hardships through the rise of population and the 
Second World War, affecting the price of exports and imports.  The resulting import 
substitution policies were unsuccessful, even though ‘intensive’ power was used to 
gain the support of the public.  This was because the policies meant that the 
economic system became highly regulated and utilised predominantly ‘authoritative’ 
power to ensure participation of its citizens.  The economic liberalisation 
programmes from 1977 onwards were also unsuccessful as the state continued to 
utilise ‘authoritative’ measures to implement policies.  Further, the even more 
centralised nature of governance and failure to engage the whole country in the 
economic process (only the Western Province and the Colombo metropolitan region 
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showed economic growth) meant that the policies implemented were flawed and led 
to an ineffective social organisation. 
5.3 Class Relations in Sri Lanka 
The dynamics of class relations in Sri Lanka changed over time, with the 
introduction of new classes and the diminished importance of some of the older 
castes (Jayawardena, 1971; 1972; Fernando, 1979; Roberts, 1974).  Here Mann’s 
four stages of class relations and struggles will be considered to see if the 
development of Sri Lankan society fits into this framework.  This section is divided 
into three main parts.  The first will briefly explain the traditional caste system that 
was prevalent in Sri Lanka.  The second will examine the nature of classes in Sri 
Lanka, based on Mann’s forms of organisation (social classes, sections, and 
segments).  The third and final section will examine the class movements to better 
understand the contradictions between the different groups in Sri Lanka. 
5.3.1 The traditional caste system of Sri Lanka 
The caste system has been prevalent in Sri Lanka as a social phenomenon from 
historical times.  However, there is a big difference in its application among the 
Sinhalese, and the Tamils.  Tamils, who are mostly Hindus, attach religious sanctity 
to the institution, whereas the Sinhalese, who are followers of Buddhism, primarily 
have no such religious sanction.  ‘Commensality’ and ‘connubium’ are areas in 
which the caste practices were observed strictly among both the Tamils and the 
Sinhalese.  Although the issue of caste is not openly discussed (unlike in India), this 
has been a factor that led to alignment of forces during the uprising of Sinhalese 
youth, the Sinhalese extremist JVP189 group, and also the Tamil paramilitaries (Bush, 
1994, p.73).  Matthews (n.d) argues that caste has also been considered in deciding 
candidates for the political parties and he states that “since independence every 
government and every political party has had a Goyigama leader, except for a brief 
                                                
 
189 Wilson (1974, p.46) argues that caste was a major method in JVP recruitment campaigns, 
especially in the low-country, southern districts among the Karavas and Duravas.  See further Jiggins, 
J. (1979). Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese, 1947-76. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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and freakish interim leadership of the SLFP by C.P. de Silva from March-May 1960, 
and the present UNP administration”190 (p.3). 
The current Sinhalese caste composition191 is: 
(a) Goyigama (‘wet rice farmers’) - 60% 
(b) Karava (‘fishermen’) - 10% 
(c) Salagama (‘cinnamon peelers’) - 7% 
(d) Batgama (‘former Palaquin Carriers’) and Wahumpura (‘juggery or raw sugar 
makers’) - 11% 
(e) Durava (‘toddy tappers’) - 4% and 
(f) Others 8% (Bush, 1994, p.73-74). 
Fernando (1979) describes the position of the traditional elites in Sri Lanka as 
follows: “[the] occupational role of the higher ranking ‘goigama’ can be compared 
with the occupational role of the mediaeval European aristocrat who ‘governed’ his 
manors and estates in return for service to the king and service to his own vassals” 
(p.29).  Therefore, castes were never confined to their respectful occupations in a 
total sense: “the washermen are only ritual washermen, the Drummers only ritual 
drummers; in their ordinary life, Goigama, Washermen, Drummers and the rest are 
all alike cultivators of the soil” (Fernando, 1979, p.29). 
The development of a plantation capitalism and wage labour relationship 
during the British colonial period saw important changes in the class composition of 
the country.  In particular, the emergence of an urban working class, which went on 
to improve its position increasingly throughout time (Jayawardena, 1972; Roberts, 
1974).  The demographic changes, coupled with socio-economic changes, points to 
the rise of new classes (Jayawardena, 1971, p.200).  This threatened the traditional 
elites who were stratified “on the basis of kinship and caste” (Fernando, 1979, p.29).  
This change in class importance was mostly in relation to the Sinhalese caste 
                                                
 
190 Another exception was President Premadasa (2 January 1989 to 1 May 1993).  He was of low caste 
background, but this was not discussed publicly.  See the Parliament of Sri Lanka website, accessed 
18 May 2012, http://www.parliament.lk/handbook_of_parliament/heads_of_state.jsp. 
191 See further the unpublished paper by Matthews, B. (n.d.).Caste and Politics in Sri Lanka. 
unpublished paper. 
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systems.  Roberts (1982) states that there has been a “marked escalation in [inter-
caste] conflict” (p.133), especially between the Goyigama and those in the coastal 
areas (such as the Karava, Salagama, and Durava).  These members did not consider 
themselves inferior to the Goyigamas due to the economic independence that they 
had gained, particularly during the colonial period.  Bush (1994, p.76) suggests that 
this is possibly where the tension between the caste and economic class forms of 
social stratification began in Sri Lanka.  He points out that caste advancement is 
slower than economic advancement, and adds that “caste advancement is an intra-
group process guided by an intra-group social stratification system, economic 
stratification is a ranking system which cross-cuts inter-ethnic groupings” (Bush, 
1994, p.76). 
Equally important is the caste system for the Tamils.  However, unlike the 
Sinhalese structure, there are three separate caste systems based on the different 
Tamil regional identities, namely, the Jaffna Tamils, the East Coast Tamils, and the 
Plantation/Indian Tamils192 (Bush, 1994, p.77).  The most important caste structure is 
that of the Jaffna Tamils, which include: 
(a) Priests: Brahmins—relatively few and do not figure in Tamil politics 
prominently 
(b) Clean castes: 
(i) Vellalar (‘farmers’) – 50% 
(ii) Koviya (‘ritual cooks’ to the vellalar) – 7% 
(iii) Karaiyar or Karava (‘fishermen’) – 10% 
(c) Service castes (in total around 15%): 
(i) Taccar (‘carpenters’) 
(ii) Kaikular (‘Weaver’) 
(iii) Vannar (‘washermen’) 
(d) Untouchables: 
(i) Pallar – 9% 
(ii) Nalavar – 9% (Bush, 1994, p.79). 
                                                
 
192 Their caste structure is closely related to the system in Kerala, while the system of the East Coast 
Tamils and the Plantation Tamils follow the Tamil Nadu system. 
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The Vellalar were the major landowners in the Jaffna peninsular.  Matthews 
(n.d:5) argues that the members of this elite group also monopolised the cultural 
leaderships, professional, and political opportunities.  It has been argued that the 
caste differences between the Tamils are also seen to feature in paramilitary politics 
(Tambiah, 1993; Bush, 1994; Pfaffenberger, 1990; Matthews, n.d).  According to 
Ivan (1993), the northern Tamil struggle was 
not only a struggle for national freedom, but also a struggle against Vallalar 
domination … The struggle of the militant Tamil youth of the north is not 
purely an ethnic struggle, a class struggle, or a caste struggle.  It is really a 
peculiar combination of all of these three factors. (p.27) 
In agreement, Tambiah (1993, p.11) says that the LTTE was led by a member 
of the Karaiyars caste.  Pfaffenberger (1990) adds that the strict control over Jaffna 
society by members of the Vellalars was being challenged by the non-Vellalar castes. 
The brief analysis of the Sri Lankan caste system helps us to recognise four 
important features in Sri Lankan society that will become important in understanding 
some of the factors that led to the Sri Lankan conflict.  They are, first, while the 
Sinhalese caste system had no connection to religion, the Tamil caste system was 
inseparable from religious sanctity.  Therefore, as seen in Chapter 4 on ideological 
power, the use of Buddhism was undoubtedly a method to unite a divided Sinhalese 
community.  Second, the formation of the JVP and the uprising of Tamil 
paramilitaries had their roots in brewing intra-group caste issues.  Further, the 
appointment of candidates in political parties shows that caste consideration remains 
prevalent in Sri Lanka.  The fourth and final observation is that, following 
independence, there has been some escalation of inter-caste conflicts between the 
Goyigama and the members of coastal areas.  The economic independence that the 
coastal castes gained during independence meant they did not consider themselves 
inferior to the Goyigama.  This is possibly the first indication of tensions that 
resulted between the caste and the economic class forms in Sri Lanka.  This will be 
explored further in the following section where Mann’s economic formations are 
applied in the Sri Lankan context. 
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5.3.2 Classes, sections and segments 
This section will briefly look at Mann’s concepts of economic cooperation to 
see the applicability of his class, sectional, and segmental economic cooperation in 
Sri Lanka’s class groupings in the late 19th century. 
Broadly, Jayawardena (1984, p.52-53) divides the members into the following 
groups: the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and the working people.  The bourgeoisie 
included the Sinhala and Tamil land owners, which comprised mainly the Goyigama 
and Vellalar castes, and also the new class of merchants that rose mainly from the 
non-agricultural coastal regions (Jayawardene, 1984, p.52).  These individuals 
monopolised the economy through their access to economic resources.  In applying 
Mann’s division, the bourgeoisie were members of the high class who controlled the 
economic resources and held economic power in society.  The petty bourgeoisie in 
Sri Lanka comprised of: 
(a) Small landowners, artisans, craftsmen, small traders and pretty producers, 
mainly rural-based, who had their origins in the pre-capitalist economy and 
were adjusting to the new economic trends.  (b) A new group of (mainly urban) 
clerks, minor bureaucrats, shop keepers and teachers, generated by the needs of 
the plantation economy and the expanding activities of the state and service 
sectors. (Jayawardena, 1984, p.52) 
The working people included: 
(a) Plantation workers of Indian origin whose employment relations were of a 
pre-capitalist nature, and a few Sinhala, Tamil and Malayali wage workers in 
the public utilities (port, railways and roads) and in numerous enterprises 
servicing the city of Colombo.  (b) The peasantry and agricultural workers 
engages in paddy cultivations and other crops.  Many were small producers 
working on their plots or as sharecroppers, eking out a precarious existence in a 
stagnant agricultural economy. (Jayawardena, 1984, p.52-53) 
All three groups are what Mann describes as classes.  The ‘classes’ that Mann 
(1993, p.8) refers to in his classification of groups are based on the members’ rights 
over economic resources and are not the same as the existing caste system in Sri 
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Lanka.193  They are based on access to economic resources and cut across any caste 
system. 
The different trades or professions that members of each group engage in are 
consistent with what Mann (1993, p.8) describes as ‘sections’.  These incorporate 
groupings of the members of each class, based on their nature of economic 
engagement or involvement, such as landowners, farmers, blue collar workers, and 
so on.  For example, the first class, which comprises the bourgeoisie, includes both 
landowners and merchants, and the second class of pretty bourgeoisie includes 
various trades and professions.  Similar categorisation is evident in the ‘working 
people’ class. 
All three of these classes could be reclassified according to, for example, 
ethnicity (that is, Sinhalese, Tamils, and Malays), castes (for example, Goyigama, 
Vellalar and Karava), or religions (Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Muslim).  This is 
what Mann (1993, p.8) refers to as ‘segments’.194  These consist of members who are 
drawn from various classes, but who share a common link based on factors such as 
lineage, tribe, locality, and/or industrial enterprise. 
Applying Mann’s economic classification of classes, sections, and segments 
demonstrates that similar groupings are available in modern Sri Lanka, with the 
traditional caste system fitting into what Mann introduces as ‘segments’.  By 
reclassifying the different ethnicities and religious groups in Sri Lanka as ‘segments’, 
it is hoped to give a rational understanding of the tensions between these segments 
and the economic class forms.  The proceeding section analyses this further. 
5.3.3 Class relations and struggles 
In this section, Mann’s four stages of class relations and class struggles will be 
considered in light of the class relations and struggles that were taking place in Sri 
Lanka.  The aim is to see whether it helps to understand the Sri Lankan conflict in a 
                                                
 
193 Although, initially, the caste system in Sri Lanka showed that the Goyigama (Sinhalese) and 
Vallalars (Jaffna Tamils), who were the traditional elite, monopolised the social, economic, and 
political areas, in the recent years this has changed. 
194 The term ‘segment’ is to be understood to be the same used in anthropological and European usage 
(contrasted with that of the American class theorists use of the term). 
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more intra-group and inter-group setting through reclassification of the groups using 
Mann’s theory on classes, sections, and segments. 
Cheran (2001, p.107) divided the history of Sri Lankan class relations and 
struggles into four periods, which will be utilised in this section.  The four periods 
analysed are: 
(a) 1880-1920, highlighted by the increased class disparities, working class 
movement, and the Muslim and Sinhalese riots 
(b) 1920-1950, the emergence of class and ethnic consciousness 
(c) 1950-1977, the solidification of ethnic dominance 
(d) 1977 and after, which saw the consolidation of ethnic nationalism. 
5.3.3.1 Increased class disparities, working class movement and the Muslim 
and Sinhalese riots (1880-1920) 
This period saw the increased class disparities between the Ceylonese 
population that was aggravated by the unequal distribution of land and treatment by 
the British colonial rulers (Bandarage, 1983, p.116).  Peebles (1976) shows that the 
crown land sales by the British were unequally distributed whereby “few prominent 
Ceylonese families accumulated enormous estates … [and a] disproportionate share 
of Crown land [was] purchased by Sinhalese elites … Even at the village level” 
(p.75).  Further, the abuse by the British of the corvée labour (rājakāriya) system 
meant that the lower classes (comprising the producer classes) faced additional 
hardships (Bandarage, 1983, p.51).  This was predominantly seen in the Kandyan 
provinces and the Great Rebellion of 1817 to 1818.  This saw all segments (some 
aristocracy, the clergy, and the peasantry) of the Kandyan population coming 
together to oust the British and attempt to restore the pre-colonial social order195 
(Bandarage, 1983, p.51). 
It was also during British rule that the working class movement emerged in Sri 
Lanka (Cheran, 2001, p.108).  Trade unions were formed and over 50%of all workers 
                                                
 
195 See further Roberts, M. (1972). Variations on the theme of resistance movements: The Kandyan 
rebellion of 1817-18 and the latter-day nationalisms in Ceylon. Ceylon Studies Seminar, 1970-71, 
series No.10, 5 October 1971. 
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became members of a trade union196 (Cheran, 2001, p.105).  The strikes that were led 
were by the progressive bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, who were struggling for 
economic and democratic rights in the background of a colonial economy dominated 
by the British, and north and south Indian merchants.  At the time, workers were able 
to unite irrespective of caste, religious, and ethnic divisions.  Their hostilities turned 
towards ‘foreign’ domination.197 
The riots between Muslims and the Sinhalese in 1915 was seen by the British 
as an attempt to overthrow their colonial rule (Bandarage, 2009, p.33).  The primary 
reason for these riots was the Police Ordinance of 1865, which restricted traditional 
Buddhist practices (Roberts, 1990; Bandarage, 2009, p.33).  Equally, the strong 
competition that existed between the Muslims and Sinhala shopkeepers and traders, 
which resulted in economic tensions between these groups, cannot be ignored.  The 
fact that the Muslim traders were immigrants from the Coromandel and Malabar 
coasts of south India further aroused hostilities towards them by the Sinhala traders. 
During this period, the struggles between the elite, controlling economic power 
in Sri Lanka and the lower classes failed to take a more pronounced organisational 
form.  Mann (1993, p.8) describes this type of vertical struggle between the classes 
as ‘latent’.  The failure of class struggles to succeed, he explains, is due to the more 
pronounced horizontal economic organisations.  This holds true in the Sri Lankan 
context, as the class struggles at the time are seen to manifest into what Mann terms 
an ‘extensive’ struggle between the segments.  This was particularly so given that the 
hostilities by the lower classes in Sri Lanka were directed towards foreigners, and 
later extended to include Muslims and, eventually, Tamils. 
                                                
 
196 See further Sarvaloganayagam, V. (1973). Trade Unions in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Academy of 
Administrative Studies, who says that, on comparing the percentage of workers in the public and 
plantation sector, these figures are positive in comparison to other developed countries. 
197 Later, it is seen that foreign domination is extended to Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka. 
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5.3.3.2 The emergence of class and ethnic consciousness (1920-1950) 
This period saw the rise of labour union movements198 in the country.  
Although the Ceylon Labour Union comprised multi-ethnic members of the working 
class, the strikes managed to produce several leaders among the different ethnic 
groups (Cheran, 2001, p.111).  There were important political and economic changes 
during this period following the Donoughmore reforms (de Silva, 2005, p.570-589).  
The first general elections in 1931 meant that the bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka attained 
political rights.  This was also the period when the country saw its revenue from 
exports plummet and unemployment increase199 due to the Great Depression of 1929 
to 1933.  Class consciousness, which was built up in the early decades of the labour 
movement, paved way to ethnic explanations of the economic difficulties 
(Jayawardene, 1987; Roberts, 1974).  Roberts (1974) states that the reason for this 
weak Sri Lankan working class was the result of: 
(a) The spatial and cultural separation of the urban working class in Colombo 
and the other larger segment of Sri Lanka’s working class population.  The 
plantation labour force is an obvious feature.  This is an important aspect, which 
Jayawardene also notes. 
(b) Caste loyalties of the working class. 
(c) Ethnic feelings provided cross-class linkages, which blunted the class 
conflict. (p.10-29) 
This movement along ethnic lines was further exacerbated with the emerging 
Sinhala Buddhist ethnic chauvinism and the political changes that were taking place 
at the time (Cheran: 2001, Roberts, 1974).  During this period, it is seen that the class 
struggles were again underpinned and the economic hardships were directed more 
towards an ethnic explanation.  This further aroused hostilities between different 
ethnic backgrounds and resulted in the struggle becoming more about the different 
segments than classes. 
                                                
 
198 Cheran (2001, p.110) states that “The Ceylon labour union under the leadership of A.E. 
Goonasinghe organized a general strike in Colombo. It was followed by a wave of successful strikes 
in the harbor in 1927, among taxi drivers and industrial workers in 1928 and culminating in the violent 
tramway strike of 1929 during which police firing led to five deaths”.  See further Jayawardena, K. V. 
(1972). The Rise of the Labor Movement in Ceylon. Durham: Duke University Press. 
199 The revenue from exports plunged from Rs. 479 million in 1927 to Rs. 189 million in 1932.  It is 
also estimated that over 9,000 Sri Lankans and 84,000 Indians lost their jobs during this period (de 
Silva, 2005, p.572).
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5.3.3.3 The solidification of ethnic dominance (1950-1977) 
In 1944, the free education200 system that was introduced in Sri Lanka meant 
that, by the early 1950s, there was a large number of educated youth looking for 
employment in the public sector (Hettige, 2000; Litte & Sabates, 2008).  Hettige 
(2000, p.328) states that this high rate of unemployment was due to three main 
reasons: firstly, the failure of the economy to expand in the light of the population 
and education growth rates; secondly, a school system that was academically 
oriented and did not equip students with ‘life skills and practical capabilities’; and, 
lastly, youth were trying to gain primarily state sector employment as these offered 
more privileges and prestige (Hettige, 2000, p.328).  Due to the limited public sector 
jobs available, politicians allocated these jobs to those who were loyal to them 
(Hettige, 2000, p.328).  Those who were not in the ruling party were alienated. 
Further, the main leftist parties of Sri Lanka; the LSSP and the SLCO, were 
also side-tracked by the political parties of the times and their strategies and policies.  
This led them to participate in the chauvinistic ideology201 that was prevalent at the 
time.  These left parties later entered electoral party politics and joined coalition 
governments (Jayawardena, 1987; Cheran, 2001).  This meant that there was no 
organised group to monitor and defend the rights and status of the working classes.  
Cheran (2001) argues that, 
by 1965 the left parties had adopted racist politics and policies and in 1972, 
when they were part of the United Front government, they enabled the 
government to constitutionally enshrine Sinhala only and Buddhism as the state 
religion … [They] failed to develop a strong secular working class 
consciousness.  p.121) 
This period is highlighted by the increasing “patron-client nature of politics” 
(Hettige, 2000, p.328).  This meant that the distribution of resources, and especially 
                                                
 
200 Hettige (2000) states that universal, free education was proposed by the government in order to 
“facilitate upward social mobility of individuals irrespective of their birth status in terms of caste, 
class, religion and ethnicity” (p.325).  Further, free education meant an increase in the large number of 
youths, who were educated in the local languages, which led to the abolition of English as the official 
language. 
201 This includes the Sinhala Buddhists rediscovery of the Sri Lankan Tamils as their ‘traditional 
enemy’. 
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employment, was based on party politics.  Language202 and ethnicity became two 
main factors that helped youths gain access to prestigious, public sector jobs 
(Hettige, 2000, p.328).  Sri Lanka’s economy was becoming increasingly controlled 
by a centralised state and the ‘political class’ that Mann (1993, p.8) describes is seen, 
wherein classes were organised for the purpose of controlling the state.203  Further, 
the evident class struggles that Mann terms as ‘latent’ does not take a pronounced 
organisational form, as the chauvinistic ideology prevalent at the time successfully 
directs these struggles into a competition between ethnicities. 
5.3.3.4 The consolidation of ethnic nationalisms (1977 onwards) 
In spite of the open economy offering new economic opportunities for some, it 
also intensified the ethnic rivalries, as the increased competition resulted in the 
deepening of inequalities between social classes (Bandarage, 2009, p.79; 
Gunasinghe, 1984, p.197).  Gunasinghe (1984) says that “the state was seen as being 
responsible for the bad state of affairs, the frustration and aggression felt by the 
urban poor took an anti-state direction” (p.207).  However, attention was soon 
diverted to the working class along ethnic lines, with the collapse of leftist parties 
(Cheran, 2001, p.126,132).  The state, with new economic policies, showed that it 
was handing over the country’s economic responsibilities to the private sector 
(Gunasinghe, 1984, p.213). 
Hettige (2000) argues that 
in the new liberal economic environment, social class has become a decisive 
factor facilitating the acquisition of readily marketable qualifications and other 
attributes and access to lucrative employment.  This, in turn, has either 
reinforced or neutralized factors such as gender and ethnicity. (p.332) 
Economic liberalisation meant that Tamil and Muslim entrepreneurs were able 
to regain their assertive position in the market, with Sinhalese entrepreneurs losing 
                                                
 
202 The Sinhala-only language policy, which was brought about in 1956, facilitated the Sinhala-
educated youth into public sector jobs over those educated in English (Hettige, 2000; de Silva, 2005). 
203 The anti-systemic movement by the JVP and the People’s Liberation Front is important here.  
Unemployment was not the sole cause of the uprising of these groups.  There were also ideological 
factors.  See further, Venugopal, R. (2010). Sectarian Socialism: the Politics of Sri Lanka’s Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Modern Asian Studies, 44:3, 567-601 and Obeysekere, G. (1974). On the 
social background of the April 1971 insurgency in Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Studies, 33 (May), 
367-384. 
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their special privileges (Gunasinghe, 1984, p.108; Bandarage, 2009, p.80).  This 
intensified the hostilities between the lower class Sinhalese204 and the minorities.  
Further, import substitution during the 1970 to 1977 period meant that the Sri 
Lankan economy faced low wages, high rates of unemployment, and low levels of 
internal differentiation (Cheran, 2001, p.131).  However, the poor failed to pressure 
the state and to take a class direction—instead, hostilities went along ethnic lines.  
The failure of class politics in Sri Lanka led to the cementing of ethnic consciousness 
and a continuing battle between the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist movements.  
Mann asserts that class struggle is outweighed by other power organisations that cut 
across class boundaries.  This proved true in Sri Lanka where ethnicity outweighed 
class divide.  
5.3.3.5 Class relations and struggles in Sri Lanka 
The analysis of class relations and struggles based on the four periods show the 
intertwining of class-consciousness with ethnic consciousness in Sri Lanka.  
Ethnicity was used to overrule class relations and later resulted in the consolidation 
of the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist movements.  This holds true of what Mann 
(1986, p.216; 1993, p.8) says regarding the diminished importance of class struggles 
(which he terms as ‘latent’) due to the more pronounced ‘extensive’ struggles 
between the segments.  Ethnicity in Sri Lanka became the main drawing card and 
was utilised continuously to underpin class issues. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Mann’s (1986) economic power network is based on the “extraction, 
transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature” (p.24).  He 
identifies four types of organisational reach of economic power that Mann terms 
extensive, intensive, authoritative, and diffused power.  The most effective 
organisation, he says, would include all these four types (Mann, 1986, p.8).  Social 
classes arises through the economic network which are shaped according to the chain 
the economic process.  However, Mann goes beyond Karl Marx and describes three 
organisational forms, namely, classes, social sections, and segments (Mann, 1993, 
                                                
 
204 This is because those mainly affected by the open economy were workers of the primitive labour 
market.  These were mainly the oppressed caste groups.  See further Cheran (2001). 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
Chapter 5 Economic Power 107 
p.8).  The ‘ruling’ or ‘dominant’ class has the most amount of economic power.  This 
is where this class of people “has successfully monopolized other power sources to 
dominate a state-centered society at large” (Mann, 1986, p.25).  The economic 
classes can result in class conflicts due to the social relationships that people in these 
classes engage in.  For this, Mann outlines four stages of class relations and class 
struggles (1986, p.24; 1993, p.8).  According to him, struggles between the different 
segments of society become more prominent, as compared to class struggles, which 
he terms ‘latent’. 
Application of Mann’s theory on economic power reveals three major points 
that help us to understand the background or root of the Sri Lankan conflict.  Firstly, 
on the surface, the period under British colonials suggests that it followed the most 
powerful and effective social organisation of economic power, based on Mann’s 
theory.  However, the changes made by the British rulers suggest the start of 
underlying economic and social issues that had a lasting effect on Sri Lanka.  
Secondly, the flawed economic policies that followed post independence aggravated 
the economic and social situation.  Finally, as Mann indicated, the class-based 
struggles (‘latent’) failed to take off and attention was drawn to more ethnic-based 
struggles (‘extensive’ struggles between segments) in Sri Lanka. 
During the British colonial administration, sweeping changes were made on the 
economic front, with various changes in land use and tenure.  These changes also had 
the effect of altering the class composition of the country.  Analysis of economic 
power during this period shows that the British colonials successfully managed to 
utilise all four forms of organisational reach that Mann introduces.  This, in effect, 
helped them to successfully carry out their economic policies.  In the short term, the 
policies suggested success, however, major flaws marked this success.  These flaws 
included the economy being reliant on a highly undiversified export economy, 
dependence on the import of basic goods, and the stagnation of local agriculture.  
This meant that the laissez-faire policy engaged more external parties in the 
economy, rather than its citizens.  Further, during British rule, great changes took 
place in the class composition with the introduction of plantation capitalism and 
wage labour.  This meant the emergence of the urban working class, which left the 
traditional elite feeling threatened.  This was aggravated by the up-country Sinhalese 
(or the Kandyans) feeling impoverished, as they lost their land to the large-
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plantation-based economy.  Also, the introduction of the Indian estate Tamil 
population to work in the large plantations, and the special preference given by the 
British to the Tamils in securing civil administration jobs, had the effect of creating 
rivalries between groups and class struggles. 
Since independence in 1948, the governments of Sri Lanka have pursued 
policies that went on to maintain and augment control over the territory of Sri Lanka 
to benefit a select, elite group.  Both the import substitution policies taken during 
1945 to 1977, and the economic liberalisation programmes from 1977, saw the 
economic area being increasingly controlled by the state and state elite.  This made 
the economic power organisations to be ineffective during these periods, as it failed 
to engage all four forms of economic reach.  Cooperation of the citizens was ensured 
through the extensive use of authoritative power that was given by the various 
legislative enactments.  Further, economic growth was centred on only a small 
portion of the country (the Western Province and the Colombo metropolitan region). 
Finally, the multi-ethnic character of Sri Lankan society resulted in demands 
being made of an ethnic nature.  The focus of attention on the accessibility and 
availability of economic resources turned into a battle between each ethnic group 
(segment) rather than class (economic class).  This affected the ethnic representation 
in the government and thereby the participation and control of the economy.  Actual 
class struggles became insignificant as ethnic consciousness took precedence.  Even 
the labour movements started to focus on ethnic grounds (Jayawardene, 1987; 
Roberts, 1974).  Analysing economic power in Sri Lanka shows that the interest 
groups within the state were formed based on ethnic groups.  As class-based 
movements failed to gain momentum throughout history, ethnicity became the 
organising principle in Sri Lankan economics.  Further, political patronage meant 
that job opportunities in the public sector were confined to a small, elite group that 
had access to politicians.  We are again reminded of Mann’s argument that class 
struggles are overshadowed by other power organisations.  In the Sri Lankan context, 
ethnicity was the factor that cut across the class boundary. 
In conclusion, economic power is a significant factor in explaining the conflict 
between different groups in Sri Lanka.  Interestingly, irrespective of whether socialist 
or capitalist policies were implemented in Sri Lanka, economic power rested largely 
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in the hands of the government and the ruling parties.  Under the executive 
committee form of government in the mid 1940s, the free education system was 
aimed at the upward social mobility of individuals.  The sluggish economy and high 
level of unemployment did not live up to expectations, but instead, resulted in 
alienation of individuals who were not part of the ruling party.  It took some decades 
for this to manifest in the form of a mass social uprising.  That came about at the 
beginning of 1970 in the form of an anti-establishment movement.  The anti-
establishment movements by the JVP and the People’s Liberation Front indicate that 
the issue was not solely an ethnic and economic one.  However; Bandarage (2009) 
states that the Tamil elite “drew attention away from the massive social and 
economic problems facing the young in all of the Sri Lankan communities” (p.53).  
This chapter highlights the emergence of ethnicity as the central element in the 
division of economic power in Sri Lanka. 
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CHAPTER 6 MILITARY POWER 
This chapter focuses on military power and how far it played a role in the Sri 
Lankan conflict.  In particular, it looks at which point in time, if ever, did various 
power holders use military power and what were they trying to achieve through it.  It 
will consider whether Mann’s military power is applicable in the context of Sri 
Lanka and whether it helps us to understand the conflict in a different perspective. 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section will consider 
military power and Mann’s form of ‘military power’.  In the second section, military 
power will be considered focusing on the five main power groups that used military 
force in Sri Lanka.  The third section will examine the role of domestic militarism 
and geopolitical militarism in Sri Lanka. 
6.1 Theoretical Considerations 
6.1.1 Military power defined 
This section will consider some of the various definitions of military power and 
determine which interpretation will be applied in this thesis.  Military power has 
been a primary instrument used by the nation-states, since the beginning of 
civilisation, to control and dominate each other.  However, the definition of military 
power and the concept of war are not seen to be of utmost importance in early 
sociology, as seen by the studies of early social theorists. 
The key issue for Karl Marx, and most Marxists, was state power, class and 
capitalism.  Military power was primarily looked at in relation to class conflicts.  
According to the Marxists’ explanation of military power, wherever there was access 
to valuable and exploitable commodities, this would give people the financial 
incentive to fight to attain them.  While military power is essentially connected to the 
state, the French Marxist philosopher, Althusser (1970), makes a distinction between 
two state apparatuses; the ideological state apparatuses205 and the repressive state 
                                                
 
205 According to Althusseur (1970), ideological state apparatuses (‘ISA’) includes; for example, the 
religious, educational, family, legal, political, trade union, communications, and cultural ISA’s. 
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apparatus.  The ‘repressive state apparatus’, what Marxists term the ‘state apparatus’, 
(for example, the government, administration, army, police, courts and the prison, ), 
are essentially the state acting as a repressive machine enabling the ruling classes to 
ensure their domination over the working class.  The unity of the repressive state 
apparatus is guaranteed through the unified and centralised organisation, controlled 
by the ruling class and promoting ruling class ideology (Althusser, 1970, p.136). 
Many theorists identify military power as a key component of state power.206  
Max Weber (1968) famously defined the ‘state’ as an organisation that claims a 
“monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (p.56).  
Although, in the past, there has been a variety of political formations (such as 
kingdoms, monarchies, and bureaucratic empires), the regulation of the inhabitants of 
these territories was through the coercion and/or through physical force (Weber, 
1968, p.1142).  Therefore, the struggle for power and conflicts were part and parcel 
of social life (Weber, 1958, p.78; Weber, 1968, p.55).  Weber (1964), by introducing 
three types of authority relations,207 became the founding father of the theory of 
organisation.  These relationships is said to differ depending on the authority and 
power (Weber, 1964, p.329-363). 
Military power becomes a source of legitimacy within the organisational form 
of the state.  This legitimate use of force was essentially monopolised and therefore 
involved: 
(a) the expropriation of the autonomous bearers of political rule; 
(b) the appropriation of the material means of power; and 
(c) its concentration in the hands of a ‘supreme ruler’. (Dusza, 1989, p.80) 
Meanwhile, the understanding of the state influences Clausewitz’s extensive 
literature on war.  Clausewitz (2001) adopts a similar understanding of the state to 
Weber’s and regards the state as the central institution of modern life, where the use 
                                                
 
206 Tilly (1985:175) says that the development of the modern nation-state: “in the long run, it all came 
down to massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion”.  See Tilly, C. (1985). 
War-making and State-making as organized crime. In P. Evans and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the 
State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
207 Weber (1964, p.329-363) the three basic types of authority relations he described were—tradition, 
charismatic, and rational-legal—these are based on the exercise of control within an organisation 
legitimate.  See further, Weber, M. (1964). The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New 
York: Free Press. 
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of force is an essential activity of the state.  This use of force, he says, could be 
deployed in order to defend and advance its interests and values, and those of the 
society it governs (Clausewitz, 2001). 
Giddens (1990, p.59) in relation to military power is primarily concerned with 
the means of violence and the development of warfare.  He concentrates on modern 
nations,208 rather than earlier government formations.  He argues that, in modern 
states, the internal borders have been pacified, while pre-modern states the extent of 
military control depended on the extent of the territory (1990, p.59).209  His views on 
military power show that he differs sharply from Marxist views.210  He argues that in 
the modern nation-state, system integration was no more the guiding force behind 
this form of power (Giddens, 1989).  He points out that there were three major 
military developments that influenced this transition and, these include; 
technological changes, modern military discipline, and the growth of naval 
capabilities.  While Giddens’ (1990) definition of states follows Weber, according to 
violence and territoriality, he qualifies his definition by arguing that only modern 
nation-states actually achieved this monopoly within its territory.  The monopoly of 
violence eluded the central state (that is, the traditional states). 
6.1.2 Mann’s military power 
Mann separates military and political power.211  He argues that military power 
is distinct, based on the following four eventualities: 
(a) “Political powers are those of centralized, institutionalized, territorial 
regulation; military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are 
organized” (Mann, 1986, p.11). 
                                                
 
208 Giddens (1989) on the characteristics of the modern nation-state outlines them as “a political 
apparatus, recognized to have sovereign rights within the borders of a demarcated territorial area, able 
to back its claims to sovereignty by control of military power, many of those citizens have positive 
feelings of commitment to its national identity” (p.303). 
209 Mann’s (1993) argument is that industrial capitalism is neither intrinsically pacific nor militarist as 
stated by Giddens. 
210 Giddens (1989) also rejects the Marxist argument with regard to capitalism and states that 
“Industrial capitalism provided the means for the industrialization of war, but the activities and 
involvements of nation-states are at the origin of the phenomenon” (p.303). 
211 See Chapter 3 on Theory and Methodology for Mann’s argument for this separation. 
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(b) There are conquests undertaken by military groups that are completely separate 
from the state.  Mann (2004) gives the example of illegal arms transport and 
says that this allows “organized gangs to challenge states, contradicting Max 
Weber’s clam that the modern state monopolizes military power” (p.14). 
(c) Military organisation is institutionally separate from state agencies, so much so 
that there have been instances when the military has managed to overthrow the 
political elite. 
(d) He also notes their separation historically, as military groups have conquered 
states and, more recently, he points to the cases of Japan and the former West 
Germany, both demilitarised yet powerful states (Mann, 1986, p.11). 
Mann defines military power as the social organisation of concentrated 
coercion and lethal violence.  He initially defined military power as the “social 
organisation of physical force in the form of concentrated coercion” (1986, p.26) but 
in his response to criticisms (particularly that of Gianfranco Poggi), he refined his 
definition to “the social organization of lethal violence” (Hall & Schroeder, 2006, 
p.351). 
Mann’s form of military power refers to the organisation of power that 
develops as a society meets its needs for physical defence and as territorial states 
require tools for new geographic acquisitions.  He summarises military power as 
follows: 
[Military power] derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and 
its usefulness for aggression.  It has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it 
concerns questions of life and death, as well as the organization of defense and 
offense in large geographical and social spaces.  Those who monopolize it, as 
military elites, can obtain collective and distributive power. (Mann, 1986, p.25-
26) 
Military organisation is, as Mann (1986) says, “essentially concentrated-
coercive” (p.26) and it relies upon violence, which is its primary method.  This type 
of power is important, not only during times of armed conflict, but also when 
historical empires existed.  Historical empires used slave labour to build their 
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extensive infrastructure projects.212  Coercion, therefore, ensures positive 
cooperation.  Military power gives those holding the power, the military elites and 
castes, the ability to exert the threat of violence (Mann, 1993, p.9).  During the time 
of historical empires, this threat of violence was used to carry out these widespread 
infrastructure projects.  The threat of violence also serves in the form of protection 
from neighbouring powers.  Therefore, the maintenance of a powerful military force 
capable of significant acts of destruction serves as a substantial deterrent for 
potentially hostile neighbours.  Mann points out that this deterrent is largely 
dependent upon the maximum effective striking range of the military (Mann, 1986, 
p.26).  Thus, when the population is closer to the centre of military power, they are 
more likely to give in.  Similarly, as the population moves further away from the 
centre of military power, the willingness declines.  Mann (1986) summarises this 
point by stating: 
military power is sociospatially dual: a concentrated core in which positive, 
coerced controls can be exercised, surround[ed] by an extensive penumbra in 
which terrorized populations will not normally step beyond certain niceties of 
compliance but whose behavior cannot be positively controlled. (p.26) 
The role of domestic militarism, according to Mann, has changed over time and 
he distinguishes four levels of domestic repressions (Mann, 1993, p.403).  The first 
level is ‘conciliation, arbitration, and persuasion’.  This is the lowest level of 
repression, as the state resorts to solving public order disputes through the use of 
these methods practically without any form of repression.  The second level is 
‘policing’.  This he describes as “combating crime and disorder by a disciplined 
force possessing only simple weapons without recourse to a show of military force” 
(Mann, 1993, p.403).  The third level is repression through the formation of 
‘paramilitary’.  This is sought by states when trouble escalates to such a degree that 
the simple policing is insufficient and an escalated show of force becomes necessary.  
The fourth and final level is the full-scale ‘military repression’.  This type of 
repression is conducted by regular troops and encompasses actual fighting and 
shooting. 
                                                
 
212 See Roberts, J.A.G. (1999). A Concise History of China. Harvard University Press, who discusses 
the use of such labour force by the Qin dynasty in China to build the Great Wall of China. 
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Mann points out that military power in Western history has changed from a 
dual function, where war and repression went hand in hand, to a more singular form 
of war, detaching its militaries from class struggles213 (Mann, 1993, p.405).  This has 
led to military firepower to largely point outwards, rather than inwards against its 
own subjects.  Mann (1993) argues that this transformation took place in the 20th 
century due to developments in the “political and social citizenship and the 
institutional conciliation of labour relations” (p.405).  Therefore, war in the West was 
separate from domestic repression and military repression was used exclusively for 
more extremist movements214 (Mann, 1993, p.411). 
Mann (1993, p.412) states that geopolitical militarism became exclusively a 
part of foreign policy in about the 18th century, with all diplomatic arrangements 
entered by extensively considering a state’s military balance of power and security.  
The person/s controlling this geopolitical militarism moved from the monarch (in the 
early days) to “supposedly democratic chief executives”215 (Mann, 1993, p.414) (with 
the formation of nation-states).  Mann (1993) argues that, as foreign policy remained 
unscrutinised and narrowly staffed, “it remained quite insulated and private, 
controlled by a particularistic alliance between a state executive elite and an old 
regime party whose economic power was in decline” (p.419).  Therefore, this 
geopolitical function made the state’s foreign policy closely aligned with the ‘state’s 
old regime core’, while repression pulled together the interests of the ‘propertied 
classes’.216 
In this regard, Mann sees military organisation as having two functions: the 
primary one being war, with a secondary function of domestic repression (Mann, 
1993, p.439).  By virtue of its function, the military is entwined with society and 
state.  According to Mann (1993, p.439), war, to some degree, was a collaboration of 
                                                
 
213 See also Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990. Oxford: 
Blackwell.  Tilly (1990, p.125), supporting this view, also points out that this form of transformation 
was not seen in the 20th century ‘third world’, as political and social citizenship has not been achieved 
by these states. 
214 See Goldstein, R.J. (1983). Political Repression in Nineteenth Century Europe. London: Croom 
Helm.  Goldstein (1983) argues that this change is due to the developments in politics that promoted 
industrialisation, literacy, and urbanisation, thereby creating a dissident petite bourgeoisie and 
working class. 
215 Mann (1993, p.414) argues that these chief executives in reality resembled the old absolute 
monarchs. 
216 See Mann (1993, p.419) where he gives the examples of the modern industrial and landowning 
capitalist as the properties classes. 
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foreign policy, largely independent from mass political parties217 and public opinion.  
It was also collaboration with industrial capitalists in relation to technology.218  
Meanwhile, in its secondary function, domestic repression, the military went on to 
represent the interest of the old and new dominant classes in society (Mann, 1993, 
p.439).  While Mann agrees that the internal developments of the military support the 
‘military caste theory’, he shows that the two functions resulted in a dualism within 
the military crystallisation (Mann, 1993, p.439).  Mann (1993) argues that this 
crystallisation,219 the dualism of caste autonomy, and the “defense of old regime and 
capitalism” (p.439) made the military significantly independent and more powerful 
than all other state crystallisations (Mann, 1993, p.439-440). 
Mann argues that the importance of military power since World War I, in 1914, 
has risen over the years and continues to be of massive importance in the 20th 
century (Mann, 1993:440). 
This chapter will consider Mann’s form of military power to determine the 
following in the context of Sri Lanka.  First, who exercised military power in Sri 
Lanka and what they tried to achieve?  Second, what form of domestic militarism 
was primarily used in the country and for what reason?  Third, whether the 
geopolitical militarism represented the interests of the ‘state’s old regime core’. 
6.2 Military Organisations in Sri Lanka and Military Activities 
Throughout the colonial phase of Sri Lankan history, five groups have 
exercised some form of military power in terms of Mann’s concept of military 
power.  To put it in successive order, these were the Western colonialists, the Sri 
Lankan government security forces, the members of the JVP, the Tamil paramilitary 
groups (more notably the LTTE), and the Indian Peace Keeping Force.  This section 
                                                
 
217 See for further information, Chapters 16 and 21 of Mann (1993) for a detailed discussion of the 
involvement of the old regime diplomats and statement in foreign policy. 
218 See Chapter 14 of Mann (1993) for further discussion of the industrial capitalists and their 
involvement through the provision of weapons, communications and supplies. 
219 According to Mann (1993) the military crystallisation was a combination of “bureaucratization, 
professionalization, military-industrial technology, old regime domination of high command and 
diplomacy, and insulation of military and diplomatic decision making” (p.439-440).  Although the 
military seem to be formally incorporated into the state, it is more powerful than any other state 
institution and was actually more independent of the state. 
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will briefly analyse the composition of each of the military organisations and their 
activities in Sri Lanka.  The aim is to understand the extent of military power used by 
each group, and each group’s respective goals. 
6.2.1 The colonialist 
Under Western colonial rule, military power was used, not only to wage war 
against the Sinhalese kingdoms, but also to suppress rebellion in the areas under 
Western rule.220  In many instances, the regiments used were European and other 
Asians, for example Malays and Bengalis.  After the British administration was well 
established throughout the country, the British created the Ceylon Rifle Regiment.  
The few natives that were amongst those in the ranks were mostly Malays.  The 
Regiment was disbanded in 1873, and by 1881 the Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers 
(which was renamed in 1910 as the Ceylon Defence Force) was created.  The aim of 
this volunteer service was to have a British garrison in the island in case of some 
external threat.  The British formed most of these military organisations, as Mann 
(1993, p.9) argues, to exert domestic repression and to ensure positive cooperation. 
The third Kandyan war, also known as the Uva rebellion of 1818, was the 
major uprising against British rule.  This was a desperate attempt to overthrow the 
imperial rulers.  The rebellion brought the chiefs, bhikkus, peasantry, and militant 
Veddas into a guerrilla-styled armed conflict, with the Kandyan nobility taking the 
centre stage.  Jayawardena (2010) observes that the unequal nature of the contest 
between peasants with primitive weapons and short of ammunition, and British 
professional soldiers equipped with the latest arms, led to a gradual collapse of this 
rebellion.  Martial law was revoked by 21 November 1818 and two leading rebels, 
Keppetipola and Madugalle, were executed, and 25 others were exiled to Mauritius.  
The British, through the use of superior military forces, ruthlessly suppressed the 
rebels.  This exercise of military power ensured that no future rebellions would take 
place in such a manner. 
                                                
 
220 These were mainly the warfare between the Kandyan kingdom and the British colonials between 
1796 and 1818.  Three major wars were fought.  The first Kandyan war (1803-1805), the second 
Kandyan war (1815), and the third Kandyan war (1817-18).  See further, de Silva (1981); 
Jayawardane (2010). 
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The colonialists, in particular the British, developed the first formal, central 
military organisation on the island.  They used military power to gain and defend 
their interests within the newly colonised territory.  Equally, as a ‘concentrated-
coercive’ method, they utilised their power to carry out infrastructure projects using 
the old ‘rajakariya’ system, especially in the Kandyan region.  Later, the British 
colonialists exercised their military power essentially to prevent any future rebellions 
on the island, which Mann would describe as a threat of violence. 
6.2.2 The government security forces 
The current Sri Lankan military is the object of the British descent.  Following 
independence from the British in 1948, the Ceylon Defence Force and the Ceylon 
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve were disbanded.  The Army Act, no.17 of 1949, 
instead created the Ceylon Army.  Later, in 1950, the Royal Ceylon Navy was 
created.  Finally, in 1951 the Royal Ceylon Air Force was established.  Following the 
country becoming a republic in 1972, the Sri Lankan government security forces 
were transformed into the Sri Lankan Army, the Sri Lankan Navy, and the Sri 
Lankan Air Force.  Thereafter, the 1978 Constitution led to the Executive Presidency 
and the President becoming the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.  The 
central military headquarters under the Ministry of Defence governed all three 
forces.  There were also three official paramilitary forces in Sri Lanka, also governed 
by the Ministry of Defence.  They included the Special Task Force, the Sri Lanka 
Civil Defence Force, and the Sri Lanka Coast Guard.  The military power in Sri 
Lanka was controlled through a centralised organisation, the Ministry of Defence, 
and by a very powerful executive president. 
The escalation of the JVP and inter-group conflicts in Sri Lanka meant that the 
size and force of the Sri Lankan government security forces also increased.  The 
government saw the need to use aggression in order to defend its territory.  This was 
based on the need to use force in order to coerce, but also as a threat of violence 
against the internal military organisations in Sri Lanka.  Broadly, there were three 
major military activities221 that the security forces had to engage in over the years.  
                                                
 
221 The reasons behind the insurrections and war will be briefly discussed below under the JVP and 
Tamil militant military organisations. 
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The first was the 1971 JVP insurrection.  The lack of an intelligence agency and the 
immature stage of the government’s security left it ill-prepared when the JVP 
insurrection erupted.  However, the government forces were able to bring the 
insurrection under control.  The second insurgency was between the Sri Lankan 
government forces and the Tamil para-militant groups.  The roots of this insurgency 
began in the mid-1970s and ended in May 2009 with the Sri Lankan Armed Forces 
defeating the LTTE.  The third major military activity was a simultaneous 
development that started in opposition to Indian intervention and that escalated into a 
military style confrontation between the armed forces and the JVP in 1987 to 1989. 
There were several reasons behind the government security forces’ use of 
military power in the 1970 and 1975 to 2009 situations.  Against the JVP 
insurrection, it was seen that military power was being used to maintain state control 
over the territory and its people.  The aim of the JVP, in both resurrections, was to 
challenge the government’s political power militarily and overthrow the political 
elite.  While Mann (1993, p.405) argues that, in the West, states detached their 
militaries from class struggles.  Here, we note that the government forces engaged in 
full-scale military repression to regain control and prevent the JVP’s activities.  
Similar actions were taken against the Tamil paramilitary groups and notably against 
the LTTE. 
6.2.3 The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
The JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or Peoples’ Liberation Front) is a 
Sinhalese extremist group which first surfaced in 1971.  Its ideology was directed 
against the Sri Lankan state and the Sinhala ruling class, and not at the ethnic ‘other’ 
as in the case of Sinhala nationalism222 (Bandarage, 2009).  By early 1971, the JVP 
claimed a membership of over 100,000, most of them operating in small cells in the 
country (Halliday, 1971).  It included a mixed cross-section of society from 
                                                
 
222 Matthew (1989, p.43) points out that, even though the JVP’s ideology was predominantly based on 
Sinhalese nationalist chauvinist nature, their relationship to Tamil sub-groups was decidedly 
ambivalent.  The JVP never attacked the LTTE or other Tamil paramilitary groups and there seemed 
to be a shared understanding that each was fighting the same enemy.  See further Bush (1994) who 
argues that the connection between the JVP and Tamil paramilitaries (especially the Plantation 
Tamils) illustrates that the “inter-group battle lines of ethnic conflict are not so rigidly hard and fast as 
often suggested” (p.167). 
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professionals to unemployed rural youths,223 as well as some Buddhist monks.  Most 
of these members had secondary education qualifications and were educated in the 
Sinhala medium education system.224  Further, most members came from rural areas 
where development had been neglected by the government225 (Chandraprema, 1991, 
p.2).  Jinnings (1979) argues that the JVP consisted of mainly persons from the lower 
castes.  The strong association of the JVP with Sinhalese Buddhist culture226 was 
evident as the group did not exist in the Sinhalese Christian areas along the coast 
north of Colombo (Matthew, 1989; Chandraprema, 1991).  In general, the JVP could 
be described as a very fluid, secretive, underground operation that did not have a 
centralised control.  They had a wide range of participants with groups emerging, due 
to the particular local conditions. 
The JVP engaged in two major attacks against the Sri Lankan government.  
The first was in 1971, which saw them attack several police stations and government 
institutions (Gunasekera, 1998).  Given the unprecedented threats to order and 
democracy, the government declared an emergency and curfew giving the police and 
army “full powers of arbitrary arrest and disposal of bodies without having to carry 
out inquests or inform the relatives of those killed” (Halliday, 1971, p.1).  Although 
the insurrection was ill-organised and the fighters were badly armed, and the police 
force was unprepared for the unexpected attack and inadequately manned to meet the 
situation.  The military had to be deployed to quell the situation and the assistance of 
foreign governments was sought to provide material support.  Britain, India, 
Pakistan, Egypt, Australia, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia were among countries from which military 
                                                
 
223 Jiggins (1979, p.123) points out that the demographic composition of the country in 1971 was 
conducive to a youth-driven insurrection.  In 1969, 60% of the total population of 12.5million were 
under the age of 25.  In the 14-25 year old category, 45% were out of school and unemployed. 
224 Approximately, 74% of the population was literate (Jiggins, 1979, p.123).  The majority was 
literate in only one language as a result of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s policy of vernacular education.  
Despite the high Sinhala literacy rate, English remained the language of status and the key to getting 
employment in higher paying jobs.  See further Jiggins (1979). 
225 See also Premachandra (1989, cited in Chandraprema, 1991) who describes the JVP support base 
as those being “bitterly discontented layer of rural middle class youth” (p.7). 
226 However, the JVP never made direct reference to religion.  Matthew (1989) argues that the JVP 
“realizes that no anti-Buddhist party could survive in Sri Lanka and therefore doe not discourage 
Buddhist ‘patriotic’ activism (in fact, it is assumed that some JVP opportunists have even donned 
robes, including perhaps even Wijeweera himself)” (p.430).  Further mobilisation was based on 
revolutionary or patriotic principles and not on Sinhalese Buddhist principles (Chandraprema, 1991, 
p.10). 
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assistance was sought.  India also sent 100 Gurkha soldiers to guard the Katunayake 
airport (Gunasekera, 1998).  The second JVP insurrection was from 1987 until 1989.  
The signing of the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement is said to have acted as a 
catalyst for this resurgence, as there was widespread social, political, and economic 
grievances at the time (Chandraprema, 1991; Gunaratna, 1990).  The JVP attacked 
all levels of government and public employees that it considered to be disobeying its 
orders.  Chandraprema (1989) says that 
knives and swords are used in preference to guns to do the actual killing … 
guns being used only for intimidation of intended victims.  Victims are very 
often cut to ribbons part by part…slowly.  Whole families have been chopped to 
bits … the children often being burnt alive.  Many members of the public - very 
ordinary people - like bus drivers, scavengers, small time shopkeepers have 
been shot for disobeying JVP orders.  This has been done regardless of the fact 




According to Gunaratna (1990:221-225), the JVP had actively recruited and 
sought support from soldiers in the Sri Lankan armed forces, however, later the 
group changed its tactics, which saw it issuing threats to the security forces and their 
families (Gunaratna, 1990:269).  This had a detrimental effect on the JVP as the 
security forces withdrew support and retaliated,228 which immediately ended the JVP 
activities.  Chadraprema (1989:297) suggests that the support for the JVP diminished 
following the large amount of deaths during the insurrection and especially by those 
caused by the government forces. 
The military organisation of the JVP is a fitting example of what Mann 
describes as an organisation being institutionally separate from the state.  Further, the 
organisation was not centralised.  Instead, it was dispersed into small groups in 
various locations.  The power that the small groups held was sufficient to initiate two 
                                                
 
227 Allegations were made by oppositional parties to the government, such as the SLFP, that not all the 
violence was carried out by the JVP.  It was believed that President Premadasa had several SLFP 
Members of Parliament murdered through the UNP-sponsored death squad called the ‘Black Cats’.  
See Weerakoon, B. (1993). Yukthia. reprinted in INFORM, Sri Lanka Information Monitor, 1 August 
1993. 
228 See Chandraprema (1991) who writes about the “Ape ekakata thope dolahak” (“Twelve of yours 
for one of ours”) (p.269) military campaign, which saw the government forces killing 200 people in 
the Menikhinna-Kundasale area following the death of three servicemen’s families at the hands of the 
JVP. 
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major offensives against the state and thereby the government security forces.  This 
is a further example of Mann’s argument that physical force is capable of being 
exercised wherever organised.  The JVP’s military activities were aimed at 
overthrowing the ruling political elite.  As noted above, Mann’s argument of 
militaries being separate from class struggles is challenged through the application of 
his form of military power in the Sri Lankan context.  This is a theme that follows 
continuously in the Sri Lankan scenario, as the military activities are internal 
conflicts between internal groups. 
6.2.4 Tamil paramilitaries and finally the LTTE 
By the early- to mid-1970s, a number of Sri Lankan Tamil resistance groups, 
many small gangs, mixing criminal activity with Tamil political aspirations, had 
emerged with the support of the TULF (Bandarage, 2009, p.97).  At the start, there 
were over 40 Tamil paramilitary groups that, by the end of 1970s, dwindled to five.  
All of the remaining five were actively committed to creating a separate Tamil 
state.229  They were the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, and the PLOTE.  There was massive 
feuding between these groups, but the LTTE230 managed to assert territorial control in 
the northern and eastern provinces following the withdrawal of the IPKF in March 
1990231 (Gunaratna, 1993).  Further, the LTTE was able to dominate the north and 
east through the provision of state-like services, which included postal, licensing, law 
and order, taxation, and health (Bush, 1994, p.226). 
Over 26 years, the LTTE conducted guerrilla and terrorist operations against 
rival Tamil groups and the government of Sri Lanka.  This also included the killing 
                                                
 
229 The LTTE were initially committed to representing the Sri Lankan ‘Tamil-speaking people’, but, 
following a minor dispute between the LTTE and a Muslim in Batticaloa around 1990, the LTTE 
declared to that they would only represent the Sri Lankan Tamils.  See further, Gunaratna (2001). 
230 Bandarage (2009, p.66) points out that the origin of the LTTE was similar to the Sinhala youth 
armed struggle and that, in 1970, the Tamil Youth League (“TLS”) was formed which later became 
the Tamil New Tigers (“TNT”).  Velupillai Prabhakaran is said to have developed the military wing of 
the TNT, which later became the LTTE, in May 1976.  See also Narayan Swamy, M.R. (1994). Tigers 
of Lanka, from boys to guerrillas (3rd ed.). Sri Lanka: Vijitha Yapa Publications. 
231 The EPRLF was a major group as they received the full backing of the IPKF and the Indian 
government.  However, following the departure of the IPKF, a large portion of EPRLF members and 
their families had relocated to south India fearing retribution from the LTTE, while some other 
members sought protection by joining the government side to fight the LTTE with army support.  See 
further, Gunaratna (1993). 
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of large numbers of civilians.232  Under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran233 
(who was based in Sri Lanka), the group established a well-trained, loyal, and 
dedicated fighting force with one goal in mind—to establish a separate homeland for 
the Sri Lankan Tamils (Hoffman, 2009, p.465).  The LTTE had a sophisticated, 
international support network, which was broadly divided into three sectors: 
financing, propaganda, and weapons procurement (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, 
Rosenau & Brannan, 2001, p.43).  This allowed the organisation to transition from a 
guerrilla group to a hybrid force equipped with a naval and nascent air wing.  The 
fighting with other Tamil groups was to eradicate any opposition to its cause and its 
organisation.  The fighting against the government was principally aimed at 
achieving a separate state for the Tamil people.  The elimination of other groups can 
be attributed to several reasons.  Firstly, it was the personal characteristic of 
Prabhakaran not to allow any rivalry to his leadership.  Secondly, it was to establish 
the claim that only the LTTE represented Tamil aspirations.  Thirdly, it was a 
military strategy, namely to have all forces fighting under a single banner. 
The organisation was highly centralised with its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran 
taking the foremost decisions in all of its activities.  The LTTE group carried out its 
operations in the north and the east of the country almost as a separate state within 
the island of Sri Lanka, its military operations always taking the lead.  The LTTE 
used its military power to coerce the people living in the LTTE-controlled areas to 
adhere to its rules and regulations.  Its advanced military capabilities and ability to 
exert threats of violence deterred other Tamil paramilitary groups from directly 
operating or opposing them, especially in the LTTE-controlled areas.  Through the 
use of military power, the LTTE elite had successfully obtained collective and 
distributive power during its operations.  This again highlights Mann’s argument that 
military power can be separate from political power, and military organisations can 
be separate from the state and exercise their power to overthrow the political elite.  
Although the fighting between the LTTE and the government security forces is 
principally highlighted, there exist elements that suggest that the LTTE grievances 
                                                
 
232 See de Silva (1993); Rubin (1987). 
233 Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1989, p.609), pointed out that Prabhakaran belonged to the Karaiyar 
caste, which is considered to be of lower caste denomination within the East Coast Tamils.  In his 
study, he stresses that the term ‘Sri Lankan Tamil’ subsumes under it a number of different categories 
of Tamils: East Coast Tamils, Colombo, and Jaffna Tamils, or Tamil Vellalas. 
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were not confined to the state political elite.  There is suggestion that these extended 
to other Tamil paramilitary groups and Tamil politicians, thereby challenging the 
argument that the conflict in Sri Lanka was purely an ethnic one. 
6.2.5 Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-1990) 
The Indo-Lanka Accord that was signed on 29 July 1987 by the governments 
of India and Sri Lanka established the IPKF.  The aim of the involvement of the 
IPKF was to facilitate the end of the fighting between the Sri Lankan government 
forces and the militant Sri Lankan Tamil groups (especially the LTTE).  Initially 
6,000 to 7,000 IPKF personnel entered Sri Lanka.  By October 1987, this number 
rapidly grew to 60,000 to 80,000 (Bush, 1994, p.216).  Harbottle (1979) says that, at 
first, the IPKF was able to bring some peace to the island through ‘an interpository 
role’.  However, this changed when they used offensive military confrontations to 
disarm the LTTE. 
The IPKF military organisation is completely separate from the state, although 
it was established further to the signing of an Accord by two governments.  It could 
be argued that however that through the signing of the agreement, this military 
organisation acted indirectly as an extension of the Sri Lankan government and its 
military power.  Nonetheless, an organisation outside the direct Sri Lanka 
government security forces did exercise some form of military power for a short 
period in Sri Lanka.  It exercised military power against the LTTE in order to coerce 
the Tamil militant group to end its campaign against the Sri Lankan state.  This 
military organisation was arguably institutionally separate from the Sri Lankan 
government agencies.  The Sri Lankan government lost control of political power 
and even sovereign rights in this area for a time.  The IPKF came to exercise physical 
force against the LTTE once they were deployed in the LTTE controlled areas (North 
and East) of Sri Lanka, again highlighting Mann’s argument that military power can 
be exercised wherever it is organised. 
6.2.6 Military organisations in Sri Lanka 
This section reveals that five separate military organisations operated in Sri 
Lanka in various periods in history, either simultaneously or consecutively.  The 
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Western colonials, especially the British, formed the more formal centralised military 
organisation in order to exert domestic repression on its subjects.  This was to ensure 
positive cooperation for its rule and it also used the threat of violence, as described 
by Mann, to prevent rebellions.  Following independence, each successive Sri 
Lankan government used the centralised military organisation to defend its territory 
and its control over the state.  The three major conflicts against the Sri Lankan state 
indicate that, in dealing with the two internal rebellion movements, the JVP and the 
LTTE, the government forces used both domestic repression and military repression 
to deal with them. 
The two resurrections by the JVP were aimed at the Sri Lankan government 
and challenged the Sinhalese ruling elite.  Although the group has strong roots in 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideals, its movement was clearly not against the other 
ethnic groups.  The LTTE, which was the strongest of the Tamil paramilitary groups, 
challenged the Sri Lankan government forces.  Its goal was to create a separate 
homeland for the Tamil people.  Although claiming to represent the Tamil minority, 
the infighting between the Tamil paramilitaries and the assassinations of Tamil 
politicians, indicate that LTTE grievances were not solely based on ethnic grounds. 
Importantly, the military power held by the LTTE and the JVP supports 
Mann’s theory that military power can be separate from political power.  Both of 
these groups were separate from the state.  Further, the JVP was not a centralised 
organisation.  It was an underground operation that was scattered around various 
locations.  The deployment of the IPKF again supports Mann’s argument that groups 
that are institutionally separate from the state can exercise military power.  It was the 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that caused the group to exercise physical force against the 
LTTE.  The aim was to coerce the Tamil militant group to end its actions against the 
Sri Lankan government.  The IPKF primarily used military repression whilst they 
were in the north and east of the island. 
Mann (1993, p.405) argues that the West, in the 20th century, detached its 
militaries from its class struggles.  However, in the Sri Lankan context, the issues 
between the Sri Lankan government forces, the JVP, and the LTTE suggests that 
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there existed underlying class elements.234  Here, views by both Giddens (1985) and 
Tilly (1990) become important.  Their views on the transformation of military power 
in the West are similar to Mann’s.  Giddens (1985), on violence in modern states, 
suggests that “it involves … not the decline of war but a concentration of military 
power ‘pointing outwards’ towards other states in the nation-state system”.  Tilly 
(1990, p.125) agrees that, in Western history, a transformation of military power has 
taken place from a dual function, involving war and repression, to a singular one of 
war, thereby detaching its militaries from any class struggles.  Important in the Sri 
Lankan context is Tilly’s (1990, p.125) comment that no such transformation was 
seen in the 20th-century third world.  He says that this is because the required 
political and social citizenship had not been achieved by these states, compared to 
the European states.  Mohammed Ayoob (1995, 2001 & 2005) explains the 
predicament of third world states effectively when he highlights that it is not possible 
to apply the same Western theories to third world states.  He argues that the process 
of state-building for third world countries was different as to what Europe had gone 
through and that, for these states, “external variables had tremendous influence in 
determining the outcome of specific attempts at state building” (Ayoob, 1995, p.42).  
Some of these external variables that came to play were: short amount of time that 
they had in state formation; remnants of colonial presence and connected issues; and, 
highly sensitive ethnic and group friction.  He argues that this inevitably means that 
such states will encounter “frequent major negative political and social effects and 
exacerbation of intra-state and inter-state conflicts” (Ayoob, 2002, p.37).  This, 
perhaps, better explains the relatively large number of intra-state conflicts that Sri 
Lanka underwent following independence, when succeeding governments were 
engaged in state-making. 
6.3 Domestic Militarism and Geopolitical Militarism 
Mann’s military power incorporates domestic militarism and geopolitical 
militarism.  This section looks at military power in Sri Lanka in the context of 
Mann’s domestic militarism and geopolitical militarism.  The aim here is to further 
investigate whether Mann’s argument of military power in the West being separate 
                                                
 
234 See Chapter 5 on Economic Power. 
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from class struggles (Mann, 1993, p.405 & 411) could be applied in the Sri Lankan 
context.  Further, this section will investigate whether the underlying interest behind 
geopolitical militarism in Sri Lanka was, as Mann described, aligned with the ‘state’s 
old regime’ (Mann, 1993, p.419). 
6.3.1 Domestic militarism and Mann’s levels of domestic repressions 
Previous analysis, in section 6.2, indicated that Mann’s argument of the 
separation of domestic militarism from class struggles in the West did not hold true 
in the Sri Lankan context.  This section will look further into this argument and also 
examine the nature of Sri Lankan domestic militarism. 
Analysis of the various military and non-military actions in Sri Lanka show 
that all four forms of domestic repressions introduced by Mann were used at some 
point in Sri Lanka.  The Sri Lankan government changed its level of repression over 
time, depending on the actions of the JVP and the Tamil militants. 
Between 1948 and 1958, each elected government faced many tensions in 
establishing the new independent state.  The pressure to apply Western democratic 
principles and its conflict with the indigenous situation posed many obstacles.  The 
majoritarian democracy that developed at the inception of the independent state came 
in direct conflict with the plural society that was in existence.  Initially, the 
government used limited coercion in promoting its policy programmes.235  In 1958, 
however, the frustrations of the Tamils over their political expectations led to 
hostility between the two main ethnic groups (Otis, 1988, p.312).  The government 
used third level repressive measures (as described by Mann) to curb the situation.  
Otis (1988) points out that these measures involved “the stationing of troops in 
Jaffna, the proclamation of a State of Emergency, a general curfew, arrests of Federal 
Party leaders, press censorship and the mandated power of arrest without warrant” 
(p.312).  This type of repression was deemed necessary by the government to 
suppress any challenge to the newly formed state and its policies. 
                                                
 
235 The major issue for the government was that of the Indian Tamil workers in the tea plantations and 
their citizenship status. 
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Although a low level of violence was seen in the period following 1958, this 
was mainly related to the imposition of the threat of violence by the government in 
1959, which tightened press censorship and introduced the death penalty.  Further, 
between 1960 and 1961, a number of security measures were introduced, such as 
curfews, stationing of troops in Jaffna and other areas, and the banning of Tamil 
meetings and processions.  The sporadic rioting and violence that were seen between 
1963 and 1966 were met with instant military repression. 
During the 1965 to 70 period, the UNP and the SLFP (who were at the time the 
two prominent political parties) supported the Sinhalese community at the expense of 
possible discrimination against the Tamil communities.236  By this period, the Tamils 
were broadly concerned with four aspects of policies undertaken by the ruling 
government.  They were in regard to education, language, colonisation, and political 
autonomy (Otis, 1988, p.257).  It was around 1970 that the leader of the LTTE, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, organised the Tamil New Tigers, consisting of frustrated 
Tamil youth who were aggrieved by the perception that education and employment 
opportunities were being denied to them (Kearney, 1975; de Silva, 1977).  However, 
the 1971 JVP insurrection saw attention being drawn away from the Tamil 
grievances.  The JVP insurrection was essentially an internal problem within the 
Sinhalese community, and was met with the increased use of coercive measures.237 
The Tamil grievances between 1975 and 1977 are said to have been similar to 
before and included the citizenship issue of the estate Tamils, the land and 
colonisation questions, education, and Tamil representation (Otis, 1988, p.316).  
There were discussions and negotiations in the parliamentary forum, but the 1977 
elections stalled this process.  The TULF declared for autonomy and Eelam238 
through the 1976 ‘Vaddukodai Resolution’ (Jayawardena, 1990, p.150).  This 
boosted radicalism in the Tamil youth and especially in the Tamil New Tigers 
                                                
 
236 See Chapter 4 on ideological power. 
237 See Otis (1988) who describes the measure to include “impounding of passports, passing of a 
Public Security Act, Army occupation in Jaffna, re-institution of curfews and increasing press 
censorshi p … army was accused of summary executions, mass arrests, use of torture and random 
killing” (p.315). 
238 The possibility of a Tamil secession was vehemently opposed by the JVP.  In 1984, Wijeweera 
(leader of the JVP) is noted to have said “The JVP and I are totally opposed to any imperialist attempt 
to divide the country.  As long as the JVP exists, as long as I live, we shall not allow any imperialist 
force to divide the country” (Jayawardena, 1990, p.150). 
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campaign.  The possibility of a separate Tamil state instigated an anti-Tamil 
campaign amongst the Sinhalese majority.  Manor (1979) argues that increased 
militarisation took place in this period, and that “Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government 
between 1970 and 1977 used police as a virtual army of occupation in Tamil 
majority areas generating considerable support for separation among the Tamil 
minority” (p.379-380).  Describing the situation at the time, Hoole et al. (1992) say 
that 
As a purely security problem, it was well within control.  The TULF was 
willing to settle for a fairly modest grant of autonomy for the Tamil areas, 
which included some compromise on land settlement.  The militants at this 
point in time respected [the] TULF and were not challenging it.  But the 
government decided to play tough, and given some of the racist attitudes of 
some of its leading members, every action of the government’s began to be seen 
as punitive.  (p.23) 
The period between 1978 and 1981 saw the increased use of coercion by the 
state and Tamil paramilitary attacks on soldiers, policemen, and others (Hoole et al., 
1992, p.35-61).  The state imposed anti-terrorist laws, emergency laws in Tamil 
areas, the death penalty for those in possession of firearms, and increased security 
personnel (Bush, 1994, p.186).  Coercion was not confined to the Tamil population, 
and the 1982 referendum239 enhanced divisions within the Sinhalese community 
(Warnapala & Hewagama, 1983, p.118-120).  In 1982, the Jayawardene government 
banned all student councils, which were formed to discuss student grievances (Bush, 
1994, p.177).  This led to strong support of students in the JVP and the growth of the 
JVP movement (Gunaratna, 1990, p.47).  While the government’s attention was 
directly to the north and east,240 in 1987, the JVP resurgence erupted.  This was again 
met by heavy military attacks by state forces. 
                                                
 
239 The referendum was called by then President J.R. Jayawardene with the aim of prolonging the life 
of parliament and his own sitting for another six years. 
240 The 1983 riots highlighted the escalated conflict between Tamil paramilitaries and the government, 
which, until then, was of relatively low intensity. 
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A critical point in the struggle between the Sri Lankan state and Tamil 
paramilitaries241 was reached in 1983.  The government believed that the issue was 
exclusively a military one and both parties’ military capabilities increased.242  The 
anti-Tamil riots that followed on the island are explained by Meyer (1984, p.142-
143) as President Jayawardena’s loss of control of his political party and his armed 
forces.243  With the brewing of the Sinhalese intra-group issues in the south, President 
Jayewardene sought the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord to engage limited 
military in Sri Lanka to help curb Tamil paramilitary issues.  However, the IPKF 
presence in Sri Lanka did little to resolve both the Sinhalese and Tamil issues.  The 
LTTE continued to dispose of its rival paramilitaries (de Silva, 1993, p.137), while 
the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the IPKF presence prompted the second insurrection 
by the JVP (Gunaratna, 1990). 
In 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa assumed the office of president.  The 
increasing conflicts with the JVP saw the president move to abrogate the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord.  It was clear that the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the presence of the 
IPKF exacerbated the intra-group violence (within both groups, the Sinhalese and 
Tamils) (Hoole et al., 1992, p.345-347).  The Indian government’s reluctance to 
withdraw the IPKF on Sri Lankan terms prompted an unexpected LTTE-UNP 
coalition.244 
Over the following years, each succeeding government engaged with the LTTE 
on several peace talks, facilitated by the Norwegians, to end the conflict.245  In spite 
of these peace talks and cease-fire agreements, both parties continued to engage in 
military activities against each other.  The government, under president Rajapaksa in 
                                                
 
241 Bastian (1993, p.22) states the proximate trigger to be the killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers in an 
ambush by the LTTE.  Hydnman (1988, p.8) argues that this ambush by the LTTE was in retaliation 
to alleged rape by soldiers of several Tamil women.  These allegations were uncorroborated. 
242 See statement by President Jayawardena quoted in The Times (London), 26 January 1986 wherein 
he states that “I shall have a military solution to what I believe is a military problem”. 
243 The riots are argued to have been orchestrated by actors within the government, namely Prime 
Minister Premadasa and Member of Parliament Gamini Dissanayake (Meyer, 1984, p.143).  See 
further Nissan & Stirrat (1984, p.179). 
244 This was because both the government and the LTTE were interested in the removal of the IPKF.  
The LTTE was concerned with the growing power of some of its rival Tamil paramilitary groups, 
such as the EPRLF, which was being supported by the IPKF.  The government was keen to expedite 
the removal of the IPKF, as they felt such removal would soften the JVP issue.  See The Economist, 
31 March 1990; India Today, 15 May 1989:88-89 for a detailed discussion on the coalition between 
the LTTE and the UNP. 
245 This thesis is not going to analyse the extensive peace negotiations that took place. 
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2009, was compelled to end all negotiations after the blockade of water at Mavil Aru 
Dam and it resorted to a full-scale military action against the LTTE.  That 
confrontation ended with the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. 
The above analysis of Sri Lankan domestic military activities indicates that 
military organisations in Sri Lanka engaged frequently in full-scale, military 
repression (as classified by Mann).  Although attempts of conciliation, arbitration, 
and persuasion were done at the political level, this was often combined with some 
other form of coercion or repression to engage the parties into an agreement. 
In addition, in and around 1990, the UNP-LTTE coalition indicates that 
seemingly inter-group conflict is too simplistic an explanation.  There is evidence 
that there are underlying intra-group issues that also come into play in the broad 
conflict between the government and the LTTE.  Further, the JVP grievances can be 
largely matched to that of the majority Sinhalese.  The group’s grievances were 
mainly against the state and the political elites, and not the Tamil groups, nor the 
other minorities.  Although the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalist movements attempted 
to transfer the blame for the economic hardships faced by the majority on the actions 
of the other, the JVP and Tamil paramilitary actions indicate clearly that there were 
underlying elements of intra-group issues.  The struggles of classes become 
important at this point.246  In this context, Mann’s (1993, p.439) argument that the 
military represented the interests of the old and new dominant classes in society also 
seems to have some truth in the Sri Lankan context.  The same can be seen through 
analysis of domestic militarism.  The situation in Sri Lanka further supports Tilly’s 
(1990, p.125) and also Ayoob’s (1995, 2001 & 2005) arguments regarding the 
difference between European and third world states.247 
6.3.2 Geopolitical militarism in Sri Lanka 
This section will analyse Mann’s geopolitical militarism in the Sri Lankan 
context, to see whether, as Mann described, the foreign policy of the state was used 
to the preserve the interests of the ‘propertied classes’ or the ‘state’s old regime core’ 
                                                
 
246 See section 5.3 on class issues. 
247 See section 6.2.6 above. 
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(Mann, 1993, p.419).  If this were to hold true, the argument of underlying class 
issues presented in the above section 6.3.1 will become more accurate in Sri Lanka. 
Although foreign policy was particularly important in Sri Lanka, Gunaratna 
(2001) argues that the Sri Lankan state had failed to successfully manage its 
“political and military dimensions of its intra-state conflict” (p.1).  This is evident by 
the actions of its closest neighbour, India, and the extensive international support that 
the LTTE had managed to foster over the years. 
The Indian government got involved in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and 
showed serious disregard to its sovereignty.  Three events highlight this.  First, in 
1987, the Indian Air Force violated Sri Lanka’s air space, allegedly dispatching 
sundry items of food for people in the north of the country.  They claimed that this 
was a ‘mercy mission’ to the people of the Jaffna peninsular (de Silva, 2008, p.185).  
This was done despite the Sri Lankan government’s specific request not to do so.  
Further, there was no evidence of a prevailing shortage of food or imminent famine 
in the area to warrant this action (de Silva, 2008, p.192).  The second event was the 
military training that the Indian government provided to several Tamil paramilitary 
groups.  Swamy (2002) highlights that 
From September 1983 until India and Sri Lanka signed the accord in July 1987, 
the RAW trained an estimated 1,200 Tamils in the use of automatic and semi-
automatic weapons, self-loading rifles, 84mm rocket launchers, heavy weapons 
and in laying mines, map reading, guerrilla war, mountaineering, demolition 
and anti-tank warfare.  Training was also given separately, on the lines of the 
army, to ‘officers’ and ‘soldiers’.  Select members of EROS, LTTE, EPRLF and 
ENDLF were also given special training in diving and under-sea sabotage. 
(p.110) 
Thirdly, the Indian government engaged in coercive diplomacy when signing 
the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987 (de Silva, 2008, p.187).  The main concerns 
that were expressed by the Government of India at the time included matters that 
were clearly within the purview of Sri Lanka’s internal affairs.248  These included: 
                                                
 
248 These concerns were expressed by the Government of India through letters that were exchanged by 
the Prime Minister of India and President of Sri Lanka.  See further de Silva (2001) and Ghosh (1999). 
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(a) the employment (by Sri Lanka) of foreign military and intelligence personnel 
to assist them in internal defence of the state; 
(b) Sri Lanka’s right to negotiate on the availability of Trincomalee, or any other 
port in Sri Lanka, for military use by any friendly country; 
(c) the work contemplated by Sri Lanka of restoring and operating the 
Trincomalee Oil Storage Tank Complex; and 
(d) the operating of foreign broadcasting firms in Sri Lanka (de Silva, 2008, 
p.187). 
Ghosh (1999), commenting on the Accord, said that 
India has not merely extracted concessions and commitment from Colombo that 
amounts to compromising of Sri Lankan independence in the area of defense 
and foreign affairs, but also has taken advantage of the troubled waters in Sri 
Lanka to pull Sri Lanka closely into its security orbit. (p.79) 
Relations with India during 1980s until the early 1990s, show that the foreign 
policy with its powerful neighbour had somewhat compromised the sovereignty of 
the Sri Lankan state. 
The extensive LTTE international organisation further compromised the 
foreign policy and sovereignty of the Sri Lankan state.  The LTTE, during its 
operations, successfully managed to draw support from its diaspora population.249  Its 
international organisations provided the group with the necessary support to maintain 
its domestic military and political campaign.  Gunaratna (1997, p.5) points out that 
the LTTE’s worldwide operation, which was in operation in over 40 countries, were 
structured around four main components, propaganda, fund raising, military 
procurement, and shipping.  The organisation maintained constant contact with its 
diaspora through mass-based political and social organisations, such as the World 
Tamil Movement, Tamil Eelam Society, and Tamil Coordinating Committee.  
                                                
 
249 The United States of America’s statistics estimated around one million Sri Lankan Tamils between 
late 1998 or early 1999.  Sri Lankan Tamil migration statistics approximate North America 250,000, 
Europe 350,000, India 100,000, Africa and Middle-East 30,000, and Australasia 40,000 (Gunaratna, 
2001:2).  About 90% of the Tamil diaspora originates from the north, particularly the Jaffna peninsula, 
the surrounding islands, and the south of the island.  See further McDowell, C. (1997). A Tamil 
Asylum Diaspora: Sri Lankan Migration, Settlement and Politics in Switzerland. Berghahn Books: 
Oxford. 
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Internationally, anti-government propaganda by the LTTE was able to affect the 
state’s investment, trade, foreign aid, and tourism.  Its success in forging close 
international ties meant that the LTTE had access to cutting–edge, terrorist 
technology.  Notably, it was the first militant group to use chemical warfare, which 
was in 1990, and were also able to successfully conduct a simultaneous information 
infrastructure attack on Sri Lankan foreign missions paralysing their e-mail systems 
in 1997 (Gunaratna, 2001, p.13).  This is in addition to the ability of the group to 
fight two armies, the Indian and Sri Lankan military forces (Gunaratna, 2001, p.13). 
The above analysis of the geopolitical militarism of the Sri Lankan state shows 
that the government had not been successful in sufficiently managing its international 
affairs.  This meant that both the Indian government and the LTTE managed to 
penetrate and question the state’s sovereignty.  However, upon coming into power, 
President Rajapaksa revealed that his government would work towards getting rid of 
the  LTTE if the peace talks failed.  The subsequent defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 
was a result of numerous factors.  These included the international stance on 
terrorism following the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America 
and the disappointment of the international community with the LTTE following 
numerous insincere peace talks.250  Smith (2010, p.43) points to China’s aid to Sri 
Lanka in exchange for development rights for port facilities and other investments as 
being the decisive factor for the Sri Lankan government’s success.251  Equally, 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa252 says, 
so many factors have contributed to the success of the Sri Lankan forces.  There 
was a clear aim and mandate from the political level to the official level and to 
the military level to destroy the LTTE at any cost.  There was no ambiguity in 
that. (Ethirajan, 2009, p.1). 
While the commitment at the political level to end the war between the state 
and the LTTE was clear, what becomes important is the state’s improvement in 
                                                
 
250 See also Smith (2010), who highlights that “the LTTE … was upgraded to Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist status in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks … Canada outlawed the LTTE’s funding 
networks … the LTTE loss of income to sustain its campaigns proved crucial to the outcome of the 
insurgency” (p.42).  Also the tsunami of 2004 had some part to play. 
251 This is because China’s aid made it possible for the Sri Lankan government to gain the military 
superiority needed to defeat the LTTE. 
252 Brother of President Rajapakse and Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka. 
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managing its foreign relations during this period.  This success curbed the LTTE’s 
funding, which ultimately weakened the fighting capacity of the group.  Further, the 
support by some other prominent states meant that the government forces were able 
to carry out their objectives without much interference from the international 
community. 
Overall, both of these major events indicate the close connection that foreign 
policy had with the internal affairs of the state.  The issue with India is indirectly 
connected with the interests of the LTTE and other Tamil paramilitary groups.  The 
objective of the LTTE was discussed in section 6.2 above and questions arose 
whether the roots of its grievances laid solely on the state and the Sinhalese 
nationalist movement.  The disputes between the Tamil paramilitary groups, the 
assassinations of Tamil politicians by the LTTE, and the alliance between the LTTE 
and the UNP, all indicated that there was more to the conflict than it being an ethnic 
one, as popularly described.  There is an indication that the intra-group element was 
a strong reason for the formation of the LTTE group and the challenge of the state 
was to contest the state elite, who were arguably representing the ‘state’s old regime 
core’.  In light of this, Mann’s assertion is applicable with regard to Sri Lanka and its 
geopolitical militarism being connected to preserve the interests of the ‘state’s old 
regime core’. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Contrary to most other theorists, Mann separates military power from political 
power.  His argument for this is based on four possibilities, which are first, the 
possibility of military power to exist wherever it is organised, second, the existence 
of military groups that are unconnected to the state, third, these military 
organisations also institutionally separate from the state, and finally, the possibility 
of military groups to conquer states.  Therefore, Mann’s definition of military power 
is “social organization of lethal violence in the form of concentrated coercion” (Hall 
& Schroeder, 2006, p.351).  Mann identifies two organisational means of this power, 
the first is domestic militarism and the second is geopolitical militarism.  Domestic 
militarism deals with the state and the coerced controls that it exercises within its 
territorial boundaries (Mann, 1986, p.26).  Mann distinguishes between four levels of 
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domestic repressions within domestic militarism.  Geopolitical militarism is 
highlighted by the interconnectedness of states and the need to enter into diplomatic 
arrangements with the other states.  Mann argues that geopolitical militarism is 
necessarily guided by the interests of the ‘state’s old regime core’ (Mann, 1993, 
p.419). 
Three observations can be made, based on the application of Mann’s form of 
military power, in the Sri Lankan context.  The first is the suitability of Mann’s 
classification of military power (that is, the separation of it from political power) to 
analyse it in relation to Sri Lanka.  The second observation is the extent of military 
power, and domestic and geopolitical militarism that was used to further the interests 
of the (arguably) ‘old regime core’.  Finally, the government used extensive military 
repressions in dealing with groups opposing it.  Interestingly, Mann’s argument that, 
in modern states, military power is detached from class struggles was shown not to 
be applicable in Sri Lanka. 
Mann’s separation of military power from political power is useful in analysing 
this form of power in Sri Lanka.  This is because the majority of the military groups 
that operated in the state were not part of the state.  For example, the JVP and the 
Tamil paramilitary groups (which includes the LTTE), were groups formed with the 
aim of challenging the government.  The IPKF was a foreign army that was invited 
by the Sri Lankan state to operate in Sri Lankan territory to aid its military 
repressions against the LTTE.  Although the state and its military (the Sri Lankan 
government forces) were necessarily part of the same institution, Mann’s 
classification was useful, as it allowed the consideration, in this thesis, of the military 
power that was utilised by non-state groups or organisations. 
Examining military power, based on Mann’s organisational means, highlights 
the extent to which the state elite used this power to further their interests.  All 
threats to the Sri Lankan state were by groups within the state.  The interests of these 
groups were primarily to challenge the state and to overthrow the political elite.  
Although the goal of the LTTE ultimately became the establishment of a separate 
homeland within the Sri Lankan territory, the group was initially established as a 
group opposing the government.  An important element that this analysis revealed 
was the intra-group struggles between the Sinhalese (the JVP and the Sinhalese state 
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elite) and the Tamils (Tamil paramilitary groups and Tamil politicians and/or state 
elites).  This inevitably raises the question of whether the issue at dispute was 
founded as a class struggle.  Further, a close investigation of the states role in its 
domestic militarism and geopolitical militarism reveals that the state elite exercised a 
high level of influence in guiding the direction of the state’s military power.  This 
thesis, therefore, agrees with Mann’s argument that geopolitical militarism is 
necessarily guided by the interests of the ‘state’s old regime core’ (Mann, 1993, 
p.419). 
In analysing the domestic militarism in Sri Lanka, it was revealed that the state 
largely used military repression to deal with the JVP and the LTTE.  While it is 
argued that the goals of both of these groups was founded on a class-based struggle, 
Mann’s (1993, p.405) assertion that, in the 20th century, states were able to detach 
their militaries from class struggles is proven to be inapplicable in the Sri Lankan 
context.  In this respect, reference was made to Tilly (1990, p.124), and Ayoob 
(1995, 2001 & 2005), who sheds some insight into the position of militaries in third-
world, developing states.  This is particularly important as these theorists indicate 
other aspects, such as the external variables that need to be investigated further to 
understand the third-world states and their state of (under) development. 
In conclusion, Mann’s framework of military power is useful to understand the 
interests of those that exercised this form of power in the Sri Lankan state.  It enabled 
the investigation of each of the military organisations, especially the state and its 
interests, to determine what their primary goal was in utilising military repression in 
the territory. 
 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
138  Chapter 7 Political Power 
CHAPTER 7 POLITICAL POWER 
According to Mann (1993, p.9), political power is the same as state power.  His 
key interest in the analysis of political power is the sort of power that the state and its 
elite possess.  Mann makes a distinction between the state elites and the “power of 
ideological movements, economic classes, and military elites” (2003 p.64).  Utilising 
Mann’s framework of political power, this chapter will analyse the manner in which 
political power was used in Sri Lanka and determine how it contributed to the 
conflict. 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section studies Mann’s 
‘political power’ and the ‘state’ after briefly considering the term based on the 
different schools of thought.  Due to Mann’s strong connection to Weber’s concepts, 
Max Weber’s views and his definition of the state will be addressed.  The second 
section considers Sri Lanka’s political power based on Mann’s political power 
organisation (domestic political organisation and geopolitical diplomacy) and his 
methods of acquiring state power (infrastructure versus despotic powers).  The third 
section looks at the formation of the Sri Lankan state, commenting on some of the 
different forms of crystallisations that have influenced the state. 
7.1 Theoretical Considerations 
7.1.1 Political power defined 
The concept of political power has different connotations depending on the 
school of thought to which the reader is aligned.  Broadly, there are four schools of 
thought: class, pluralist, elitist, and realist.  The definitions of these will be 
considered briefly below. 
Of the leading class theorists, Karl Marx (1818-1883) is one of the most 
prominent.  Marx’s view is that “Political power is merely the organized power of 
one class for oppressing another” (Marx, Engels & Lenin, 1984, p.59).  As with most 
class theorists, Marx’s explanation is to reduce political power to economic power 
relations.  In the analysis of political power, the state becomes the ultimate object of 
discussion, due to it being the vehicle of political power.  For a Marxist, an ideal 
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state would be to have no state at all.  This is because they view any government 
(whether elected democratically or through a dictatorship) as a vehicle for 
maintaining class antagonism (Marx, 1937, p.19).  Engels (1984) supports this view 
and says that “the modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist 
machine” (p.124). 
Pluralists consider that there is more to society than classes, as contended by 
class theorists (Mann, 1993, p.47).  Pluralist theories attempt to explain only the 
modern, democratic state phenomenon.  According to them, through modernisation, 
political power moved from the feudal kings to the people (Mann, 1993, p.46).  Dahl 
(1956, p.333; 1961, p.85-6; 1977 cited in Mann, 1993, p.47) explains that this change 
was possible by two processes: (1) institutional ‘contestation’, which meant that 
interest groups in society were being represented, and (2) through this contestation, 
the level of ‘participation’ improved, thereby creating a better democracy.  Dahl’s 
(1964) conception of power in general is that it is “the ability to induce A to do 
something he would not otherwise do” (p.50).253  However, the modern state’s ability 
to generate sufficient competition and participation is overshadowed when the 
government consists of a single elite or a dominant class. 
The third school of thought is that of elitists.  According to the elitists, there is 
no way out of the elite structure in any society.  These theorists focus on the 
autonomous powers of the state.  Mann (1993, p.48) highlights that there are two 
views on autonomy within this school of thought.  The classical elite theorist 
identifies the governing elite as having some form of superior innate personal 
qualities that assist them in exercising this type of power.  They see political power 
“as a dynamic relation between the state and civil society” (Mann, 1993, p.48).  
Mosca (1939) says 
political power never has been, and never will be, founded upon the explicit 
consent of majorities.  It always has been, and it always will be, exercised by 
organized minorities, which have had, and will have, the means, varying at the 
times, to improve their supremacy on the multitudes. (p.326) 
                                                
 
253 Similar to Lukes’ (1974) definition of political power as “all forms of successful control by A over 
B- that is, of A securing B’s compliance” (p.36).  See further, Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A radical view 
(2nd Ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Therefore, a central, organised, and cohesive minority always exercises 
political power.  The later versions of elitist theories start to emphasise the 
institutional framework of society to explain political power.  Skocpol (1979) defines 
the state as “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed and 
more or less well co-ordinated by an executive authority … an autonomous structure 
- a structure with a logic and interests of its own” (p.27).254  This means that states 
were considered as different actors and also rational ones with their own private 
interests.255 
Realist theorists believe that sovereign states are the unitary power actors in 
their territories and in the international system (Mann, 1993, p.49).  This means that 
no international institution, non-government organisation, individual, corporation, or 
sub-state will have influence over the state.256  Realist theorists, such as Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), introduced the ‘absolute monarchy,’ which explains the 
monarchy as wielding unrestricted political power over its territory and citizens.257  
This view has been criticised by the opposing international relations theory, which 
emphasises the interdependence of states.  International relations theorists’ focus is 
on modern, global capitalism and “see contemporary norms of cooperation as 
reflecting shared plural, material interests”258 (Mann, 1993, p.50).  Mann (1993) 
argues that both of these theories are faulty and that “calculations of interest were 
always influenced by all of the entwined sources of power, and always involved 
norms—sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent—emanating from complex 
attachments to the ‘imagined communities’ of class and nation” (p.50). 
                                                
 
254 See further Mann (1993, p.48); Krasner, S. (1984). Approaches to the state: Alternative 
conceptions and historical dynamics. Comparative Politics, 16 (January); and Levi, M. (1988). Of 
Rule and revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
255 One of the merits of elitist theories has been the identification of the state acting geopolitically 
(Mann, 1993:49; Giddens, 1985; Levi, 1988). 
256 See further Poggi, G. (1990). The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospectus. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, pp. 23-25.  Also cited in Mann, 1993, p.49. 
257 See Hobbes, T. (1651/2010). Leviathan: or the matter, form and Power of a Common-wealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil. (I. Shapiro (ed.)). Yale University Press. 
258 See further Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1977/1989). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (2nd Ed.). Boston: Little-Brown. 
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7.1.2 Weber and his political concepts 
Weber discusses the state and argues that the state goes through three stages of  
institutional development which he terms ‘political power’, ‘state’, and the ‘modern 
state’ (Mann, 1993, p.55).  The first stage of the state, claims Weber, is political 
power.  He argues that the state does not exist even though political power does 
(Weber, 1978).  He states that “a ruling organization will be called political insofar 
as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area 
by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff” 
(Weber, 1978:v.1, p. 54-56, also cited in Mann, 1993, p.55). 
Weber (1978:v.1, p.54-56) defines the second stage as follows: “A compulsory 
political organization with continuous operations will be called a state insofar as its 
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force in the enforcement of its order”.259  Therefore, when a political 
organisation employs a “legitimate monopoly over the organized use of force within 
a given territory” (Giddens, 1971, p.156), it transforms itself into a ‘state’. 
Weber (1958) states that the “development of the modern state is identical … 
with that of modern officialdom and bureaucratic organizations” (p.3).  Giddens 
(1971) emphasises Weber’s modern state and says that the modern state saw the 
“development of mass political parties and the emergence of professional politicians” 
(p.167).  The emergence of bureaucracy and administrative rationality were 
important elements that emerged in Weber’s modern state.  Weber (cited in Giddens, 
1971) sums up modern, bureaucratic states as follows: 
Everywhere the development of the modern state is initiated through the action 
of the prince.  He paves the way for the expropriation of the autonomous and 
private bearers of administrative power who stand beside him, those who 
possess in their own right the means of administration, warfare, and financial 
organization, as well as politically disposable goods of all sorts.  The whole 
process is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise 
through gradual expropriation of the independent producers.  We perceive that, 
in the end, the modern state controls the total means of political organization 
which actually come together under a single head. (p.180) 
                                                
 
259 This definition of the state has been widely followed.  See Poggi (1990); Giddens (1985, p.18). 
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Weber (1968, p.56) identified the state as having the following characteristics: 
(a) The right to use physical force in a given territory. 
(b) Governance through a centralised area. 
(c) The ability to distribute power. 
(d) A unit with the ability to enforce administrative and legally binding orders in a 
given territory. 
(e) The ability to change ‘legislation’ (Satzung). 
(f) The enforcement of their law and orders. 
(g) The regulation of the competition for political offices and selection of the 
bearers of rulership according to established rules. 
7.1.3 Mann’s political power 
Mann’s political power is the same as state260 power (Mann, 1993, p.9).  This 
power network arises when groups of people try to rule a designated area in a 
territorial fashion. 
In Mann’s (1986) words, political power is derived “from the usefulness of 
centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social 
relations” (p.26).  This type of power is unique compared to the other power 
networks, as it is able to delimit societies.  Mann (1986) highlights the ability of 
political power to demarcate the boundaries of a society, and states: 
As here defined, political power heightens boundaries, whereas the other power 
sources may transcend them.  Second, military, economic, and ideological 
power can be involved in any social relationships, wherever located.  Any A or 
group of As can exercise these forms of power against any B or group of Bs.  
By contrast, political relations concern one particular area, the center.  Political 
power is located in that center and exercised outward.  Political power is 
necessarily centralized and territorial and in these respects differs from the other 
                                                
 
260 According to Mann (1986), the state is “a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 
embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover a territorially 
demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up 
by physical violence” (p.37). 
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power sources.  Those who control the state, the state elite, can obtain both 
collective and distributive power and trap others within their distinctive 
organization chart. (p.27) 
Being territorially bounded means that political power is much more limited in 
scope, as compared to the other networks of power, therefore, making it less 
complicated in nature.  The regulations and coercion which are centrally 
administered by this form of power further limits its reach.  Macauslan (2010) points 
out that this is because of the “limited means of power identification when observing 
state behavior” (p.22). 
According to Mann (1986, p.27), this type of political power organisation is 
‘sociospatially dual’ as the state deals with both domestic (internal) and international 
(external) issues.  In the domestic, political organisation, the state is ‘territorially 
centralised’ and ‘territorially-bounded’.  This means that the state is able to attain 
excessive, autonomous power when social life supports the enhanced cooperation 
and exploitation in the demarcated confined territorial setting (Mann, 1986, p.27).  
Therefore, domestic states use techniques of authoritative power261 to enhance this 
cooperation and exploitation.  Mann (1986, p.27), however, distinguishes this from a 
military organisation as he says that the centralised setting and use of authoritative 
power is not as advanced as it is in a military organisation.  Macauslan (2010) 
fittingly sums up Mann’s domestic power organisation and says “the centralized 
power elite focus not only upon the maximization of resources within the territorially 
bounded region but with the prevention of developing alternative political power 
structures” (p.23). 
Mann’s (1986, p.27) second form of political power organisation is what he 
refers to as ‘geopolitical diplomacy’.  This arises through the regulation of interstate 
relations.  Mann (1986) highlights the importance of geopolitical organisation.  He 
says it is an “essential part of social life … of overall social stratification” (Mann, 
1986, p.27) and in his view “the nature of a state’s behavior in one organization 
cannot necessarily be reduced to the mechanisms that drive behavior in the other” 
(Macauslan, 2010, p.23). 
                                                
 
261 Mann (1986) defines authoritative power as being “willed by groups and institutions” (p.8). 
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Mann uses the terms ‘infrastructural’ power and ‘despotic’ power “to identify 
the two different ways in which a governmental apparatus acquires and uses 
centralized power” (Agnew, 2005, p.443).  According to Agnew (2005), despotic and 
infrastructural power identify 
two different functions that state[s] perform and that underpin their claims to 
sovereignty: the struggle for power among elites and interest groups in one state 
in relation to elites and interest groups elsewhere and the provision of public 
goods that are usually provided publicly (by states).  (p.443) 
Mann describes these as two styles of state powers and distinguishes the two as 
follows, “the first sense [despotic power] denotes power by the state elite itself over 
civil society.  The second [infrastructural power] denotes the power of the state to 
penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own 
infrastructure”262 (Mann, 1984, p.188). 
‘Despotic’ power is the “distributive power of state elites over civil society” 
(Mann, 1993, p.59).  This type of power means that only people who are considered 
as elite does when they use their power in society to carry out their can impose its 
wishes and, as power is exercised by the state in a repressive manner, it is considered 
a ‘negative’ type power.263  Meanwhile, infrastructural power is a more ‘positive’ 
one, as it entails a cooperative relationship between society and the government.  
Mann (1993) points out that ‘infrastructural’ is the “institutional capacity of a central 
state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions” 
(p.59). 
Mann (1984, p.114) argues that capitalist democratic states are ‘despotically 
weak’ but ‘infrastructurally strong’.  This he says is because in such states politicians 
are elected and chances of an autonomous state elite controlling the state is unlikely.  
Further, infrastructural power is increased by the states’ involvement in the everyday 
life (through transport, welfare, taxes, and so on).  Mann (1984, p.117) cites some 
ways in which the state has managed to penetrate social life, which include: 
                                                
 
262 Mann (1993, p.2-3) states that another way of understanding this difference is by looking at 
Weber’s theory on distributive and collective powers. 
263 Lucas (1998) compares the military regimes in Nigeria as having a high degree of despotic power 
because of the frequent use of coercion to achieve their goals. 
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(a) Providing services that are centrally-organised services  
(b) Encouraging a high literacy rate amongst its population, which ensures that its 
citizens understand state laws and state powers. 
(c) Providing a valid method of exchange of goods and services through currency, 
system of weights and measures. 
(d) Providing efficient and effective communications and transport systems. 
By providing high quality and quantity of these services, the state is able to 
increase its infrastructural power.  However, Mann (1986) says, that there is no 
specific techniques that a state will definitive utilise to provide these types of 
services.  Mann (1984, p.117) argues that it is actually partly social development and 
partly society’s ability to increase collective social mobilisation of resources that 
leads to the changes of state power.  Therefore, the state adds no fourth power that is 
peculiar to itself, but, instead, the state uses the other three main types: ideological, 
economic, and military. 
The superimposition of a despotic or infrastructural framework upon the four-
dimensional model (IEMP) offers a means of categorising and comparing different 
forms of statehood over large-scale, macro-historical time-frames (see Table 3 
below).  There are four ideal types (Mann, 1984, p.115; 1993, p.60). 
 
Table 3: Two dimensions of state power 
(Source: Mann, 1993, p.60) 
According to Mann, these four facets is key to understanding the state and its 
complexity, which he refers to in his book, the ‘incoherence’ of state power (2003, 
Jacoby, 2004).  Most authoritarian states264 strive to achieve a balance between 
                                                
 
264 Some theorists argue that authoritarian states are inherently more powerful.  Lucas (1998, p.92) 
names Samuel Huntington as one such theorist and (also) argues in his research that the Nigerian 
military tried to portray itself as a powerful unit by virtue of suppressing individual rights in order to 
achieve socio-economic modernisation for the state.  See Huntington (1968). 
 Infrastructural Power 
Despotic Power Low High 
Low Feudal Bureaucratic-democratic 
High Imperial/absolutist Authoritarian 
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despotic and infrastructural power.  Mann’s (1993) analysis indicates that in weak 
states, the balance between despotic and infrastructural power is not reached and 
there is tension seen due to that.  Mann (1993) points out that while the state co-exist 
with a number of other competing power networks, a weak state is unable to bypass 
these competing networks of power (compared to stronger states) and therefore will 
rely on other networks for cooperation and legitimacy.265  Meanwhile, the more 
infrastructurally strong a weaker state becomes, this poses a threat to despotic power 
as the state “enables civil society parties to control the state” (Mann, 1993, p.69).  
Mann does not discuss this any further.266 
The state power held by a feudal state is considered the weakest, due to the 
feeble despotic and infrastructural powers.  Mann (1993, p.60; 1984, p.115) 
considers this type of state to have existed in medieval Europe, when a medieval king 
could not intervene in social life and had only autonomy over his own private sphere.  
The king had to rely on infrastructures of autonomous lords, the church, and other 
corporate bodies. 
The imperial state has pronounced despotic power and little infrastructural 
power.  This means that it is limited in its ability in penetrating and coordinating civil 
society.  These imperial states need support of some of the other power networks267 to 
rule effectively.  Mann (1984, p.115; 1993, p.60) says that ancient states, such as the 
Akkadian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, and Roman, were similar to this type of 
imperial state. 
The third type of state is the bureaucratic state which has advanced 
infrastructures that are “largely controlled by either capitalists or the democratic 
process” (Mann, 1993, p.60).  He compares this to modern Western liberal states, 
such as the United States of America, where the state is controlled by others and the 
decisions are enforced through the state’s infrastructures. 
                                                
 
265 Mann (1993, p.107-109) shows that the least autonomous states possessed the most infrastructural 
power and the most autonomous states were subject to resistance with regard to social change by the 
elite. 
266 Wiarda (1994, cited in Lucas, 1998) states that the autonomy of despotic power is in constant 
conflict with the need for cooperative arrangements.  See also Kohli, Shue, & Migdal (1994). 
267 Mann contrasts between the state elite and power groups.  State elite includes the personnel in the 
centralised institution of the state.  Power groups which external to the state can be further divided 
into classes (economic), movements (including ideological), and also and military elites. See further 
Mann (1984). 
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The authoritarian states show an “institutionalized form of despotism” (Mann, 
1984, p.116).  This is where the competing power groups use the state’s 
infrastructural reach to enforce their decisions.  Often the competing interest groups 
fight to control the government, instead of attaining political goals.  Mann (1984, 
p.116; 1993, p.60) cites the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and China as possible 
examples. 
Mann (1993, p.9) comes up with his own theory regarding state formation, 
which is discussed in the subsequent section. 
7.1.4 State and Mann’s ‘polymorphous crystallisation model’ 
Mann’s definition of the state is largely influenced by Max Weber (1984, 
p.112; 1993, p.55).  However, unlike Weber, Mann has relaxed the bond between 
political and military power.  Thus, Mann (1993) defines state power as follows: 
The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to 
cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of 




Mann’s definition of the state is institutional (whereby states are recognised 
more by the central location), rather than functional (based on what the state does).  
His central question is “what is the nature of the power possessed by state and state 
elites?” (Mann, 1984, p.112).  With Mann’s division between power groups and state 
elite, the question that then follows is “what is the power of state elites as against the 
power of ideological movements, economic classes, and military elites?” (Mann, 
1984, p.112). 
Mann views the state as “a multiplicity of different institutions” (Goldblatt, 
1995, p.161) that he calls a ‘polymorphous crystallisation’.  By this term, Mann 
(1993) conveys “the ways states crystallize at the centre—but in each case a different 
centre—of a number of power networks” and adds that states “have multiple 
                                                
 
268 Weber’s definition is different in the last phrase and, instead, includes “a monopoly of authoritative 
binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence” (Mann, 1984, 
p.112). 
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institutions, charged with multiple tasks, mobilizing constituencies both through their 
territories and geopolitically” (p.75).  Broadly, five aspects of sociological thoughts 
have on the modern state has influenced Mann’s (1994) theory, they are: Marxism,269 
pluralism,270 elite theory, true elitism and institutional statism271 (p.44; Goldblatt, 
1995, p.161).  He also speaks of the different influences, such as the domestic and 
international economic, ideological, and military powers that ultimately shape the 
crystallisation of the modern state.  Mann’s important empirical finding is in respect 
of the emergence of the early modern European state.  He contends that military 
power has been at the centre of its formation (1993; and Hyslop, 2009). 
Mann (1993, cited in Jacoby, 1994) argues that the state is not a “unitary, self-
seeking, and instrumentally coherent actor” (p.404).  This is because: 
(a) the state is infused with multiple civil interests and is not simply crystallised in 
one particular form, making it ‘polymorphous’; and 
(b) state expansion was the result of a large number of different structures and 
their cooperation272 (Mann, 1993, p.88). 
He speaks of the different influences, such as the domestic and international 
economic, ideological, and military powers, that ultimately shape the crystallisation 
of the modern state.  Each state crystallises differently.  Mann asserts that modern 
Western states are ‘crystallised’ in several principal forms.  He describes six forms of 
crystallisation of modern states.  They are capitalist, militarist, representative, 
territorial, ideological-moral, and patriarchal (Mann, 1993, p.81).  He identifies 
capitalist,273 representative, territorial, and militarist as higher-level (fundamental) 
crystallisations (Mann, 1993, p.81).  Mann (1993) argues that, although the modern 
                                                
 
269 Marxism alone is rejected, as it there is ambiguity on the role of the states. Whether they are 
“independent actors or merely arenas of conflict” (Goldblatt, 1995, p.162). 
270 Pluralism is seen to be ineffective, as it fails to acknowledge the state or parts thereof as 
‘autonomous social actors’ (Goldblatt, 1995, p.162). 
271 Mann (1993) terms this the ‘cock-up theory’, meaning that the formation of the state is purely 
determined by events that one is unable to predict (by luck) and the result of a whole range of 
interconnected decisions. See Mann, (1993, p.44). 
272 See Jacoby (2004) who refers to the state expansions being “promoted by the transnational, 
economic links and changing cultural identities of exploration, colonialism, and de-colonisation as 
part of the ‘complex combination of relative autonomy and symbiotic interdependence’, which 
structures the state-society relationship” (p.404).  
273 What Mann (1993, p.82) describes as a capitalist, is the inter-connection or the power sources in 
creating and maintaining a state committed in preserving the ownership and private property relations. 
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Western states vary in their religion and language, the commonality of these states is 
their ability to modernise “the common capitalist and a more representative national 
and militarist character” (p.82) through the development of the sources of social 
power in order to survive as a state. 
The capitalist form is highlighted through class conflicts and also the 
segmental power actors that dominate.  Mann (1993, p.82) sees the socialist 
opposition as being more of a threat to capitalism than Marx’s argument in relation 
to feudalism. 
The representations form of crystallisation takes into account Robert Dahl’s274 
two democratic preconditions, namely, contestations and participation (Mann, 1993, 
p.83).  Contestation is seen as having come about as a struggle against the 
monarchical despotism.  Participation is the concern regarding which classes (ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic communities) should be permitted public office and even 
state education. 
This question of participation, Mann (1993) says, leads to the ultimate question 
of “how centralized, uniform and ‘national’ should the state be?” (p.84).  He 
highlights that the struggle over centralised and local regional powers is vital when 
analysing state formations275 (Mann, 1993, p.85).  This brings the third form of 
crystallisation, which is how nationalistic and how territorial?  Table 4 below shows 
the principal options available in considering the distribution of power and levels of 
government. 
 
                                                
 
274 Robert Alan Dahl is an American political scientist who, with his book “Democracy and its critics” 
(1989), argues that no modern state meets the ideal democracy.  He comes up with five criteria to 
reach the ideal.  See further Dahl, R.A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. US: Yale University Press. 
275 Mann states that these issues have been mostly ignored by almost all theories of the state except by 
Rokkan.  Stein Rokkan (1921-1979) was a Norwegian politic scientist and sociologist who created a 
series of models for state and nation formations in Europe.  See further Rokkan, S. (1970). Citizens, 
Elections, Parties. Oslo:Universitetforlaget. 
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Table 4: The national questions; central versus local infrastructural power 
(Source: Mann, 1993, p.85) 
With most states in the 18th and 19th centuries increasing their infrastructural 
powers, states with low infrastructural powers are argued to be only evident in the 
pre-modern state (Mann, 1993, p.85).  States where the most amount of infrastructure 
expansion is done by the local-region government, then is a ‘confederal state’.  Mann 
(1993, p.85) gives the 19th century United States as an example of a confederal state, 
where most political functions were carried out by the state and the local 
government, rather than through Washington.  Where the expansion is predominantly 
by the central government, it yields what Mann (1993, p.85) terms a centralised 
nation-state.  He gives post-revolution France as an example of the centralised 
nation-state.  When the expansion of infrastructural power happens evenly, it 
produces a ‘federal nation-state’.  This, Mann (1993, p.85) says, is like imperial 
Germany or the late 20th century United States. 
The fourth higher-level state crystallisation is militarism.  Mann (1993, p.86) 
argues that militarism in the present day is still infused into the state, its fiscal 
politics and citizenship issues.  It is also connected to the two forms of 
crystallisation, representative and national, as military coercion was an obvious 
method to instil one’s beliefs.  Mann (1993) argues that this militarism also “helped 
give a relatively territorial definition to capitalists’ conceptions of interest and to the 
foreign policy of emerging nation-states” (p.86).  This was especially at the 
beginning of the 20th century, with various groups advocating domestic and/or 
geopolitical militarisms for various reasons. 
Mann (1993, p.86-87) says that there is difficulty in developing a general 
theory of the ultimate relations among these four higher-level state crystallisations 
as: 
(a) they would yield 16 possible combinations; 
  Central Government 
 Infrastructural Power Low High 
Low (Pre-modern state) Centralised nation-state  Local 
Government High Confederal state Federal nation-state 
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(b) these states were not fully autonomous, analogous cases; 
(c) all four crystallisations entwined to produce emergent, unanticipated 
consequences that affected each other’s development—‘interaction effects’ 
producing yet more ‘variables’; and 
(d) the impurity of classes, representation, nation-states, and military-civilian 
relations increased as they participated in both domestic and foreign policy . 
Mann’s theory on the formation of the modern state attempts to show that 
states’ formation has the force of shaping classes and nations (Tarrow, 1994, p.1031 
and Goldblatt, 1995, p.165).  This ability is said not to be present in any of the other 
networks of power.  Finally, Mann argues that Western societies from the mid-19th 
century onwards were primarily structured by classes and nation-states and the 
complex intertwining between them (Mann, 1993, p.87 and Gorski, 1995, p.773). 
Mann (1993, p.402-440) is particularly interested in the power of war276 and 
finds that it has the power to transform states and societies.  Gunn, Grummitt & 
Cools (2008) credit Charles Tilly277 and Michael Mann as being the architects of 
developing an all-embracing theory, framework that allows the sociologists to 
analyse the interactions of the different power networks in order to understand state 
and its growth. 
Mann shows that the state is ‘polymorphous’, in that it is able to have different 
roles in its domestic affairs as well as in its geopolitical interactions (Jacoby, 2004). 
7.2 Political Power in Sri Lanka 
Mann’s political power organisation is ‘sociospatially dual’.  Following 
Mann’s form of political power, this section analyses the political power in Sri Lanka 
in terms of both its domestic as well as its international organisation to understand 
                                                
 
276 Tarrow (1994), commenting on Mann’s work, says that “States made war, and war remade states, 
deeply affecting the classes and nations they represented.  War is also the major way in which these 
states related to one another, a theme Mann chooses not to develop fully until his final chapter on 
World War I” (p.1031).  According to Gorski (1995, p.773) Mann finds that World War I was jointly 
caused by the interaction of classes, statesmen, militaries, and nationalist parties and, more 
specifically, from the ‘unintended consequences’ that resulted from their interaction. 
277 See Gunn, Grummitt & Cools (2008) on Tilly’s theory of the state, armies and coercion. 
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the nature of political power that existed or exists in Sri Lanka.  Further, using what 
Mann describes as methods of acquiring a state’s centralised power, this section 
investigates infrastructural and despotic powers in order to understand the extent of 
which, or perhaps both, influenced state power in Sri Lanka. 
7.2.1 Domestic political organisation 
Mann (1986, p.27) says the state can exercise excessive power in a demarcated 
territorial setting when social life supports this.  In this section, the domestic political 
organisation in Sri Lanka is explored from colonial times to the present to understand 
whether the state exercised excessive autonomous power and, if so, how such power 
was exercised. 
British colonisation resulted in the integration of previously separated regions 
of the island and the commencement of a highly centralised colonial state278 
(Bandarage, 2009, p.29).  The British occupation of the Kandyan territories, without 
losing a single soldier and with the British army marching triumphantly to the 
ancient seat of Sinhalese power, guided by its own principal chiefs, shows the nature 
of power the British gained in a short period of time on the island.  However, much 
of this power was gained through the agreement that the British rulers entered with 
the members of the Kandyan feudal-administrative class (Bandarage, 1983, p.49).  
The agreement was the Kandyan Convention, which was signed on 2nd March 1815 
by the British, whereby the British agreed to govern the island according to the 
“customary laws and institutions of the kingdom” (Bandarage, 1983, p.49).  
Although the Bhikkus (the Buddhist monks) were not signatory of the Convention, 
its principal clause was the declaration that the “the religion of the Buddha professed 
by the Chiefs and inhabitants was ‘inviolable’ and its rites, ministers and places of 
                                                
 
278 The British achieved this in several stages.  Between 1795 and 1796, the British captured the series 
of Dutch forts along the sea coast of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon).  By the end of 1795, all the forts, from 
Trincomalee northwards, and southwards up to Kalpitiya, were in British hands.  The Dutch soon also 
abandoned Negombo and withdrew to Colombo.  Colombo also capitulated on 16th February 1796 
and in the terms of capitulation included provisions for the surrender of other Dutch forts on the island 
south of Colombo to the British.  The Maritime Provinces came to be retained by the British 
permanently by the decisions made at the Peace of Amiens, 25th March 1802.  In 1801, the British 
government also took the administration of the island out of the hands of the East India Company and 
made the island a Crown colony.  Finally the British occupied the Kandyan territories (de Silva, 2005, 
p.275-286). 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
Chapter 7 Political Power 153 
worship were to be maintained and protected” (Clause 5, Kandyan Convention).279  
This agreement was paramount for the British to gain the cooperation and support of 
the citizens.280  This is what Mann (1993) describes as the use of ‘authoritative 
power’ to gain the support of the citizens. 
The domestic, political organisation, post–independence, continued to become 
increasingly centralised.  Again, authoritative power was used to legitimise political 
leadership.  In 1948, D.S. Senanayake (during 1947 to 1952) had to decide between 
two versions of nationalism: one, the “narrower sectionalisms of ethnic and religious 
groups” (de Silva, 2005, p.608), and the other, based on the acceptance of the reality 
of a pluralistic majority taking into consideration the interests of both the majority 
and minority parties.  Senanayake’s decision (quoted in de Silva, 2005) 
was a double compromise: the softening of Sinhalese dominance by the 
establishment of an equilibrium of political forces, the keynote of which was 
moderation, and the emphasis on secularism, a refusal to mix state power and 
politics with religion, even though a concept of a special responsibility for 
Buddhism was tactically accepted.  It required D.S. Senanayake’s enormous 
personal prestige and consummate statecraft to make it viable. (p.609) 
de Silva (2005, p.554-555) identifies three points in analysing Senanayake’s 
response to political implications of minority anxiety on Sri Lanka’s development as 
an independent state.  First, were the guarantees preventing discrimination 
incorporated into the Soulbury Constitution of 1944, which was a D.S. Senanayake 
initiative.  The second was the formation of the UNP designed to make a fresh start 
in politics in the direction of moderate opinion.  It was to be a political party 
necessarily representative of the majority, but acceptable to the minorities.  Thirdly, 
he resisted attempts to abandon the concept of a secular state in preference for the 
principle of the state’s religious neutrality.  This type of governance helped unite the 
                                                
 
279 See further, The Proclamation of 2nd March 1815 or the Kandyan Convention in A Revised Edition 
of the Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Vol.1 (Colombo: Government Printer, 1923), pp.59-60. 
280 Interestingly, the Kandyan interests that the British promised to uphold began to come into conflict 
with European capitalist interests (Bandarage, 1983, p.50).  Nissan & Stirrat (1990, p.29) argue that, 
in order to get out of these agreements, British rulers went on to formalise cultural differences and 
made this the basis for social organisation and political representation. 
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state into a strong, centralised, political force gaining the support of all individuals 
and groups.281 
However, this type of nationalism was short lived in Sri Lanka.  Economic 
pressures,282 coupled with the island-wide Buddha Jayanthi celebrations to mark the 
2,500th year of Buddha’s birth (de Silva, 2005, p.616), saw the emergence of a bi-
polar, electoral system.  The SLFP (who was the opposition party at the time) sought 
a “welfare statist policies and state intervention in the management of the economy” 
(Jayasuriya, 1989:11).  They were also openly expressing strong Sinhala nationalistic 
sentiments, which helped them to gain the support of rural-urban voters (consisting 
largely the working class and lower middle class. Further the SLFP sought a 
coalition with some elements representing the left and formed an electoral alliance 
with it as well as with certain extreme Sinhalese nationalist elements (Jayasuriya, 
1989).283  The SLFP and its new republican constitution of 1972 was “in many ways 
a symbolic assertion of nationalism”284 (de Silva, 1977, p.11).  One of its central 
features  was national State Assembly and the power it held in the domains of  
legislative, executive, and judicial (Zafrullah, 1981, p.20).  Jayasuriya (1989, p.14) 
argue that this constitution established a ‘legitimised dictatorship’ of parliament.  
What becomes evident during this period is that political power was increased 
through increased centralisation and the support of different interest groups, 
primarily the majority Sinhalese population. 
                                                
 
281 de Silva (2005, p.609), however, argues that D.S. Senanayake’s concept of nationalism was still 
flawed as it remained to be largely elitist and had little popular support extending beyond the political 
establishment. 
282 Such as the problems of terms of trade, the decline in prices of rubber, and the world shortage in 
rice production.  See Chapter 5 on Economic Power. 
283 de Silva (2005) observes that one of the immediate consequences of the transformation was that the 
concept of a multiracial polity was no longer politically viable in Sri Lanka.  In the Sinhala language, 
“the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous and a multi-cultural or multi-
communal nation or state was incomprehensible to the popular mind.  The emphasis on the sense of 
uniqueness of the Sinhalese past and the focus on Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhalese and the 
country in which Buddhism stood forth in its purest form, carried an emotional appeal compared with 
which a multicultural polity was a meaningless abstraction” (p.626). 
284 The new constitution gave Buddhism the foremost place with the state obliged to protect the 
religion, meanwhile section 18(i)(d) ensured that the other religions continued to secure their rights to 
practice freely In the island.  With that provision Sri Lanka ceased to be secular state, although it did 
not become a theocratic state.  While the Roman Catholics did not oppose the move, the indigenous 
Tamils saw the provision on religion and recognising Sinhala as the state language “with a distinctly 
inferior and hazy position accorded to Tamil[s]’ (de Silva, 2005). 
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Although the change of regime in 1977 saw the re-emergence of the UNP 
(1977-1994) into power, and the inclusion of Tamil and Muslim minorities through 
various concessions,285 the numerous constitutional reforms that took place radically 
increased political power to a few state elites (de Silva, 2005, p.681).  The new 
government’s first acts included introducing a radically different constitutional 
structure, converting the Westminster–style parliamentary government that was in 
existence to a presidential system, which saw the installation of the president in 
office for a six-year term once elected, with a two term limit.  The new constitution 
virtually transferred those powers to the executive president.286  The executive 
president gain unlimited powers other than the parliaments right in regard to 
appropriations.  Other features of the new constitution were the introduction of a 
referendum and proportionate representation.  Wilson (1988) described this type of 
governance as a ‘Bonapartist state’.  Although the new government included the 
interests of minority groups, the legislative reforms, and especially the new 
constitution, sought to instil more power to a few state elite, especially the president. 
This type of exceedingly centralised and excessively autonomous, domestic, 
political organisation continued in Sri Lanka despite the 1994 elections.  Jayasuriya 
(2005, p.27) says that the issues that were highlighted in the 1994 election consisted 
of the peoples concerns with regard to the widespread corruption and petty patronage 
and the war between the state and the LTTE. Chandrika Kumaratunga (the new 
leader of the SLFP) was viewed as a leader with clear and transparent objectives, 
especially the pursuit of policies aimed at reconciliation with the Tamil people.  This 
was partly due to her deep personal and moral commitment shown for peace and 
reconciliation with the Tamil people (Jayasuriya, 2005, p.48).  Kumaratunga’s 
convictions allowed her to win the presidential election with the highest percentage 
of votes received by a candidate at a presidential election, winning 62.28% of the 
votes.  Despite the confronting issues raised during the election, on the political 
                                                
 
285 Such as declaring that Sinhalese and Tamil would be the national languages, with Sinhala 
remaining as the official language, removing the distinction between Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian 
Tamils and giving ‘stateless’ persons all of the civil rights of citizens of the country. 
286 The raison d’être of the new government was necessarily to achieve economic development and 
stability in the process of modernisation.  In order to achieve this task, the government engaged in and 
implemented economic doctrines followed by the western more developed states. Further they heavily 
relied on foreign aid to achieve the necessary economic developments.  The 1978 constitution acted as 
the chief facilitator in implementing the new policies (Jayasuriya, 2005, p.17). 
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front, the nature of power exercised by the state and the state elite remained intact.  
As Jayasuriya (2005) stated that the main issues of corruption and abuse of power 
remained unchanged. 
Domestic, political organisation in Sri Lanka shows that the state, with the 
support of different interest groups and institutions, was able to exercise unduly 
autonomous power from the time of colonial rule to the present.  The British initially 
sought to make promises to gain the support of the Kandyan feudal administrators.  
Following independence, the Senanayake government was able to gain popular 
support through the involvement of both ethnic groups.  The emergence of a bi-polar, 
electoral system saw the Bandaranaike government gaining political power by 
promoting the interests of the majority population.  The UNP government, which 
was more sympathetic to the minorities, was elected amidst a period of great ethnic 
tension.  It utilised its support to make radical legislative changes.287  This saw 
disproportionate political power resting with the state elite, notably the president, 
through the establishment of the executive presidency system.  This meant that 
power was increasingly centralised and largely controlled by the president.  
Interestingly, subsequent governments never abolished the executive presidency, 
although this continued to be a contentious issue during each election.  The domestic, 
political organisation in Sri Lanka has become increasingly centralised with the 
president of the country gaining excessive power.  Authoritative power has been 
gained over time through the cooperation of different interests groups, thereby 
ensuring the necessary level of support. 
7.2.2 Geopolitical diplomacy 
Mann (1986) emphasises the importance of interstate relations through his 
second form of political power organisation, which he calls ‘geopolitical diplomacy’.  
He stresses its significance by stating that the “deep-rooted, multistate diplomatic 
civilization of Europe” (Mann, 1986, p.27) was the leading driver of the overall 
social stratification in the successive, hegemonic and despotic pretensions of the 
German, Spanish, and French emperors, rather than the states actual strengths.  This 
                                                
 
287 For example, the new Presidential system of government, the new 1978 Constitution and the 
creation of an executive Presidency, along with the creation of economic liberalisation programmes.  
See, generally, chapter 5.2.3. 
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section will, therefore, analyse Sri Lanka’s interstate relations and comment on the 
overall social stratification. 
Analysis of the interstate relations by the Sri Lankan state suggests that it failed 
to successfully manage its foreign relations.  This inevitably put increasing pressure 
on the state and the state elite to maintain support by its citizens.  Two factors that 
stress this failure are the relations and certain confrontations with its closest 
neighbouring state, India, and the success by the LTTE in creating and maintaining 
an extensive, international support network for a number of decades. 
Sri Lanka has always had a strong link with her close neighbour, India.  The 
historical connection, coupled by the proximity288 of the two states, and the 60 
million ethnic Tamils in India (Ahmed, 1996, p.258), linked the nations together.  
The relationship took a new turn with the conflict in Sri Lanka.  Violence in Sri 
Lanka saw a large influx of refugees across the Palk Straits to India between 1984 
and 1986 (Chadda, 1997, p.151).  The Indian government felt the need to exert 
pressure on the Sri Lankan government to resolve the internal conflict, due to the 
possible effect it would have on its own ethnic minority issues (Otis, 1988, p.263).  
Later, the assassination by the LTTE of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of 
India, in 1991 further heightened its involvement in Sri Lankan affairs.  This incident 
served to strengthen India’s support of Sri Lankan efforts to contain the LTTE 
insurgency.  For India, the internal pressures from Tamil Nadu and India’s geo-
strategic concerns overpowered any regard that India had for Sri Lanka’s territorial 
and administrative integrity289 (Lyon, 1999, p.92-93). 
For the Sri Lankans, the presence of over 80 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu 
made them an increasingly communally-conscious-oriented group.  The proximity of 
its powerful neighbour was of continuous concern to the government of Sri Lanka.  
In an effort to repair relations with India, Sri Lanka was forced to engage in talks that 
resulted in the signing of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord290 (Lyon, 1999; Otis, 
                                                
 
288 India is less than 30 miles to the north of Sri Lanka. 
289 See Weisman (1987), who speaks of India airlifting 25 tonnes of (supposedly) relief supplies in 
early June 1987 to the north of the island, despite the Sri Lankan government’s refusal and denial of 
any supplies. 
290 However, the accord was flawed in the sense that Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa did not 
sign it, as he believed that it was a violation of the country’s sovereignty (Lyon, 1999, p.94). 
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1988).  This resulted in 50,000291 Indian military personnel being placed in the 
northern provinces to help curb the LTTE (Otis, 1988, p.256).  However, relations 
between the two states remained strained, as even the withdrawal of the IPKF was 
contentious. 
The failure of the Sri Lankan state to maintain good interstate relations is 
further displayed through the support that the LTTE organisation was able to foster 
from the large Tamil expatriate communities living in Europe, Canada, the United 
States of America, and other nations.292  Kodikara (1989, p.718) argues that, in the 
early 1980s, the RAW, which is an Indian intelligence agency, provided the LTTE 
with training facilities, safe sanctuary, political bases, and military supplies.293  As 
Modelski (1964) says, external actors were able to “[strengthen] the hands of the 
insurgents, [build] up their moral, [keep] up their hope” (p.31).  This held true in the 
Sri Lankan context.  The extensive LTTE international network allowed it to build a 
strong force and engage in military fighting with Sri Lankan security forces for 
nearly three decades.294 
Geopolitical organisation became increasingly important in Sri Lanka with the 
escalation of the Sri Lankan conflict.  It could be argued that the conflict was able to 
proceed for such a long time, and to the extent that it did, partly as a result of the 
failed management of interstate relations on the part of the Sri Lankan state.  The 
proximity of India, with its strong support-base for the Tamil minority, also 
enhanced the insecurity felt by the majority Sinhalese population.  The strong LTTE 
organisation, or arguably the weak Sri Lankan geopolitical diplomacy, meant that the 
state’s sovereignty came to be challenged, enhancing Mann’s contention regarding 
the importance of geopolitical organisation. 
                                                
 
291 The exact number has been disputed by both parties.  It is rumoured to be much higher.  
Allegations were also made that 100,000 IPKF personnel were on the island, which was contrary to 
the agreed 50,000. 
292 Both domestic elites (movement and regime leaders) and international actors contribute to the 
development of a mature ethnic consciousness.  See further  Young, F. (1966). A Proposal for 
Cooperative Cross-Cultural Research on Intervillage Systems. Human Organization, 25, 46-50.  This 
is what Benedict Anderson has termed ‘long-distance nationalism’ (in Imagine Communities). 
293 See further Narayan Swamy, M.R. (2008). Inside and Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran. Colombo: 
Vijitha Yapa Publications, pp. 89-93. 
294 See further Chapter 6 on Military Power. 
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7.2.3 Despotic power 
Despotic power is one manner in which the government is able to acquire and 
exercise political power (Mann, 1986; Agnew, 2005, p.442).  The elite of society 
exercise this type of power over the rest of the citizens, facilitated by the centralised 
state.  This section will consider whether the elite in Sri Lanka exercised any power 
over civil society. 
Looking at the political elite in Sri Lanka, the majority of them consisted of the 
bourgeois class that was established during British rule295 (Guneratne, 2008, p.102).  
Allan (1980, p.112) argues that, in Sri Lanka, the struggle for power consisted of a 
multitude of factors.  Namely, the elite waged power struggles and often reflected the 
sentiments of the masses to gain support.  Frequently, the elites resorted to 
manipulating the masses in accentuating their needs and fears.296  Importantly, the 
struggle for power was entwined with both the economic and ideological aspects.297  
Kearney (1964) explains that Sinhalese nationalism, in the decade following 
independence was a reaction against the Westernised upper classes by the “small 
Sinhalese-educated intelligentsia of writers, school teachers, and bhikkus” (p.128).  
The post-independent UNP government of 1948 consisted of members of this 
Westernised elite (Kearney, 1964, p.127).  S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (leader of he 
SLFP party and the succeeding president in the 1950s), who also came from a 
privileged, elite background, successfully managed to gain the support of the masses 
by appearing to “speak with his people, not to them” (Allan, 1980, p.112).  Similar 
elite leadership was mostly seen in Sri Lankan politics. 
Interestingly, the bourgeois class, or the upper classes in Sri Lankan society, 
did not control the leadership of the two main dissident groups in Sri Lanka, namely, 
                                                
 
295 See Guneratne (2008), where he says that “the bourgeois class in Sri Lanka has its origins in the 
social and economic transformations wrought by colonialism.  The colonial economy provided 
opportunities to entrepreneurs from hitherto undistinguished families to enrich themselves and join 
those members of the old aristocracy who had also prospered under British rule—to paraphrase 
Kumari Jayawardena (2000), nobodies became somebodies” (p.102).  See further Jayawardena, K. V. 
(2000). Nobodies to Somebodies: The Rise of the Colonial Bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Social 
Scientists’ Association and Sanjiva Books. 
296 See further, Allan (1980, p.109), where he discusses the discriminatory legislations that followed 
after fears that were instilled on the masses by the local elite. 
297 This idea is closely linked to the use of ethnicity to overrule old class relations.  See further 
Cheran, R. (2000). Changing formations: Tamil nationalism and national liberation in Sri Lanka and 
the disapora (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Canada: York University. 
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the LTTE and the JVP.  The leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakran was born to a 
middle-class Hindu family in Jaffna (Swamy, 2008, p.19).  He was part of the 
Karaiyar caste, considered to be of the lower caste denomination within the East 
Coast Tamils (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 1989, p.609).  The LTTE spokesperson, 
Anton Balasingham, speaking of the LTTE and its struggle, commented that the 
“bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie” (Balasingham, 2004) dominated traditional 
Tamil parliamentary, political parties and that these political parties were founded on 
a conservative ideology (Balasingham, 2004). Equally, members of the JVP 
consisted mainly of the lower caste Sinhalese (Jiggins, 1979; Bandarage, 2009). 
The above analysis indicates that one of the methods by which the 
governmental apparatus acquired political power was by virtue of strong, despotic 
power in Sri Lanka.  In Sri Lanka, the state elite comprise mainly old caste or class 
elites.  The political elite have a strong hold on the state and execution of state 
policy.  The membership and leadership of the two main opposing groups, the LTTE 
and the JVP, further enhance this. 
7.2.4 Infrastructural power 
Mann (1984, p.117) describes infrastructural power as methods by which the 
state penetrates social life.  He argues that strong states are able to lock in more 
social relations within their territorial boundaries through the increased involvement 
in society’s everyday life (Mann, 1993, p.59).  Whether the Sri Lankan state 
succeeded in penetrating social life will be considered. 
The Sri Lankan state is seen to have only moderately penetrated social life.  
While it succeeded in encouraging a high literacy rate amongst its population 
through the free education system (through public schools and universities around 
the island), the state failed to guarantee employment to those who successfully 
completed their studies in the public sector.298  The state has, as highlighted by Mann, 
provided its citizens with its own currency299 and adopted the universally accepted 
system of weights and measures.  However, analysis of economic policies300 indicates 
                                                
 
298 See discussion of the JVP in Chapter 6, Military Power. 
299 The Sri Lankan rupee (SLR). 
300 As discussed in Chapter 5 on Economic Power. 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
Chapter 7 Political Power 161 
that involvement of the population in the economy has been weak.  Finally, both the 
communication and transport system in Sri Lanka is partially privatised and, 
although the majority of the population utilises public transport, the standard of this 
service leaves much to be desired. 
Infrastructural power, according to Mann (1984, p.117), promotes social 
development and increases collective social mobilisation of resources.  The situation 
in Sri Lanka does not suggest that the state exercised a strong infrastructural power.  
However, as Otis (1988) argues, the state successfully penetrated social life through 
the following means: identity, territory, religion, language, economics, and politics.301  
Therefore, the Sri Lankan state is seen to have infiltrated social life and exercised a 
strong hold on political power.  Based on this argument, it is concluded that Sri 
Lanka resembles an authoritarian state (as described by Mann, 1984, p.115 & 1993, 
p.60), where both despotic and infrastructural powers are high.  It is also concluded 
that Mann’s contention that interest groups compete to control the government, 
rather than to attain political goals, also holds true in Sri Lanka. 
7.2.5 Mann’s political power and Sri Lanka 
The above study of political power in Sri Lanka, utilising Mann’s theory, 
revealed five main features.  First, looking at the domestic, political organisation 
from British colonial times to the present showed that, over time, political power 
became increasingly centralised.  The final straw was the 1978 constitution, which 
introduced the executive presidency, vesting extensive and unlimited powers in the 
president above and over the elected parliament.  Equally, the state elite used, what 
Mann describes as, ‘authoritative power’ to ensure cooperation from different 
interest groups.  Second, although interstate relations are paramount to states, Sri 
Lanka’s relationship with its closest neighbour, India, and the ability of the LTTE 
organisation to build an extensive, international network highlight the state’s failure 
to manage its geopolitical diplomacy.  Third, looking at the methods in which the 
government of Sri Lanka acquired political power reveals the strong connection 
between the political elite and the old caste or class elites on the island.  The 
                                                
 
301 Most of these have been discussed in previous chapters.  Particularly important is Chapter 4 on 
Ideological Power, as the state’s penetration to social life is argued to be mainly through ideological 
means. 
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membership and leadership of the two main opposing groups, the JVP and the LTTE, 
being from the lower castes or classes, further emphasise the strong, despotic power 
structure that exists in Sri Lanka.  Fourth, infrastructure power, based on a strict 
application of Mann’s theory, reveals that the state exercised weak to moderate 
infrastructural power in Sri Lanka, due to its failure to infiltrate social life through 
social development and mobilisation of resources.  However, in defining political 
power, Mann highlights that other power sources are able to transcend the 
centralised, political structure (Mann, 1986, p.27).  In this respect, it is argued that 
infrastructural power was actually high in Sri Lanka by virtue of the state’s 
successful penetration into social life through the use of other power sources, 
especially that of ideology.  Based on this argument, it is concluded that the state 
took the form of, what Mann describes as, an authoritarian state, with high levels of 
despotic and infrastructural powers. 
7.3 The Formation of the Modern State of Sri Lanka 
Mann’s modern Western states are ‘crystallised’ utilising several different 
forms of crystallisations (1993, p.81).  While he argues that each state is unique in its 
crystallisation, they are all influenced by the other three sources of power.  This 
section will look at the Sri Lankan state in light of Mann’s principal forms of 
crystallisations to understand some of the influences that shaped the state of Ceylon 
(later Sri Lanka). 
The colonisation of the island by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British made a 
lasting impression in the makeup of the island.  While the Portuguese and Dutch had 
influenced economics, religion, and language on the island, their main interests were 
military302 and commercial (de Silva, 1986; Kearney, 1967).  Originally, the British 
occupation of Sri Lanka was purely strategic, as its objective was to avoid a possible 
transfer of the island to the French by the Dutch during the Napoleonic wars.  
However, the British soon discovered its commercial potential and sought to open 
                                                
 
302 To enhance the military connections to the country, the Portuguese encouraged intermarriage 
between the European and native populations.  The processes of intermarriage lead to the 
development of an anglicised Portuguese-native language (for example, Portuguese-Sinhala, 
Portuguese-Tamil and Portuguese-Malay) bilingual population.  See further, Perera, R. A. (2003). 
Language ideology in a nation in transition: The Implication of peace in Sri Lanka (Unpublished 
Masters dissertation). USA: California State University. 
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the upcountry to capitalist development (Bandarage, 2009, p.29).  To achieve its 
goals, Britain introduced new policies that contributed to ethno-religious competition 
and stratification amongst the population (Bandarage, 1983).  The administration of 
the island was highly centralised and political control was based in the capital city of 
Colombo (Bandarage, 2009, p.29).  Later, the British introduced several democratic 
elements to Sri Lanka.  These included self-government through the introduction of 
territorially-based representation,303 universal suffrage in 1931,304 and the Soulbury 
Constitution.  However, in spite of the democratic elements, the island remained 
ethnically divided through the favouritism shown by the British to the semi-European 
Burgher305 population and some castes or classes.306  The capitalist interests of the 
British surpassed any of the other higher-level crystallisations that Mann (1993) 
describes in the formation of the state at the time. 
Following independence, the British left behind a “Sinhala-Tamil inter-
communal elite” (de Silva, 1986, p.17).  The ethnic competition, which surfaced at 
the time of territorial-based representation, escalated by the time of the Soulbury 
Constitution.  The first parliament of independent Sri Lanka consisted of D.S. 
Senanayake (a Sinhalese), as the prime minister, and prominent Tamil leaders, such 
as Ponnambalam and Arunachalam Mahadeva, in the cabinet.  However, the 
Westminster model of parliamentary democracy meant that political groups could 
form governments without the support of minority groups.  This meant that 
subsequent elections were marked by majoritarian politics.  S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
and his SLFP offered to “change the colonial social order and bring social justice, 
dignity, and self-respect for the Sinhalese Buddhist masses” (Bandarage, 2009, p.41).  
                                                
 
303 This was the first sign of political democracy on the island.  The first election of the Legislative 
Council was in 1921 and showed the first signs of a possible ethnic issue with the importance of 
numerical strength (that is, Sinhalese representation) becoming prevalent.  See further, Bandarage 
(2009). 
304 Universal suffrage was introduced following the Donoughmore Commission and Ceylon became 
one of the earliest British colonies to promote the vote for both men and women, and the working 
classes (Bandarage, 2009, p.35). 
305 Burghers are the mixed Dutch-Sinhalese people. 
306 Appointments to administrative posts were from the Mudaliyar classes, who had access to an 
English education.  Under the Dutch, Mudaliyars were appointed from castes such as Salagamas 
(Sinhala caste) and they continued under the British.  So did other castes like the Karawas, who 
enjoyed military captaincies under the Portuguese and throughout British times.  Tamil appointees to 
high office were always from the Vellala caste.  The main grievance of the Sinhalese was the 
favouritism shown by the British administration to the minority Tamils in the administration.  Junior 
administration was monopolised by Tamils from Jaffna. 
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He succeeded in winning the elections with the aid of the Buddhist Jayanti307 
celebrations that were taking place at the time of the elections (de Silva, 1981, 
p.517).  The independent state of Sri Lanka saw a growing rise in the importance of 
ideology and religion in the formation of government.  The majoritarian politics 
meant that support was gained through the use of ideology.  While other forms of 
crystallisation (such as capitalist, representative, and territorial) were still important 
in the succeeding governments, the main form of crystallisation was that of ideology. 
The economic failures by the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government308 meant that 
J.R. Jayewardene’s UNP government came into power in 1977 with overwhelming 
support by all communities, based on the economic development that the party 
promised (Bandarage, 2009, p.77).  The new constitution brought in a powerful 
executive presidency, limiting the powers of the parliament.  The free-market 
economy led to increased inequality and poverty that affected all ethnic, regional, 
and class divides (Bandarage, 2009, p.77).  Again, the interest of the government and 
the state elites was primarily based on the economy.  The state utilised mainly a 
capitalist form of crystallisation.  The growing class divides and the growing 
dissatisfaction in the political elites again led to the use of ideology to gain support.  
The subsequent government formed by the PA, re-utilised the Buddhist Sinhalese 
ideology as the basis for gaining the support of the masses.  Further, in 2009, the 
Rajapaksa government engaged in active military combat against the LTTE to 
implement its policies. 
The state of Sri Lanka, as it is now known, has been shaped by a number of 
different forms of crystallisations.  Its history shows that some forms of 
crystallisation took precedence over others at times, however, the primary form 
seems to have been that of ideology and capitalist forms of crystallisation.  No doubt, 
these have been instrumental in Sri Lanka shaping its classes and the nation on the 
whole. 
                                                
 
307 This is the Buddhist celebration of 2,500 years since the death of Lord Buddha.  This was also a 
time in Sri Lanka when there was a mass movement to restore the island’s historical legacy as the 
island of the Sinhalese and the island of the Buddha’s teaching. 
308 Sirimavo Bandaranaike (wife of assassinated S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike) was sworn the prime 
minister of the country in 1960.  Her socialist, economic policies resulted in discontent amongst both 
the Sinhalese and Tamil communities.  See Chapter 5 on Economic Power. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
Political power, for Mann, is the same as state power.  It is derived “from the 
usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects 
of social relations” (Mann, 1986, p.26).  His discussion of political power highlights 
two main aspects.  The first is the organisation of such power, which he describes as 
“sociospatially dual” (Mann, 1986, p.27).  The domestic political organisation is one 
that is territorially centralised and territorially bounded, enabling those in power to 
attain excessive autonomous power in the demarcated area.  The geopolitical 
diplomacy highlights the interconnectedness of states and the effect that that has on 
the overall social stratification of the state.  The second aspect of Mann’s discussion 
of political power is the methods by which the state acquires and uses centralised 
power, namely despotic and infrastructural power.  While despotic power is 
exercised by the state elite, infrastructural power is the type of power that the state 
gains by penetrating social life through various infrastructures.  While Max Weber 
largely influences Mann’s definition of the state, Mann speaks of the formation of 
the state as a ‘polymorphous crystallisation’, where various forms of crystallisation 
are shaped, based on the multitude of interests and influences.  His theory on the 
formation of the state highlights the uniqueness of each state and the situation that 
led to its creation.  
Analysing Sri Lanka’s political power and state formation, based on Mann’s 
theory, highlights three realities.  First, political power was highly centralised in all 
aspects.  From British colonial rule to the present, administration of the island was 
brought into a central place and eventually, through the 1978 constitution, to one 
person, the executive president.  Equally, those controlling the state remained 
members of the traditional caste or class elite.  Second, investigation of the state to 
gain penetrative power to social life through the provision of infrastructure indicated 
that the Sri Lankan state did not exhibit high, infrastructural power as described by 
Mann.  However, the transcendent nature of the other power sources meant that the 
political elite were able to penetrate social life, especially through the use (arguably, 
the abuse) of ideology extensively.  This is further emphasised by the third and final 
reality that influenced the present Sri Lankan state, namely that there were primarily 
two major forms of crystallisation.  In colonial times, the capital form of 
crystallisation was the most important.  However, following independence, the 
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majoritarian politics saw ideology becoming an important factor in state formation.  
These two forms continued to take precedence, thereby still shaping the classes and 
the nation at the present time. 
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CHAPTER 8 INTERCONNECTIONS 
This chapter will look at the interconnections between Mann’s four- 
dimensional framework of social power.  It analyses Sri Lanka’s state formation with 
particular reference to the forces that influenced the conflict between the Sri Lankan 
state and the LTTE organisation.  The chapter is divided into three sections.  The first 
section will consider Mann’s framework of social power.  The second section will 
highlight the key findings from Sri Lanka that were drawn from the analysis of the 
four social powers in Chapter 4 to Chapter 7 inclusive.  The third section will 
consider Mann’s overall model, in the context of Sri Lanka, to explore the 
development of the Sri Lankan state and the issue of the LTTE.  Mann’s model will 
be tested to see its adequacy in explaining Sri Lanka’s social development. 
8.1 Mann’s Four-dimensional Model of Social Power 
8.1.1 Overall IEMP model 
Mann (1986) highlights the difficulty in developing a theory about societies.  
He says, “human societies are inherently messy” (p.30).  For this reason, his theory 
focuses on social power.  He provides the following framework: 
We start with humans pursuing goals.  I don‘t mean by this that their goals are 
‘presocial’ – rather that what the goals are, and how they are created, is not 
relevant for what follows.  Goal-oriented people form a multiplicity of social 
relationships too complex for any general theory.  However, relationships 
around the most powerful organizational means coalesce to form broad 
institutional networks of determinate, stable shape, combining both intensive 
and extensive power and authoritative and diffused power.  There are, I suggest 
four such major sources of social power, each centered on a different means of 
organization.  Pressures toward institutionalization tend to partially merge them 
in turn into one or more dominant power networks.  These provide the highest 
degree of boundedness that we find in social life, though this is far from total.  
Many networks remain interstitial both to the four power sources and to the 
dominant configurations; similarly, important aspects of the four power sources 
also remain poorly institutionalized into the dominant configurations.  These 
two sources of interstitial interaction eventually produce a more powerful 
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emergent network, centered on one or more of the four power sources, and 
induce a reorganization of social life and a new dominant configuration.  And so 
the historical process continues. (Mann, 1986, p.30) 
Mann (1986, p.518) argues that the interrelation of the four sources of social 
power provide an overall account of social development.  He presents his overall 
model in a summary, diagrammatic form.  See Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Causal IEMP model of organised power 
(Source: Mann, 1986, p.29) 
These four sources of social power are distinctive forms of sociospatial 
organisation, through which humans can achieve a broad, but not exhaustive, 
package of their myriad goals (Mann, 1986, p.28).  The broken lines in the diagram 
above indicate the messiness of human societies that Mann speaks of.  Therefore, in 
addition to his argument that no definite theory can be made on human societies, he 
adds that any theory that follows this model can “only encompass some of their 
broadest contours” (Mann, 1986, p.30). 
The main shapes that Mann identifies are transcendent or immanent (from 
ideological power), circuits of praxis (economic), concentrated-coercive (military), 
and centralised-territorial and geopolitical, diplomatic (political) organisation (Mann, 
1986, p.28).  These, he says, are ‘promiscuous’ as they are drawn from and structure 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
Chapter 8 Interconnections 169 
a wide area of social life (Mann, 1986, p.28).  He sums up by stating that these 
sources of social powers are only the ideal types,309 each attaining an “intermittent 
existence as distinct organisations within the division of labour” (Mann, 1986, p.28) 
and one or more of these sources may have more influence at any one time in 
shaping social life (Mann, 1986, p.28 & 518).  Further, each of these organisational 
powers can be turned into any one of the others.  He concludes by stating that there is 
no obvious, formulaic, general patterning of the interrelations of power sources 
(Mann, 1986, p.523).  In summarising his overall model, Mann (1986) says that: 
A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be 
given in terms of the interrelations of what I call the four sources of social 
power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships.  
These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions, levels, 
or factors of a single social totality.  This follows from my first statement.  (2) 
They are also organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. (p.2) 
8.1.2 Four power sources and their roles highlighted 
This section will highlight the principle features of Mann’s four sources of 
social power. 
Mann’s ideological power offers two distinct means.  The first is transcendent, 
where social authority is gained through some divinely granted manner.  Mann 
(1986) describes this quality as “the essence of either humanity itself or at least of 
humans presently divided by ‘secular’ organizations of economic, military, and 
political power” (p.519).  The second is what he terms immanence.  This is where 
groups reinforce their solidarity through some form of internal morale brought about 
by the use of common ritual and aesthetic practices.  These two forms are different 
and are seen to often oppose each other.  Mann (1986) states that where “ideological 
movements combined elements of both, contradictions were set up with immense 
implications for social development”310 (p.519-520). 
                                                
 
309 Mann (1986, p.523) states that the four power sources are distinctive organisation means that are 
useful to social development.  However, each of them presupposes the existence and interconnections 
of the others to varying degrees.  In reality, they are rarely pure and, therefore, these are only ‘ideal 
types’. 
310 Mann (1986, chapters 12 and 13) has attributed the dynamism of European civilisation to the 
contradictions that ensued between the transcendent salvation and the immanent class morale of the 
medieval lords, which, he says, were both fuelled by Christianity. 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
170  Chapter 8 Interconnections 
Economic power incorporates two areas of social activity.  The first is what 
Marx called the praxis, which is the “intervention of human beings in nature through 
labor” (Mann, 1986, p.28) where it is characteristically intensive.  The second is the 
extensive form, which is when goods are circulated, exchanged, and consumed.  
While economic power enables the access of people in their everyday lives, the 
weakness of economic power relations lead to social classes and class struggles.  
Mann (1986) argues, “economic power and social classes are reorganized principally 
by the structures of military or ideological power”311 (p. 520). 
Military power is essentially concentrated coercion to attain social cooperation.  
This type of power is also used during peacetime “where forms of social cooperation 
can be socially and geographically concentrated, there is a potential for increasing its 
yields by intensifying coercion”312 (Mann, 1986, p.520).  Mann’s argument is that 
militarist empires used this type of power to foster social and economic development 
(Mann, 1986, p.521). 
Political power originates from the need for centralised, institutionalised, and 
territorialised regulation of social relations (Mann, 1986, p.26).  This leads to 
dominant social groups (which ultimately becomes the state elite) in pursuit of their 
goals to exercise this form of power.  The state gains this form of power either 
through infrastructural means or through the use of despotic powers.  Mann (1986) 
argues that “the state’s central strength is also its weakness: lack of penetrative 
powers into the decentralized reaches of civil society” (p.521).  He splits political 
organisation into two categories, domestic and geopolitical diplomacy. 
                                                
 
311 Mann (1986, chapters 5, 8, and 9) identifies norms that have been established predominantly by 
military pacification that he calls ‘compulsory cooperation’.  Then, in chapters 11 and 12 (Mann, 
1986), he identifies others that have been established predominantly through normative pacifications, 
that is, through the transcendent norms of an ideological power movement (Mann, 1986, p.520). 
312 In chapters 5, 8, and 9, Mann (1986) discusses several ancient empires.  He shows the ‘compulsory 
cooperation’ that was used as a means of controlling societies and increasing their collective powers 
by intensifying the exploitation of concentrated pockets of labour (Mann, 1986, p.521). 
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8.2 Sri Lanka and the Four Sources of Power 
Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, inclusive, analysed the four sources of power as pure 
forms within the Sri Lankan context.  The general aim was to understand the various 
influences that culminated in the formation of the state and the conflict between the 
Sri Lankan state and the LTTE.  This section will recap the essential points that were 
drawn from the findings in the earlier chapters. 
8.2.1 Ideological power in Sri Lanka 
The study of Sri Lanka showed that both means of ideological power were 
applied in achieving various goals.  The transformation of Buddhism as a 
transcendent power had numerous implications.  Firstly, as a transcendent power, it 
united the previously divided Sinhalese communities with the divine purpose of 
ensuring the protection of Buddhism (allegedly) within this sacred Buddhist island.  
Secondly, it gave the members of the Sinhalese Buddhist community a legitimate 
social need and, therefore, a right to openly demand from its rulers the protection of 
Buddhist philosophy and culture.  Finally, the religious-ethnic revival movement that 
ensued resulted in it being embraced by the political elite and the state.  The intimate 
connection between Buddhism and the state continues to date. 
The second means of ideological power came into effect almost as a reaction to 
Buddhism becoming a transcendent power.  A sense of competition between the 
ethnic groups emerged that led to each group using this means of power to strengthen 
the internal morale of its group.  Two developments were observed following this 
development.  Firstly, there arose a strong, Sinhalese, ethnic group utilising language 
and religion as its main draw cards to ensure solidarity and cohesion within the 
group.  Secondly, in competition, a strong Tamil group emerged, also emphasising 
religion and language, but which later developed new symbols to foster support, such 
as a separate homeland and some unique rituals. 
The combination of both of these means of ideological power, during a short 
period of time in Sri Lankan society, meant that competing ideologies and ethnicities 
tore into the development of the state.  Ideology became an important source of 
power in state formation following independence.  It remains so to the present. 
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8.2.2 Economic power 
The application of Mann’s theory of economic power suggests that the 
economic policies that were implemented in the unified Sri Lankan state were flawed 
and failed to address the different interests of the population.  This led to three 
important changes.  First, decisions on economic policies were taken from an 
increasingly centralised body.  This resulted in unequal and uneven patterns of 
regional development.  Economic growth was seen mainly in and around the capital 
of the country.  Second, the sweeping economic changes, especially those made 
during British colonial rule, had the effect of permanently changing the class 
composition in the country.  The introduction of the Indian estate, Tamil population, 
the emergence of the urban working class, and the preferential treatment of the 
British to the minority groups for civil administration jobs all created changes that 
left the traditional elite (stratified based on the traditional caste systems) feeling 
threatened.  The third, and final, observation is that the class-based struggles that 
ensued, following the flawed economic policies, and the changes in the class 
composition failed to materialise.  Instead, the multi-ethnic character of the society 
resulted in the focus being diverted, based on ethnic grounds.  This, coupled with the 
ideological movements that were taking place at the time, meant that the accessibility 
and availability of economic resources became a battle between the ethnic groups.  
These events reinforce Mann’s arguments, firstly, that class-based struggles, which 
he terms latent, fail to take off and attention is drawn to extensive struggles between 
segments (in the case of Sri Lanka, ethnic-based struggles).  Secondly, those 
economic and social classes are reorganised principally by structures of military or 
ideological power (the basis for Sri Lanka had been ideology). 
8.2.3 Military power 
Five military organisations have exercised military power in Sri Lanka since 
1815.  There are three features that can be observed in the study of military power in 
Sri Lanka based on Mann’s military network.  First, based on the military 
organisations of the LTTE and the JVP that operated in Sri Lanka, Mann’s separation 
of military power from political and/or state power is accepted.  Both of these groups 
in Sri Lanka were separate from the state and did not necessarily operate in a 
centralised manner.  Further, both of these organisations were engaged in armed 
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conflict aimed against the Sri Lankan state.  Second, analysis of the groups’ motives 
in using military power reveals that underlying class elements played a vital role.  
This shows that Mann’s argument regarding the ability of Western militaries to 
detach from class struggles is not applicable in the context of Sri Lanka.  In this 
respect, arguments from Tilly (1990) and Ayoob (1995, 2000, 2001) become 
important.  These theorists suggest that, in third world states, the failure of the 
development in political and social citizenship meant that these militaries were 
unable to avoid the full-scale military repressions in dealing with class struggles.  
Therefore, the third observation flows from the second observation above.  That is, 
as suggested by Mann, the geopolitical militarism is closely aligned with the state’s 
‘old regime core’.  The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, and the dismantling of the 
JVP military organisations in the late 1980s, suggest that the state’s ‘old regime 
core’, being the class or caste elite, continues to exercise this concentrated coercion 
even during peacetime by virtue of them possessing such power. 
8.2.4 Political power 
Looking at political power in Sri Lanka, based on Mann’s model, emphasises 
three principle features in relation to the formation of the Sri Lankan state and 
political power, different from the time of British colonial rule.  First, while Mann’s 
political power is territorial centralisation, the British unified the island with a central 
administration, and political power became increasingly centralised in the succeeding 
years.  So much so that the 1978 constitution vested excessive political power in the 
executive president, who also became the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
and the head of cabinet, possessing almost unlimited power.  Second, this centralised 
state also set up a permanent state elite in Sri Lanka, comprising primarily members 
of the traditional caste or class elites.  This is further brought to attention by the fact 
that the two main oppositional groups, the LTTE and the JVP, its leaders and 
members, comprised of persons of lower caste or class denomination in comparison 
to the members of the ruling parties and other political parties.  The third feature of 
state formation and political power is the close relationship between political power 
and transcendent, ideological power in Sri Lanka.  The state elite in Sri Lanka relied 
on this type of power to penetrate social life and gain the support of the masses.  
While Mann (1986, p.522) argues a negative correlation to exist between political 
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and transcendent, ideological power due to states fears of the possible ‘invisible 
connections’ of ideological movement, in the context of Sri Lanka, the state is shown 
to have embraced this form of power and it is seen to have been one of the its 
principle forms of crystallisation. 
8.3 Re-reading Sri Lankan History Using the IEMP Model 
The thesis has attempted to follow Mann’s theory of social power to reconsider 
the events that led to the conflict between Sri Lankan government forces and the 
LTTE.  In doing so, the development of the Sri Lankan state has been traced to 
determine the key forms of state crystallisation that influenced the direction of the 
state’s formation.  This section will bring together Mann’s four sources to present an 
account of the social development that led to the present Sri Lankan state and its 
internal conflict with the LTTE. 
The history of Sri Lankan social development was traced, based on the 
interrelations of the four sources of social power.  These four sources are only ideal 
types and, therefore, they are, in reality, interconnected with one another to vary 
degrees (Mann, 1986, p.17 & 523).  Mann (1986, p.28 & 518) also argued that, in the 
shaping of social life, one or more of these powers might have had more bearing than 
others in some periods.  This is shown in Table 5 below, where the predominant 
power source of the period is highlighted in the development of the Sri Lankan state. 
 
Table 5: Large-scale change in the development of the Sri Lankan state 
Power Source 
Social Change 
Ideological Economic Military Political 
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The discussion of the main form of social and state development will be based 
on the four periods identified in Table 5 above.  The first is from 1815 to 1948, 
which was marked by British colonial rule in Sri Lanka.  The second is from 1948 to 
1955, which is the initial period following the gaining of independence.  The third is 
from 1955 to 1970, when mass party politics became established, and the fourth and 
last, is from 1970 to 2009, which was the period highlighted by active military 
organisations. 
8.3.1 British colonial rule and capitalist economic policies 
The development of the Sri Lankan state since the time of the British colonial 
rule has been analysed.  This is because Western colonisation of the island, and 
especially the British colonial, rule, led to the unification of the island into one 
central, administrative, colonial state (Bandarage, 2009, p.29).  As Mann (1986, 
p.26-27) identifies, the state becomes the primary-organisation form of political 
power in society.  This meant that the power it gained through the organised and 
centralised administration had the effect of controlling and changing overall social 
interaction (Jacoby, 2004, p.168).  The formation of the state by the British, during 
this period, was greatly influenced by capitalist interests, and autonomy was gained 
through the highly centralised, administrative structure.  Initially, British occupation 
was purely strategic, as Britain wanted to avoid the possible transfer of control of the 
island from the Dutch to the French during the time of the Napoleonic wars.  Soon, 
however, the British discovered the commercial potential of the island.  From then 
on, the British governed purely by a capitalist ambition and the rulers introduced 
changes that went on to permanently change the course of development of the state 
and social life.  The economic changes that the British introduced to achieve their 
capitalist goals were extensive, and resulted in changing the whole economic and 
social structure of the island.  Jacoby (2004, p.174) states that centrally–planned, 
economic development was one of the methods by which those in power tried to 
bring the masses closer to state power.  This holds true in the Sri Lankan context, as 
the British rulers gave primacy to the new, highly–centralised plantation industry, 
ignoring the extremely segmented, traditional, agricultural industry.  The new 
plantation industry developed fast with the significant investment by virtue of it 
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being ‘authoritatively’ connected to the ideology of the times and the political 
infrastructure of the state. 
The industrial-capitalist development and the narrowing of the rural or urban 
divide that Mann (1993) identifies were not, however, achieved in Sri Lanka.  This 
was because the majority of the population remained vastly dependent on the local 
agricultural industry.  Further, the import of basic goods meant that local farmers 
could not compete with these products.  Therefore, the change to social life was 
extensive.  Independent to the social groups based on the traditional caste systems, 
capitalism generated extensive and political classes through the introduction of new 
sources of labour, the new urban workers, and the colonial divide-and-rule policies.  
The new classes were divided into bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, the working 
people, and the peasant class (Jayawardena, 1984, p.52-53, Mann, 1993, p.724).  
They were all based on access to economic resources, rather than from the traditional 
caste system that existed.  Although this new system allowed for the upward mobility 
of persons from the lower classes, the economic policies of the period exacerbated 
the divide between the classes.  Sri Lanka’s principle form of state crystallisation 
during British rule was the capitalist form.  Mann (1993, p.83) argues that, in states 
where the principle form of crystallisation is that of the capitalist form, class 
conflicts and segmental power actors would inevitably highlight these states.  
Although in Sri Lanka no class conflicts were observed on the surface at the time, in 
the subsequent periods class struggles and ethnic leaders are seen to emerge that, 
arguably, originated through these capitalist policies. 
8.3.2 Independence and united state elite 
The period following independence was one of unity between the different 
interest groups.  The leadership that inherited the governance of the state was 
essentially the members of the traditional elite from all communities (de Silva, 2005, 
p.609).  The traditional elites are those that were based on the caste systems (Sinhala, 
Tamil, and other) in Sri Lanka.  The traditional elites became more established over 
the years through political power structures and by their links to the state.  These 
elites eventually became established as the state elite exercising and/or having access 
to political power.  Similar to Mann’s analysis of Rome, where the state was obliged 
to utilise authoritative power to rule (Jacoby, 2004, p.168; Mann, 1993), the 
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traditional or state elites in Sri Lanka used ‘authoritative’ power to maintain support 
for their governance.  Mann (1986 & 1993; Jacoby, 2004, p.168) says that this type 
of governance led to the development of ‘multiple and cross-cutting social cleavages’ 
in western Europe.  However, these social cleavages were, again, not openly 
apparent in Sri Lanka as the D.S. Senanayake government publicised its form of 
nationalism to be intended to unite the state with the acceptance of all interest 
groups.  It is argued that, in reality, the interests were essentially elitist and that 
political power at the time ensured the maintenance of the disproportionate and 
segmentalised class structure, with elite interests taking the leading role.  This is 
despite the failure of any class struggles to take off. 
8.3.3 Ideology and the rise of mass party politics 
Elections in 1956 took a whole new turn with a wave of Sinhalese nationalism 
(Kearney, 1967, p.80).  The elections coincided with the 2,500th-year anniversary 
celebrations of Buddha’s birth.  This was a period in which the greater part of the 
population was facing extreme economic hardship.  The then opposition party saw 
the opportunity to gain the support of rural voters, the urban working class, and the 
lower middle class voters by playing to the strong Sinhalese nationalist sentiment 
that was prevalent at the time (de Silva, 2005, p.626).  Ideology offered itself as a 
means of penetrating social life and masking the underlying economic issues that 
were creating unease in Sri Lankan society at the time.  S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
offered to “change the colonial social order and bring social justice, dignity, and self-
respect for the Sinhalese Buddhism masses” (Bandarage, 2009, p.410), and changes 
to various legislative enactments emphasised the states new direction.  Mann (1993, 
p.730) describes this type of nationalistic development as ‘religious’ proto-
nationalism and highlights 16th-century Protestantism and the Catholic counter-
reformation that emerged during this period as a good example of this.  He suggests 
two elements that aided this type of nationalism.  First was the ability of the church 
to spread, through its control of the vernacular and the literary networks.  Second 
was the role of the church drumming up support for the state in geopolitical conflicts.  
This example is particularly important, as there exist parallels with the conditions in 
Sri Lanka. .  As discussed in Chapter 3, the issues of language (Sinhala) and religion 
(Buddhism) were intermeshed at the time.  The majority of the population, especially 
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those in the rural areas, were only literate in the Sinhala language.  The use of 
Sinhalese ancient chronicles in promoting this kind of nationalism allowed the state 
elite to gain the support of the masses by diverting economic issues to those of 
religion and ethnicity. 
Similarly, Mann (1993), in his account of Western development, says that 
ideological networks acted as the link between the state and its masses.313  The 
socialist, economic policies that were in place during this period in Sri Lanka also 
support the nationalist sentiments and the state’s aim of redistributing wealth (de 
Silva, 2005, p.639).  However, elitist control of political power remained unchanged 
and the inequality between the social groups widened.  Again, class conflicts never 
materialised.  Here, Mann’s (1986, p.216 & 1993, p.8) argument regarding the 
diminished importance of class struggles (which he terms ‘latent’), due to the more 
pronounced ‘extensive’ struggles between the segments, become relevant.  Mann 
points to ancient Greece, early Rome, and the present capitalist era as societies where 
class conflict could take off.  He argues that, in most instances, this is not possible as 
the dominant classes were too organised, while the others had no means to organise 
themselves.  Although neither class nor ethnic conflicts erupted during this period, 
ethnicity in Sri Lanka became the main draw card and it was utilised continuously to 
underpin class issues.  Analysis of labour movements also shows the focus being on 
ethnic grounds (Jayawardene, 1987; Roberts, 1974).  Therefore, it is seen that 
ethnicity was the factor that cut across the class boundary and the ideological power 
took centre stage in the development of society and state. 
8.3.4 Military organisations and military repression 
The unequal and uneven patterns of regional development remained the same 
(Bandarage, 2009, p.78) and the hardships faced by the masses were aggravated with 
the various economic policies of succeeding governments.  The economic 
liberalisation programmes that ensued in 1977 increased this uneven development 
and failed to engage the greater part of the population.  The Sinhalese nationalist 
movement in the previous period resulted in the rising of a strong, Tamil nationalist 
                                                
 
313 Jacoby (2004) argues that this type of linear account lacks comparative breadth and is weak by 
virtue of the “causal powers that were intrinsically different from existent military and economic 
linkages” (p.171).  In this aspect, Mann’s account is comparable in the context of Sri Lanka. 
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movement.  Meanwhile, political power continued to be increasingly centralised and, 
by then, was controlled excessively by the state elite.  The 1978 constitution 
weakened the parliament with the introduction of the executive presidency that 
transferred excessive power to one person, the president.  The population saw no 
change, irrespective of which political party came into power. 
The important development during this period was the two main military 
organisations (LTTE and the JVP) that were formed to challenge the Sri Lankan 
state.  Similarities of the two groups were that they both consisted of persons of 
lower classes, mostly educated and unemployed, living in rural areas, with the aim of 
challenging the state and the state elite.  The main difference was the ethnic groups 
that they both represented.  The JVP had strong roots to the Sinhalese Buddhist, 
nationalist ideals while the LTTE consisted of members from the Tamil minority.  In 
response, during this period, the Sri Lankan state and its security forces were seen to 
utilise military power to repress these movements that threatened their position in the 
state. 
Mann’s (1993, p.405) argument in relation to the European state and the 
decline in domestic repression cannot be applied to the Sri Lankan scenario.314  
Domestic repression was at its height during this period.  The cause of this seems to 
have been largely based on class struggles between the higher classes, comprising the 
state elite, and the lower classes (through the military organisations by the LTTE and 
the JVP).  In spite of the two major resurgent movements by the JVP in 1971 and 
1987 against the Sri Lankan state, the movement failed to overthrow the ruling 
government.  Arguably this was due to its lack of means to get organised, in 
comparison to the state and the state elite who were the dominant classes, according 
to Mann (Mann, 1986, p.216; 1993, p.8).  The struggles by the LTTE gained 
momentum in about the 1980s, with the group establishing itself as a strong force 
against the state.  While class issues have been one of its guiding drives for its 
inception, as the group progressed in its cause, it became defined as an ethnic-based 
struggle.  Again, this reinforces Mann’s argument (Mann, 1986, p.216; 1993, p.8) 
concerning the failure of class-based struggles to materialise.  The focus was on the 
extensive struggles between segments within each class.  As argued in Chapter 4, the 
                                                
 
314 Please see Chapter 6, section 6.2.6. 
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conflict between the LTTE and the state emerged as one based on ethnicity as the 
central element in the division of economic power in Sri Lanka. 
Mann (1988) defines militarism as “an attitude and a set of institution which 
regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” 
(p.124).  According to Mann, militarism was a method in which the state pursued its 
geopolitical objects and enhanced its methods of domestic repression.  This is true in 
both the context of the Sri Lankan state and its use of military power.315  While the 
state’s security forces were seen to represent the state’s ‘old regime core’, what 
becomes evident is the use of military repression in dealing with the internal, military 
organisations.  This highlights the inability of the Sri Lankan state to detach 
militaries from situations of (arguably) class struggles.316  The development of the 
state during this period was increasingly governed through militarism.  As Mann 
describes, this type of crystallisation helped the state by giving it a method to instil 
its beliefs and/or goals through military coercion (Mann, 1993, p.86). 
8.3.5 IEMP model and state crystallisation 
In this section, some of the key observations from the analysis of Sri Lanka 
have been superimposed onto Mann’s IEMP model (in Figure 1 above), keeping in 
mind Mann’s (1986) assertion that “human societies are inherently messy” and that 
this model will “only encompass some of their broadest contours” (p.30).  It is hoped 
that Figure 2 below, which illustrates some of the key facts in Mann’s model, will 
help in understanding some of the causal sequences that led to the current state 
formation and the conflict between the state and the LTTE. 
                                                
 
315 See Chapter 6 on Military Power for a detailed analysis of military power in Sri Lanka using 
Mann’s theory. 
316 See section 6.2.6 for further discussion. 
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Figure 2: IEMP model and Sri Lanka 
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The current shape of the Sri Lankan state was influenced primarily by three 
forms of crystallisation, namely, capitalist, militarist, and ideological.  Mann (1993, 
p.82) explains capitalist crystallisation through the introduction of privileged, private 
property rights and capital accumulation that was seen in Western states.  These 
aspects went on to be applied as an internal logic by the political actors almost 
everywhere in the West by 1860 (Mann, 1993, p.82).  In Sri Lanka, the capitalist 
crystallisation (which emerged at the time of British occupation), saw the power 
holders (for example, the traditional land owners) wanting to preserve their position 
by maintaining a strong link with the state.  The traditional elite in Sri Lanka 
eventually also became the state elite and the economic elite.  This allowed them to 
maintain control and influence the direction of the state and the economy to their 
benefit.  Mann (1993, p.82) asserts that capitalist crystallisation ultimately draws 
attention to class conflict.  This is especially evident in the context of Sri Lanka, as 
the rise of class disparity resulted in the formation of two groups, the JVP and the 
LTTE, which went on to challenge the Sri Lankan state and its state elite.  The 
capitalist ideology of the time increased the disparity between the different classes, 
thus leading to several significant disputes between the state and the two groups that 
were claiming to represent the interests of the lower classes.317 
The second form of crystallisation that influenced Sri Lanka was militarism.  
Mann (1993, p.86) argues that this form is related to domestic representative and 
national crystallisation.318  While the Sri Lankan state elite used domestic and 
military repression to protect their interests, the use of militarism by the LTTE and 
the JVP is, in a way, linked to their aim of gaining domestic representation of 
members of different classes (later, also ethnicities) in state affairs.  Compared to 
Western states, Sri Lankan political and social citizenship had not reached an equal 
state of development, which enabled its military to detach itself from class struggles.  
Therefore, militarism became important in Sri Lanka, as it was extensively used as a 
method of carrying out domestic repression to coerce the different groups in society 
                                                
 
317 Although the LTTE struggle took the form of an ethnic one, it is argued in this thesis that it was 
essentially a class conflict. 
318 Mann (1993, p.83) explains this as the contestation that began as a struggle against monarchical 
despotism.  This, therefore, refers to the participation of the classes, ethnicities, religious, and 
linguistic communities in the state. 
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into submission to one group’s belief.  This holds true of all three of the main 
military groups in Sri Lanka. 
Meanwhile, the third form of crystallisation is not what Mann defines as a 
higher-level form of crystallisation ‘at the extensive level’319 (Mann, 1993, p.81).  
The reason for this, he says, is due to the diminished importance of religions and 
ideologies over time, and them being reducible to the representative and national 
forms of crystallisation.  However, it is argued that, in the Sri Lankan state and 
community, the importance of ideology and religion, contrary to Mann’s 
assertions,320 have increased in importance.  Ideology and religion are seen to have 
had a massive influence in the formation of the state and also in the development of 
ethnic fractions within the Sri Lankan community.321 
8.4 Conclusion 
Mann’s (1986) theory is based on the intertwining and the relative importance 
of organisations based on four “overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of 
power” at any given time (p.1).  The four power networks are ideological, economic, 
military, and political.  Mann (1986, p.17, 523) argues that these sources are only 
ideal types and therefore, in reality, are interconnected with one another to varying 
degrees at any one time.  His model, which, in short, is described as “the IEMP 
model”, he says, will only generate “a general account of societies, their structure, 
and their history” (Mann, 1986, p.2).  This is because of the existence of a myriad 
goals by human beings and the IEMP model that will “only encompass some of their 
broadest contours” (Mann, 1986, p.30). 
Mann’s theory on social power and his IEMP model was applied in order to see 
whether this framework could give a better account of the Sri Lankan state 
development and the issues that contributed to the state’s internal conflict with the 
LTTE.  As Mann states, even after analysing five countries in the development of his 
theories, he could only come out with some broad suggestions about general patterns 
                                                
 
319 See Mann (1993, p.81) for a further discussion. 
320 This is primarily due to Mann’s theory being predominantly applicable for Western nation-states. 
321 See Chapter 4 on the analysis of ideological power in Sri Lanka for a further discussion of the 
importance of ideology in the development of the state and society. 
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of state formation (Mann, 1993, p.87).  With that in mind, this thesis makes the 
following broad suggestions while rejecting the previous single-factor theories on Sri 
Lankan state formation and social change.  These are as follows: 
(a) That three principle forms of crystallisations influenced the development of the 
current Sri Lankan state.  These were capitalist, militarist, and ideological 
forms of crystallisations. 
(b) The capitalist policies that were introduced resulted in the formation of new 
classes and increased disparity between classes. 
(c) Militarism was used extensively by the state and other military organisations to 
instil each group’s beliefs and to coerce others. 
(d) Ideology became an important form in the Sri Lankan state and society, as it 
was used to penetrate the social life and to gain the support of the masses.  It 
also succeeded in turning, what was essentially, a class-based struggle (as 
argued in this thesis) into an ethnic struggle (the most popular explanation). 
The capitalist, economic policies introduced during the British colonial rule 
were an important factor that influenced the direction of the state and social group 
formation in Sri Lanka.  While economic power rested largely in the hands of the 
government and the ruling parties, comprising of the traditional elite and the higher 
classes, the policy changes over the years resulted in the continued alienation of 
individuals not part of the ruling party.  This exacerbated the class divide.  It took 
some decades for this to manifest in the form of a mass social uprising.  That came 
about at the beginning of 1970 in the form of an anti-establishment movement by the 
JVP. 
The anti-establishment movements by the JVP and, subsequently, the LTTE 
indicate that the issue was not solely an ethnic one (as popularly defined), but had its 
roots in an economic issue.  From the early 1970s onwards, an increase in domestic 
repression resulted from this.  To achieve their goals, all three major military elites 
used military repression to coerce and persuade other groups and individuals during 
this period.  Unlike in the West, the Sri Lankan military failed to detach itself from 
class struggles.  Militarism, therefore, became an important form of crystallisation in 
the development of the state.  The state’s continued centralised administration meant 
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that state power, economic power, and military power rested with a few individuals 
(the state elite), who were essentially preserving the interests of the ‘state’s old 
regime core’. 
Further supporting Mann’s view that the extensive struggles between segments 
were more pronounced than class-based struggles, Bandarage (2009) states that the 
Tamil elite “drew attention away from the massive social and economic problems 
facing the young in all of the Sri Lankan communities” (p.53).  The emergence of 
ethnicity as a central element in the division of economic power began with a focus 
on ideology.  The mass party politics that were encouraged by the political elite to 
gain power from about 1956 onwards led to ideology becoming paramount in the 
development of the state and society.  Ideology played a pivotal role in promoting a 
strong Sinhalese and Tamil group, but, equally, it created an ethnically-divided 
society. 
In conclusion, Mann’s model offers a fertile base to analyse and understand the 
historical events in Sri Lanka.  It allowed understanding state formation and the 
conflict between the state and the LTTE by analysing sometimes overlapping, power 
networks.  This meant that both state formation and the origins of the conflict could 
be better understood in an holistic manner, rather than a narrow one. 
 
Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
186  Chapter 9 Conclusion 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION 
This thesis used the theoretical framework of Michael Mann’s four sources of 
social power, together with primary and secondary historical sources, to explore the 
extent to which each of these power sources and their interconnections has had an 
influence on the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
To conclude, this chapter will look at how useful Mann’s model was in the 
analysis, whether it rectified and filled the lacuna identified from previous 
scholarships, and the extent to which additional, theoretical perspectives could 
enhance the usefulness of Mann’s model.  Finally, it will make recommendations for 
future research. 
9.1 Assessing the Usefulness of Michael Mann’s Model 
This thesis demonstrated the usefulness of Mann’s theory and methodology 
threefold.  First, the thesis demonstrated the analytical utility of Mann’s model to 
better understand state formation and the development of society.  Second, it showed 
the ability to analyse social change in a multifaceted manner.  Finally, Mann’s model 
allowed this research to analyse the conflict in two steps: step one, to look at the 
historical events, using the four power sources as filters, to evaluate the past events; 
and step two, to evaluate the combined effect of the findings of each power source to 
better understand the effect it had on social change. 
9.1.1 Better understand state formation and development of society 
The application of Michael Mann’s framework on social power and state 
formation provided a unique insight into the influences that drove the formation of 
the Sri Lankan state since colonial rule.  His model showed some of the different 
influences, which he terms as ‘forms of crystallisation’, that led to the formation of 
the Sri Lankan state as we know it today. 
As observed from Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 of this thesis, the formation of the 
Sri Lankan state was the result of at least two major forms of crystallisation.  First 
was the capitalist form, which was introduced by British colonial rulers.  The 
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capitalist ideology is seen to have swept through all aspects of economic, political, 
and social life, creating and enhancing class disparity.  The second form, ideology, 
allowed the state to be swept along by competing belief systems, especially those 
promulgated by the two main ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils.  It is 
argued in this thesis that the use of ideology was prompted by the state and political 
elite, who were looking to preserve their hold on state and economic power. 
Mann (1993, p.88) highlighted that each of these forms of crystallisation is a 
blend of multiple civil interests, which is why he refers to the state as polymorphous.  
Through the use of Mann’s model, this thesis demonstrated how these two forms of 
crystallisation were the higher forms of crystallisation in the Sri Lankan context, 
which influenced the formation of the Sri Lankan state and classes. 
9.1.2 Multifaceted approach to understanding social change 
Mann’s (1986, p.523) framework provides a robust theoretical model that can 
accommodate the influences of different power sources at varying degrees and at 
various times.  The researcher was mindful of the importance of each power source, 
irrespective of the one that seemly took precedence at a certain point in time.  
Further, Mann’s model endorsed that, in reality, each of the power sources was a 
combination of one another, rather than existing as ideal types.  In addition, Mann 
(1986) argued that the myriad human goals and the messiness of societies meant that 
any models will “only encompass some of their broadest contours” (p.30). 
This meant that, in the analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka, this thesis was able 
to identify some important and overlooked aspects of the conflict.  Instead of 
categorising the conflict as broadly ethnic or even political, this thesis demonstrated 
the multifaceted nature of the conflict.  The application of the model showed the 
interconnection of the following factors, which influenced the conflict in Sri 
Lanka322: 
(a) the capitalist interests that shaped economic policies and centralisation of state 
power; 
                                                
 
322 Again taking in to account that this list is not an exhaustive one and that the researcher is mindful 
that many more aspects have or may have come into play. 
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(b) the state elite and their connection with the traditional elite, and their goals; 
(c) the formation of new classes since British colonial rule; 
(d) the increased disparity between the classes that resulted from new economic 
policies; 
(e) the political elite and the use of ideology to access the masses and to gain 
political power; and 
(f) the state’s use of military repression to preserve its interests. 
These are the major findings based on the analysis in Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 
(inclusive) above.  Mann’s model allowed this research to look at the historical event 
from a new point of view, by looking at some of the different elements that 
influenced each event.  In doing so, this thesis was able to appreciate the 
interconnections of the events and to understand the conflict as being multi-causal.  
This guides and connects to the final benefit of Mann’s model. 
9.1.3 Four filters to evaluate historical data 
The majority of the previous scholarships explained the conflict using a mono-
causal explanation.  This is where Michael Mann’s work becomes invaluable, as his 
network of social power allows the filtering of historical data through four filters (as 
‘ideal types’323) before looking at their interconnections.  This enabled an analysis of 
the conflict taking into consideration the different historical events by evaluating, not 
only their historical significance at the time, but also the influence of the power 
sources and their combined effect.  For example, the majority of previous studies 
blamed the mass party politics that was promoted in the 1955s onwards on the 
Buddha Jayanthi celebrations and the Sinhalese nationalism movement.  However, 
this research saw the deeper complexity of this type of politics, which was influenced 
by a whole host of events, including the economic background at the time, the failure 
of economic policies, the decline in export income due to the world war, and 
increased disparity and unrest between the classes.  Added to this is the aspiration of 
the political elite, which gives us a different understanding of the events. 
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Analysing the Sri Lankan Conflict Using Michael Mann’s Four-Dimensional Model of Social Power 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 189 
Mann’s model gives four filters to understand historical events, before looking 
at their interrelated effects.  His theory was adaptable to the Sri Lankan context, 
although his two-volume book on the sources of social power deals primarily with 
the Western world. 
9.2 Situating the Thesis in the Context of Existing Scholarships 
The vast quantity of literature on the conflict has only focused on certain 
aspects of the conflict.  While the majority of these scholarships define the conflict as 
being based on ethnic, political, or economic issues, this thesis shows the difficulty 
in giving a single-factor explanation.324  Although this research does not deny some 
of the findings of existing literature, it finds fault in the mono-causal explanation of 
the conflict. 
Looking at the large amount of scholarly literature describing the conflict as an 
ethnic one, based on either an age-old rivalry or one that was manifested through 
colonial rule (De Silva, 1986; Otis, 1988; Imtiyas & Stavis, 2008), this thesis 
disputed the idea that ethnicity can be understood as a sufficient cause of the conflict.  
In Chapter 4, the thesis considered the Sinhalese, nationalist movements, the cultural 
competitiveness of the two ethnic groups, and British colonial policies in analysing 
the ideological power and the development of ethnic fractions in the Sri Lankan 
community.  In doing so, although, on the surface, it revealed that an ethnically-
divided society did manifest through the use of ideology, this thesis argued that this 
seeming ethnic manifestation of the conflict was actually the result of a combination 
of interests rooted also in two of the other power sources, economic power (Chapter 
5) and political power (Chapter 7).  In line with Mann’s (Mann, 1986, p.216; 1993, 
p.8) assertion that class struggles are overshadowed by ‘segmental’325 struggles, in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, it is argued that ethnicity became the central element that 
succeeded in overriding the class divisions and struggles.  Chapter 7 highlighted the 
centralisation of political power and the state elite’s use of ideology to ‘penetrate 
social life’.  The importance of ethnic divisions for the benefit of the state elite is 
                                                
 
324 Please see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict. 
325 In the context of Sri Lanka, the segment that crossed class boundaries was the division based on 
ethnicity.  Mann (1993, p.8) defines segment as a ‘class fraction’, or consisting of members drawn 
from several classes.  Please refer further to Chapter 5. 
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emphasised through the majoritarian politics that developed shortly after 
independence.  This thesis illustrated the need to consider a multitude of 
complementary factors.  Therefore, describing the conflict as solely an ethnic one, 
without considering the various other factors that influenced the ethnic dimension of 
the conflict, was argued by this thesis to be a superficial understanding of the 
conflict. 
The second prevalent explanation of the conflict with other scholarships was 
the political interests of the Tamil and Sinhalese elite and the use of the majoritarian 
parliamentary structure (Otis, 1988; Manogram, 1987; Ram, 1989; Perera, 1997; 
Shastri, 2009).  These scholars blamed the conflict on the rise of an ethno-political 
system.  While this literature has broadened the understanding of the conflict from 
one primarily based on ethnic dimensions, to one considering the underlying interests 
of the political elite, it has failed to highlight the economic and military dimensions 
of the conflict.  The politicisation of the ethnic differences has been a major feature 
that created the divisions in Sri Lankan society, however as argued already, there has 
been a multitude of reasons that led to the outbreak of the conflict, and explaining it 
without considering all of its influences makes it deficient.  For example, the gross 
failure to consider the class element of the conflict, and the similarity of the conflict 
to the JVP uprising against the government means that these previous scholarships 
failed to consider all of the relevant dynamics of the conflict. 
This thesis has a closer affiliation to the literature that explains the conflict as 
being based on economic factors (for example, Samaranayake (1997), Jayasuriya 
(2000), Bandarage (2009) and Gamage (2009)).  The identification of uneven 
distribution of social and economic benefits and the growth of Tamil militancy and 
the JVP by this literature gives a rational approach, compared to that of the popular 
ethnic or ethno-political descriptions of the conflict.  While this thesis identifies with 
an economic explanation of the conflict, equally it has sought to consider the other 
elements (whether ethnic, political, military, colonial, or other), as well as their 
interconnections with these economic explanations.  Agreeing with Bandarage’s 
(2009) assertion that: 
to grasp the complexity of the separatist conflict in Sri Lanka it is necessary to 
move beyond psychologically based interpretations confined to ideology and 
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consciousness and narrow views which see it as either a terrorist or an ethnic 
problem.  It is necessary to examine the complex intersection of cultural and 
political-economic forces (p.28). 
Bandarage (2009), in her book “The Separatist conflict in Sri Lanka: 
Terrorism, ethnicity, political economy”, analyses the conflict utilising a broader 
outlook than most other existing literature.  Like Bandarage, this thesis has followed 
the exploration of the multitude of factors that were prevalent in contributing to the 
ultimate conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state.  However, by way of 
contrast with other studies, including Bandarage’s work, the main contribution of this 
thesis is the use of a well-defined and systematic framework and sociological model 
to better understand the conflict and its origins. 
This thesis has dealt with the shortcomings of the existing scholarly literature 
on the Sri Lankan conflict by using Michael Mann’s model as the framework to 
highlight the multi-causal sources of social power that resulted in the conflict.  
Analysing the large amount of literature on the conflict, this research showed the 
different aspects of the conflict by studying them based on Mann’s four sources of 
power.  These were dealt with in Chapter 4 to Chapter 8, inclusive, above.  
Thereafter, the multi-causal effect was highlighted by superimposing each of these 
four ideal types into Mann’s IEMP model in Chapter 9.  This enabled the thesis to 
highlight the ethnic, ethno-political, and economic contributions of the conflict 
individually, before explaining the Sri Lankan conflict utilising all of the 
contributory factors. 
9.3 Improving the Model and Further Research Recommendations 
Mann’s model was proved to be an invaluable framework in the analysis of the 
Sri Lankan conflict.  While this thesis was able to utilise his framework, which is 
predominantly targeted at understanding the development of Western states, a slight 
amendment is suggested here that will enable the application of Mann's theory to 
analyse social change and development of third world states.  Further, based on an 
omission in his framework highlighted by Mann himself, this thesis makes a 
suggestion for future research to utilise gender-related issues. 
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One of the observations of this thesis, was the inapplicability of Mann’s 
argument of the separation of domestic militarism from class struggles in the Sri 
Lankan context.326  Here, views by Tilly (1990) and Ayoob (1995; 2001; 2005) 
became important.  It may be prudent to include some of the external variables that 
Ayoob (2002, p.37) identifies as influencing a third world state and the relatively 
large number of intrastate conflicts.  The factors that Ayoob (1995; 2001; 2005) 
highlighted include: the lack of adequate time for state building; the near 
impossibility of failed states actually officially failing and being replaced by some 
other recognised political arrangement; the highly disruptive colonial inheritance; 
ethnic fissures leading to frequent attempts at secession; demands for social justice at 
an early stage in state-making; and the unrepresentative and authoritarian character 
of many regimes in developing states.  While Mann’s (1993, p.405) assertion 
regarding the separation of class struggles in 20th century Western states was not 
applicable in the context of Sri Lanka, this did not affect the utility of his overall 
model.  This thesis was able to utilise Tilly (1990) and Ayoob (1995, 2001 & 2005) 
to explain the inapplicability of Mann’s assertion in the context of Sri Lanka. 
Future research is recommended on the contribution of gender-related issues 
and the conflict in Sri Lanka.  This line of research is suggested based on the large 
number of women fighters that were engaged by the LTTE organisation in its fight 
against the Sri Lankan government.  This aspect of the conflict has not been 
addressed by this thesis and may shed some new insight on the conflict.  Mann 
(1986), himself, states that his concepts would not have any “relevance to 99 percent 
of humanity’s life span to date” (p.34).  While concentrating on the physiology of 
power, he admittedly omits from his theory what he refers as the ‘intimate’ aspects of 
life and/or gender relations (1986, p.34).  Although gender-related issues are 
important, particularly to shed some insight into the LTTE and the attraction that 
Tamil women saw in the organisation, this avenue was not pursued because the 
researcher did not feel that it would have explained the ‘origin’ of the conflict. 
A further line of research flows from two much anticipated publications by 
Mann.  These are volumes 3 and 4 of his work on The Sources of Social Power.  
Volume 3, published in November 2012, is entitled Global Empires and Revolution, 
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1890 - 1945, and volume 4, due to be published in January 2013, is entitled 
Globalisation, 1945 - 2011.  Given the deadline for handing in this thesis, 
unfortunately, it was not possible to review these publications prior to finalising this 
work.  However, they represent exciting lines of research for the future.   
In conclusion, Mann’s model offers a superior framework to analyse state 
development and social change, including conflicts and/or struggles.  The application 
of his model in the context of Sri Lanka has facilitated an understanding of the 
multifaceted elements that contributed to the conflict and the interconnections 
between some of these elements.  Building upon Mann’s model utilising Tilly (1990) 
and Ayoob (1995; 2001; 2005) enabled the application of his model to analyse non-
Western, third world state development and social change.  This thesis highlights the 
utility of Mann’s framework in the study of state formation and the conflict in Sri 
Lanka.  Through the use of a sociological model and well-organised framework, this 
thesis has looked at the Sri Lankan conflict in a unique and original way that could 
equally be followed in other postcolonial studies of state formation and conflict. 
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